dorfteich/apps/web/e2e/README.md
Claude Opus 4.8 ae8cdd0e1e
All checks were successful
CD / Build and push images (push) Successful in 3m13s
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (push) Successful in 2m36s
CI / Auth e2e pack (push) Successful in 3m38s
CI / Build container images (push) Has been skipped
CD / Deploy to Test (push) Successful in 8s
CD / Smoke tests against Test (push) Successful in 1m12s
CD / Promote to Int (push) Successful in 11s
Add cross-feature permission hardening matrix (#60)
Permissions cut across every M2–M5 feature; this pack pins the security-relevant
subject × surface combinations so a weakened guard is caught.

- `apps/web/e2e/permission-matrix.spec.ts`: an API-level (the UI adds nothing
  over the resolved status code) parameterized suite over the subjects — site
  admin, pond admin/owner, editor, the same editor label-restricted by a
  `secret`-label deny, reader, public (anonymous), and the foreign user (new
  `fixture-outsider`, a member of nothing) — across the surfaces: page read,
  edit (collab-token `rw`/`ro`), sidebar list, search, versions, media, and the
  public HTML endpoint. It enforces the 404-vs-403 policy: an unauthorized read
  is 404 (existence hidden), an unauthorized write on something readable is 403.
- wired into the pipeline as its own CI step; documented in
  `apps/web/e2e/README.md` (with the subject/surface list) so later features
  extend the matrix rather than writing bespoke permission tests.
- seeded-regression check (acceptance criterion): temporarily forcing the
  collab-token to always `rw` (ignoring write permission) makes the pack go red
  on the "reader gets `ro`" and public/foreign cells — verified locally, then
  reverted. Runs in ~1 s (well under the 10-minute budget).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 00:43:16 +02:00

112 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

# End-to-end tests
Playwright suites, most local-only — three run in CI/CD:
| Suite | Target | Where it runs |
| ----------------- | --------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `smoke.spec.ts` | any deployed stage | CD pipeline against `https://test.dorfteich.cloud` after every deploy |
| `auth.spec.ts` | full local stack **with Mailpit** | CI job `auth-e2e` on every PR/push; locally against the dev stack |
| `content.spec.ts` | full local stack | same CI job `auth-e2e` (a second step), right after the auth pack |
| everything else | full local stack | locally only — `editor`/`sidebar`/`image`/`link`/`markdown`/`trash`.spec.ts |
`content.spec.ts` is the M2 content regression pack (issue #32): page
lifecycle, editor basics, image paste, Markdown round-trip, and trash —
enough to catch a regression across the whole content model without
re-running every edge case the feature-specific packs above already cover.
Its Markdown round-trip test is a real regression pin, not just a smoke
check: it compares the seeded "Every Element" fixture page's exported
Markdown byte-for-byte against the checked-in `content-page.md` (see
"Content fixtures" below) — any schema/serializer change that alters how a
node round-trips fails it, once the seed has re-run against the changed
code (build → migrate → seed → test, exactly CI's order).
## Running locally
```sh
# 1. Stack: database + Mailpit, api (3001), web dev server (5173)
docker compose -f deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml -f deploy/compose/compose.dev.yml up -d db mailpit
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://dorfteich:dorfteich@localhost:5434/dorfteich pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api db:seed
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://dorfteich:dorfteich@localhost:5434/dorfteich PORT=3001 pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api start:dev &
pnpm --filter @dorfteich/web dev &
# 2. Tests
E2E_BASE_URL=http://localhost:5173 E2E_MAILPIT_URL=http://localhost:8025 pnpm --filter @dorfteich/web e2e
```
`auth.spec.ts` skips itself when `E2E_MAILPIT_URL` is unset, so the CD
smoke run never trips over it.
## Fixture matrix
Seeded by `pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api db:seed` (idempotent — re-running
never duplicates). Shared password: `fixture passwort 123`. Fixtures exist
only on dev machines and disposable CI/Test databases.
| Username | State | Purpose |
| ------------------ | ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `fixture-admin` | active, Site Admin | admin UI/permissions cases |
| `fixture-user` | active | regular journeys, settings, sessions |
| `fixture-editor` | active | second regular account for the collab-permissions pack (reader/editor of another's pond) |
| `fixture-viewer` | active | signed-in non-member for `authenticated`/`public` access-rule cases (issue #55) |
| `fixture-outsider` | active | the "foreign user" of the permission matrix — member of nothing (issue #60) |
| `fixture-pending` | e-mail not verified | unverified-login cases |
## Permission matrix (`permission-matrix.spec.ts`, issue #60)
The cross-feature permission hardening pack pins the security-relevant
**subject × surface** combinations against regressions. It is API-level (the
UI adds nothing over the resolved status code) and enforces the 404-vs-403
policy: an unauthorized _read_ is 404 (existence hidden), an unauthorized
_write_ on something readable is 403.
- **Subjects:** site admin (`fixture-admin`), pond admin / owner
(`fixture-user`), editor (`fixture-editor`), the same editor _label-restricted_
by a `secret`-label deny, reader (`fixture-viewer`), public (anonymous), and
the foreign user (`fixture-outsider`, a member of nothing).
- **Surfaces:** page read, edit (collab-token `rw`/`ro`), sidebar list, search,
versions (history = write), media, and the public HTML endpoint.
- **Extending it:** a new permission-touching feature adds a surface here (one
`expect` row per subject) rather than a bespoke test, so the matrix stays the
one place the policy is pinned. A weakened guard is caught here — verified by
temporarily loosening a route decorator and watching the pack go red.
## Content fixtures
`db:seed` also creates a **shared** pond `content-fixtures` (owned by
`fixture-user`) with two pages, for the content regression pack and manual
QA:
- **Every Element** (`every-element`) — every editor schema node and mark
(issue #24: headings 14, all list types, table, blockquote, code block,
horizontal rule, hard break, and all five marks). Loaded from the
checked-in `apps/api/prisma/fixtures/content-page.yjs`, a Yjs snapshot
generated from the human-readable `content-page.md` next to it —
`content-page.md` is the thing to read or edit; the `.yjs` file is a
build artifact of it, not source.
- **Fixture Image** (`fixture-image`) — one real, servable uploaded image
(the placeholder `fileId` inside the Markdown fixture above is not a
real attachment; this page's image is).
Regenerating after editing `content-page.md`:
```sh
pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api fixtures:regenerate
```
This is deterministic — re-running without editing the Markdown produces a
byte-identical `.yjs` file (the script pins the Yjs document's `clientID`,
which is otherwise randomized per `Y.Doc` instance) — and it refuses to
write a snapshot that isn't a fixed point of the Markdown round-trip
(`docToMarkdown(markdownToDoc(x)) === x`), so a stale fixture can't get
checked in silently.
## Conventions
- New feature packs get their own `<feature>.spec.ts` next to these and
extend the fixture matrix here (permission matrix arrives with M5,
issue #60).
- Use `contextForUser()` from `helpers.ts` for signed-in tests — it logs
in through the api and hands you a browser context with the session
cookie, no UI login repetition.
- Flaky tests are defects (ADR 0014): fix or quarantine immediately.