dorfteich/apps/web/e2e/README.md
Claude Opus 4.8 ae8cdd0e1e
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Add cross-feature permission hardening matrix (#60)
Permissions cut across every M2–M5 feature; this pack pins the security-relevant
subject × surface combinations so a weakened guard is caught.

- `apps/web/e2e/permission-matrix.spec.ts`: an API-level (the UI adds nothing
  over the resolved status code) parameterized suite over the subjects — site
  admin, pond admin/owner, editor, the same editor label-restricted by a
  `secret`-label deny, reader, public (anonymous), and the foreign user (new
  `fixture-outsider`, a member of nothing) — across the surfaces: page read,
  edit (collab-token `rw`/`ro`), sidebar list, search, versions, media, and the
  public HTML endpoint. It enforces the 404-vs-403 policy: an unauthorized read
  is 404 (existence hidden), an unauthorized write on something readable is 403.
- wired into the pipeline as its own CI step; documented in
  `apps/web/e2e/README.md` (with the subject/surface list) so later features
  extend the matrix rather than writing bespoke permission tests.
- seeded-regression check (acceptance criterion): temporarily forcing the
  collab-token to always `rw` (ignoring write permission) makes the pack go red
  on the "reader gets `ro`" and public/foreign cells — verified locally, then
  reverted. Runs in ~1 s (well under the 10-minute budget).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 00:43:16 +02:00

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End-to-end tests

Playwright suites, most local-only — three run in CI/CD:

Suite Target Where it runs
smoke.spec.ts any deployed stage CD pipeline against https://test.dorfteich.cloud after every deploy
auth.spec.ts full local stack with Mailpit CI job auth-e2e on every PR/push; locally against the dev stack
content.spec.ts full local stack same CI job auth-e2e (a second step), right after the auth pack
everything else full local stack locally only — editor/sidebar/image/link/markdown/trash.spec.ts

content.spec.ts is the M2 content regression pack (issue #32): page lifecycle, editor basics, image paste, Markdown round-trip, and trash — enough to catch a regression across the whole content model without re-running every edge case the feature-specific packs above already cover. Its Markdown round-trip test is a real regression pin, not just a smoke check: it compares the seeded "Every Element" fixture page's exported Markdown byte-for-byte against the checked-in content-page.md (see "Content fixtures" below) — any schema/serializer change that alters how a node round-trips fails it, once the seed has re-run against the changed code (build → migrate → seed → test, exactly CI's order).

Running locally

# 1. Stack: database + Mailpit, api (3001), web dev server (5173)
docker compose -f deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml -f deploy/compose/compose.dev.yml up -d db mailpit
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://dorfteich:dorfteich@localhost:5434/dorfteich pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api db:seed
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://dorfteich:dorfteich@localhost:5434/dorfteich PORT=3001 pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api start:dev &
pnpm --filter @dorfteich/web dev &

# 2. Tests
E2E_BASE_URL=http://localhost:5173 E2E_MAILPIT_URL=http://localhost:8025 pnpm --filter @dorfteich/web e2e

auth.spec.ts skips itself when E2E_MAILPIT_URL is unset, so the CD smoke run never trips over it.

Fixture matrix

Seeded by pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api db:seed (idempotent — re-running never duplicates). Shared password: fixture passwort 123. Fixtures exist only on dev machines and disposable CI/Test databases.

Username State Purpose
fixture-admin active, Site Admin admin UI/permissions cases
fixture-user active regular journeys, settings, sessions
fixture-editor active second regular account for the collab-permissions pack (reader/editor of another's pond)
fixture-viewer active signed-in non-member for authenticated/public access-rule cases (issue #55)
fixture-outsider active the "foreign user" of the permission matrix — member of nothing (issue #60)
fixture-pending e-mail not verified unverified-login cases

Permission matrix (permission-matrix.spec.ts, issue #60)

The cross-feature permission hardening pack pins the security-relevant subject × surface combinations against regressions. It is API-level (the UI adds nothing over the resolved status code) and enforces the 404-vs-403 policy: an unauthorized read is 404 (existence hidden), an unauthorized write on something readable is 403.

  • Subjects: site admin (fixture-admin), pond admin / owner (fixture-user), editor (fixture-editor), the same editor label-restricted by a secret-label deny, reader (fixture-viewer), public (anonymous), and the foreign user (fixture-outsider, a member of nothing).
  • Surfaces: page read, edit (collab-token rw/ro), sidebar list, search, versions (history = write), media, and the public HTML endpoint.
  • Extending it: a new permission-touching feature adds a surface here (one expect row per subject) rather than a bespoke test, so the matrix stays the one place the policy is pinned. A weakened guard is caught here — verified by temporarily loosening a route decorator and watching the pack go red.

Content fixtures

db:seed also creates a shared pond content-fixtures (owned by fixture-user) with two pages, for the content regression pack and manual QA:

  • Every Element (every-element) — every editor schema node and mark (issue #24: headings 14, all list types, table, blockquote, code block, horizontal rule, hard break, and all five marks). Loaded from the checked-in apps/api/prisma/fixtures/content-page.yjs, a Yjs snapshot generated from the human-readable content-page.md next to it — content-page.md is the thing to read or edit; the .yjs file is a build artifact of it, not source.
  • Fixture Image (fixture-image) — one real, servable uploaded image (the placeholder fileId inside the Markdown fixture above is not a real attachment; this page's image is).

Regenerating after editing content-page.md:

pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api fixtures:regenerate

This is deterministic — re-running without editing the Markdown produces a byte-identical .yjs file (the script pins the Yjs document's clientID, which is otherwise randomized per Y.Doc instance) — and it refuses to write a snapshot that isn't a fixed point of the Markdown round-trip (docToMarkdown(markdownToDoc(x)) === x), so a stale fixture can't get checked in silently.

Conventions

  • New feature packs get their own <feature>.spec.ts next to these and extend the fixture matrix here (permission matrix arrives with M5, issue #60).
  • Use contextForUser() from helpers.ts for signed-in tests — it logs in through the api and hands you a browser context with the session cookie, no UI login repetition.
  • Flaky tests are defects (ADR 0014): fix or quarantine immediately.