Commit Graph

14 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
4755c18ef5 Add conversion job queue and pandoc sidecar integration (#62)
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Import/export conversions run asynchronously against an internal pandoc-server
sidecar with limits and graceful failure (ADR 0009). This is the plumbing;
the import (#63) and export (#65) features enqueue jobs onto it.

Sidecar & config:
- pandoc/core:3.6 in HTTP server mode added to the Compose stack, internal
  network only, with a wget healthcheck on /version; the api depends on it
  healthy and reaches it via the new PANDOC_URL env (default http://pandoc:3030).
- readyz gains a warning-level `converter` check: an unreachable sidecar
  degrades import/export but never flips the instance to unready (new `warn`
  status on ReadinessCheck).

Conversion flow (apps/api/src/import-export/):
- ConversionJob table (per-request work queue, distinct from the name-keyed
  maintenance Job table): owner, formats, input/result bytes, status, attempts,
  lockedAt. Migration + owner cascade.
- PandocConverter (abstract) + PandocServerConverter: POST / with
  {text,from,to,standalone}; binary input formats (docx/odt/…) are base64-encoded
  in `text`; 60 s AbortController timeout; input/output size caps. Failures map
  to distinct localized codes — converter_unavailable / converter_timeout
  (retryable) and conversion_failed (final).
- ConversionWorker: claims one job at a time with `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`
  (safe against overlapping sweeps and a second process), recovers a stale
  RUNNING lock, retries transient failures up to 3 attempts then fails. A 2 s
  sweep plus wake-on-enqueue means a queued job survives an API restart.
- ConversionJobService.enqueue (size-limited) + owner-scoped GET /jobs/:id
  (poll) and GET /jobs/:id/result (stream the output); a foreign/unknown id is
  404. ConversionJobView in @dorfteich/shared.

Tests:
- conversion-job.e2e.db.test.ts (fake converter injected via a new createTestApp
  override hook): enqueue→convert→poll→result; foreign/unknown job 404; a
  persisted PENDING job picked up by a fresh app's worker (restart survival);
  sidecar-down fails after 3 retries while the API stays healthy.
- pandoc.converter.test.ts: success, non-200→conversion_failed, refused→
  converter_unavailable, and a delay-injecting server→converter_timeout.
- Verified locally against a real pandoc/core:3.6 container: markdown→html,
  markdown→docx (valid PK/OOXML bytes), and a docx→markdown round-trip.

Local: typecheck, lint, i18n:check, build all green; api 193 tests
(9 new), shared 121, web 50.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 04:06:27 +02:00
30891f99cf Add non-image attachments with allowlist, SVG policy, and file managers (#61)
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Extend uploads (#27, ADR 0011) beyond images to a configurable general
attachment allowlist, plus the page attachments section and the Pond Admin
file manager.

Backend:
- Two instance settings: `upload.allowedExtensions` (lowercase, dot-stripped,
  images always allowed regardless) and `upload.svgPolicy` (reject | sanitize).
- FilesService.resolveUpload: raster images still decided by magic bytes; SVG
  is sanitized with DOMPurify (scripts, event handlers, foreignObject stripped)
  or rejected per policy; everything else is admitted only if its extension is
  on the allowlist. A sanitized SVG's stored bytes are re-accounted so
  pond_usage matches disk.
- Downloads set `Content-Disposition: attachment` for every non-raster type
  (office files, PDFs, SVG) with `nosniff`, so they can never execute inline;
  raster images stay inline for page embeds.
- New endpoints: `GET /ponds/:id/files` (pond_admin: all files + usage + orphan
  flag), `POST /pages/:id/files` and `GET /pages/:id/files` (page-write/read:
  the attachments section). New error code `upload_type_not_allowed` (de+en).

Frontend:
- Page attachments section (AttachmentsPanel): upload, list with type glyph,
  size, and uploader, insert-as-link into the document (an internal media link
  that downloads, never renders inline), and delete. Toggled in the editor.
- Pond file manager (PondFileManager) in pond settings for Pond Admins: every
  file with its referencing page (or an orphan flag) and storage usage.
- Admin uploads settings form (allowlist + SVG policy). New `files` i18n
  namespace (de+en).

Tests:
- files.e2e.db.test.ts: allowlisted non-image accepted and served as a
  download; disallowed extension rejected; renamed-.html-as-.png still fails;
  SVG sanitized (scripts/handlers stripped) and reject-mode rejects; page
  attachment listing; pond file manager usage/orphan; non-admin denied.
- New e2e pack apps/web/e2e/attachments.spec.ts (+ CI step): upload → list →
  insert link (verified attachment disposition + nosniff), disallowed-type
  error, pond file manager usage/orphan.

