Permissions cut across every M2–M5 feature; this pack pins the security-relevant subject × surface combinations so a weakened guard is caught. - `apps/web/e2e/permission-matrix.spec.ts`: an API-level (the UI adds nothing over the resolved status code) parameterized suite over the subjects — site admin, pond admin/owner, editor, the same editor label-restricted by a `secret`-label deny, reader, public (anonymous), and the foreign user (new `fixture-outsider`, a member of nothing) — across the surfaces: page read, edit (collab-token `rw`/`ro`), sidebar list, search, versions, media, and the public HTML endpoint. It enforces the 404-vs-403 policy: an unauthorized read is 404 (existence hidden), an unauthorized write on something readable is 403. - wired into the pipeline as its own CI step; documented in `apps/web/e2e/README.md` (with the subject/surface list) so later features extend the matrix rather than writing bespoke permission tests. - seeded-regression check (acceptance criterion): temporarily forcing the collab-token to always `rw` (ignoring write permission) makes the pack go red on the "reader gets `ro`" and public/foreign cells — verified locally, then reverted. Runs in ~1 s (well under the 10-minute budget). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
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End-to-end tests
Playwright suites, most local-only — three run in CI/CD:
| Suite | Target | Where it runs |
|---|---|---|
smoke.spec.ts |
any deployed stage | CD pipeline against https://test.dorfteich.cloud after every deploy |
auth.spec.ts |
full local stack with Mailpit | CI job auth-e2e on every PR/push; locally against the dev stack |
content.spec.ts |
full local stack | same CI job auth-e2e (a second step), right after the auth pack |
| everything else | full local stack | locally only — editor/sidebar/image/link/markdown/trash.spec.ts |
content.spec.ts is the M2 content regression pack (issue #32): page
lifecycle, editor basics, image paste, Markdown round-trip, and trash —
enough to catch a regression across the whole content model without
re-running every edge case the feature-specific packs above already cover.
Its Markdown round-trip test is a real regression pin, not just a smoke
check: it compares the seeded "Every Element" fixture page's exported
Markdown byte-for-byte against the checked-in content-page.md (see
"Content fixtures" below) — any schema/serializer change that alters how a
node round-trips fails it, once the seed has re-run against the changed
code (build → migrate → seed → test, exactly CI's order).
Running locally
# 1. Stack: database + Mailpit, api (3001), web dev server (5173)
docker compose -f deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml -f deploy/compose/compose.dev.yml up -d db mailpit
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://dorfteich:dorfteich@localhost:5434/dorfteich pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api db:seed
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://dorfteich:dorfteich@localhost:5434/dorfteich PORT=3001 pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api start:dev &
pnpm --filter @dorfteich/web dev &
# 2. Tests
E2E_BASE_URL=http://localhost:5173 E2E_MAILPIT_URL=http://localhost:8025 pnpm --filter @dorfteich/web e2e
auth.spec.ts skips itself when E2E_MAILPIT_URL is unset, so the CD
smoke run never trips over it.
Fixture matrix
Seeded by pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api db:seed (idempotent — re-running
never duplicates). Shared password: fixture passwort 123. Fixtures exist
only on dev machines and disposable CI/Test databases.
| Username | State | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
fixture-admin |
active, Site Admin | admin UI/permissions cases |
fixture-user |
active | regular journeys, settings, sessions |
fixture-editor |
active | second regular account for the collab-permissions pack (reader/editor of another's pond) |
fixture-viewer |
active | signed-in non-member for authenticated/public access-rule cases (issue #55) |
fixture-outsider |
active | the "foreign user" of the permission matrix — member of nothing (issue #60) |
fixture-pending |
e-mail not verified | unverified-login cases |
Permission matrix (permission-matrix.spec.ts, issue #60)
The cross-feature permission hardening pack pins the security-relevant subject × surface combinations against regressions. It is API-level (the UI adds nothing over the resolved status code) and enforces the 404-vs-403 policy: an unauthorized read is 404 (existence hidden), an unauthorized write on something readable is 403.
- Subjects: site admin (
fixture-admin), pond admin / owner (fixture-user), editor (fixture-editor), the same editor label-restricted by asecret-label deny, reader (fixture-viewer), public (anonymous), and the foreign user (fixture-outsider, a member of nothing). - Surfaces: page read, edit (collab-token
rw/ro), sidebar list, search, versions (history = write), media, and the public HTML endpoint. - Extending it: a new permission-touching feature adds a surface here (one
expectrow per subject) rather than a bespoke test, so the matrix stays the one place the policy is pinned. A weakened guard is caught here — verified by temporarily loosening a route decorator and watching the pack go red.
Content fixtures
db:seed also creates a shared pond content-fixtures (owned by
fixture-user) with two pages, for the content regression pack and manual
QA:
- Every Element (
every-element) — every editor schema node and mark (issue #24: headings 1–4, all list types, table, blockquote, code block, horizontal rule, hard break, and all five marks). Loaded from the checked-inapps/api/prisma/fixtures/content-page.yjs, a Yjs snapshot generated from the human-readablecontent-page.mdnext to it —content-page.mdis the thing to read or edit; the.yjsfile is a build artifact of it, not source. - Fixture Image (
fixture-image) — one real, servable uploaded image (the placeholderfileIdinside the Markdown fixture above is not a real attachment; this page's image is).
Regenerating after editing content-page.md:
pnpm --filter @dorfteich/api fixtures:regenerate
This is deterministic — re-running without editing the Markdown produces a
byte-identical .yjs file (the script pins the Yjs document's clientID,
which is otherwise randomized per Y.Doc instance) — and it refuses to
write a snapshot that isn't a fixed point of the Markdown round-trip
(docToMarkdown(markdownToDoc(x)) === x), so a stale fixture can't get
checked in silently.
Conventions
- New feature packs get their own
<feature>.spec.tsnext to these and extend the fixture matrix here (permission matrix arrives with M5, issue #60). - Use
contextForUser()fromhelpers.tsfor signed-in tests — it logs in through the api and hands you a browser context with the session cookie, no UI login repetition. - Flaky tests are defects (ADR 0014): fix or quarantine immediately.