Local: typecheck, lint, i18n:check, build all green; api-db 184, shared 121,
web 50; attachments pack 3/3, members 3/3, content 5/5. Adds dompurify + jsdom
to the api for server-side SVG sanitization.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 02:52:40 +02:00
42e97b9df2 Add Site-Admin user management (#59)
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Instance operators get basic user administration for support, abuse handling,
and GDPR groundwork (security.md §Privacy).

- api `admin/`: Site-Admin-gated `/admin/users` — a searchable, paginated list
  (username, e-mail, status, role, pond count, last login) plus lifecycle
  actions: disable/enable (a disabled user is logged out everywhere and login
  is refused with the distinct `account_disabled`), resend verification, delete,
  and grant/revoke Site Admin. Guards: you cannot act on your own account
  (`cannot_modify_self`) and the last Site Admin cannot be dropped
  (`last_site_admin`). Every action is audit-logged with the actor.
- `PseudonymizationService`: account deletion scrubs the PII, removes all login
  identities + sessions, and trashes the personal pond — the kept row is what
  authorship references, so shared content the user authored shows as "Deleted
  user" (no orphaned/cascaded content).
- web: the Admin area gains a 'Users' surface — search, pagination, and the
  actions (destructive ones behind an inline two-step confirm; self-actions
  hidden). New `users` i18n namespace (de+en).
- tests: `user-admin.e2e.db.test.ts` (disable → logout + login blocked; delete
  → pseudonymized authorship + personal pond trashed + credentials gone; last
  Site Admin and self protected; Site-Admin gating); a non-destructive browser
  `admin-users` pack proving disable-in-UI blocks login and enable restores it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 00:31:41 +02:00
7f1c49db53 Add pond member management UI (#54)
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Pond Admins manage who participates in a pond, by role, with editor/reader
seat quotas — the member-facing layer over the grant model (#51/#52).

- shared: `MemberView`/`PondMembersView` + add/change-role schemas
  (`members.ts`), a `members` i18n namespace (de+en), and member error codes.
- api `members/`: a member-centric API over pond-scope user grants —
  `GET /ponds/:id/members` (any member, for transparency: list grouped by
  effective role + seat usage + `canManage`), `POST` (add by exact username or
  e-mail — no directory browsing), `PATCH :userId` (change role), `DELETE
  :userId` (remove), all Pond-Admin-gated by the guard. Editor/reader seats are
  enforced against `editors_per_pond`/`readers_per_pond` (#22) inside a
  per-pond advisory-locked transaction so counts cannot race; the owner's
  membership is protected, personal ponds refuse a second admin (shared grant
  rule), and the last Pond Admin cannot be dropped. Every change invalidates
  the pond permission cache and fires the access NOTIFY (#39/#53).
- web `members/`: `MemberManager` in Pond Settings — list grouped by role with
  a search filter and seat usage, add-by-identifier form (disabled with a
  localized explanation when the chosen role's seats are full), per-member role
  change and remove; read-only for non-admins; the personal-pond rule is
  surfaced. There is no invitation flow (v1): adding is immediate, and the copy
  says so.
- tests: `members.e2e.db.test.ts` (add/change/remove, seat exhaustion,
  personal-pond and owner rules, read-only transparency, last-admin) and a
  `members` browser pack (immediate second-browser access, quota disables the
  add action, non-admin read-only) with its own CI step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-09 20:22:52 +02:00
0c6494f209 Enforce permissions in API guards and retire interim access (#52)
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Every route now declares its access rule explicitly and is enforced
through the shared resolution algorithm (permissions.md):

- PermissionGuard + decorators (@RequiresPondRole, @RequiresPagePermission,
  @RequiresAttachmentPermission, @AuthenticatedOnly) applied to every
  route; a route-enumeration test proves full coverage alongside
  @Public()/Site-Admin-guarded routes.
- 404/403 policy (documented in README conventions): denied reads answer
  404 (existence hiding), denied writes on readable things answer 403;
  trash views need write capability (ADR 0013).
- PermissionService resolves page/pond questions via the shared resolver,
  with an in-process pond-context cache (grants + label parents) that is
  invalidated on every grant/label-tree change and TTL-bounded as a
  multi-process safety net. Grant changes also fire pond_access_changed
  for collab revalidation (#39/#53).
- shared: pond-scope resolution (hasPondRole, canSeePond) next to the
  page resolver; grant wire schemas + GrantView.
- Owner Pond-Admin grants: migration backfill for all existing ponds,
  created transactionally with every new pond (shared + personal + seed).
- Grant CRUD under /ponds/:id/grants (pond_admin-gated) with structural
  and referential validation, last-admin protection, audit logs.
- InterimAccessService deleted; page lists, search, backlinks, phantom
  links, and trash listings are filtered per page through the resolver;
  collab tokens are now truly ro for readers.
- Fixture-matrix e2e (reader/editor/pond admin/foreign, label-deny,
  authenticated-subject, revoke-then-immediate-deny cache test).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
2026-07-09 16:31:41 +02:00
4d48d72c40 Add grant model and shared permission-resolution algorithm (#51)
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The heart of the security model: one algorithm, implemented once, for API,
collab, and UI (permissions.md — authoritative).

- shared `permissions/`: pure resolution (`resolvePageCapability`) exactly per
  permissions.md — specificity page > label (incl. ancestor labels) > pond,
  deny wins within a level, default-closed, Site Admin bypass — plus the trash
  rule (`canAccessPage` / `canAccessTrashedPage`, ADR 0013). `grantValidationError`
  enforces the structural constraints. Documented, I/O-free signatures for
  API/collab reuse.
- prisma: `RoleGrant` (+ grant enums) per data-model.md, unique on
  (pond, subject, role, scope); migration adds a CHECK backstop that a
  POND_ADMIN grant is pond-scope + user-subject.
- api `grants/`: `GrantsService.createGrant` validates before insert (structural
  + no extra admin on a personal pond), rejects duplicates; `grantsForPond`
  returns the shared resolver model (what #52/#53 consume); enum mappers between
  the DB and the shared model. Interim "who may manage grants" stays until #52.
- tests: exhaustive table-driven resolver suite — every worked example from
  permissions.md §Resolution, edge cases (multi-label deny-wins, ancestor
  inheritance, anonymous/public, most-specific-allow-beats-less-specific-deny,
  trash) and a property test (a less-specific grant never overrides a
  more-specific decision); validation unit tests; grants db test proving
  write-time rejection of invalid grants.
- i18n: grant error codes (de + en).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
2026-07-09 14:02:07 +02:00
a3a012c41d Add hierarchical labels: model, CRUD API, and validation (#43)
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Introduce pond-scoped hierarchical labels as the foundation for M4
organization and, later, M5 label-scoped permissions.

- shared: `labels.ts` with the label schemas/views and the pure tree
  helpers (buildLabelTree, collectSubtreeIds, collectAncestorIds,
  labelDepth, subtreeHeight). These are the single hierarchy walk the
  label API and the future permission resolver both build on
  (permissions.md: a grant on a label applies to all its descendants).
- prisma: `Label` (self-referential parent_id, unique per (pond, parent,
  name), cascade to subtree) and `PageLabel` assignment table; migration.
- api: `LabelsService` + controller. Tree endpoint returns the hierarchy
  in one call; create/rename/recolor/move/delete and page assign/unassign.
  Validation: cycle prevention on move, depth limit 6, unique name per
  (pond, parent) — enforced under a per-pond advisory lock so root-label
  uniqueness holds despite Postgres treating NULL parents as distinct.
  Delete cascades the subtree and requires `?force=true` when pages are
  assigned. Assignment rejects labels from a different pond. Access gated
  through InterimAccessService on the owning pond.
- i18n: label error codes and the colour validation message (de + en).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
2026-07-09 10:30:17 +02:00
a645763679 Add page trash: soft delete, restore, and purge job (#31)
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Backend: a generic maintenance-job scheduler (SchedulerService, `jobs`
table) that any later maintenance job registers with instead of
growing its own timer loop. Due-ness and the run-mutex both live in
the DB row (`lastRunAt` survives a restart; claiming a due job is one
atomic `UPDATE ... WHERE status != 'RUNNING'`), and an injectable
ClockService lets tests simulate retention elapsing without waiting or
faking the global clock.

Trash endpoints: GET /ponds/:id/trash (list), POST /pages/:id/restore,
DELETE /pages/:id/purge (manual, bypasses retention) — all sharing the
same purge logic as the scheduled daily job (default 30-day retention,
new trash.retentionDays instance setting). Purging deletes a page's
content cache, update log, and attachment files/quota; page_versions
is a placeholder until M3 exists. Direct navigation to a trashed page
now 404s with a distinguishable `page_trashed` code for editors (a
plain 404 for everyone else) instead of the generic not-found.

Attachment.pageId — added in #27 but never wired up — now gets set on
every page state save to whichever page's document currently embeds
the file, which is what lets purge find a page's files.

Frontend: a per-pond trash view (restore/purge), a "move to trash"
action with confirmation in the page menu, and a trash link in the
sidebar for pond owners. Also fixes react-query retrying 4xx responses
for several seconds by default, which was masking the trash-hint 404
in the UI (and would have affected any other not-found/permission
error the same way).

Closes #31
2026-07-08 12:48:17 +02:00
0fae699018 Add file storage service and image upload API (#27)
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Implements the FileStorage abstraction (uploads/<pondId>/<fileId> on the
mounted volume), the attachments model, and POST /ponds/:id/files, GET
/media/:fileId, DELETE /files/:id. Uploads are validated by sniffing
magic bytes rather than trusting the client's Content-Type/filename
(catches a renamed .html-as-.png), checked against the max_file_bytes
and storage_bytes quotas, and served with nosniff + immutable caching.

Closes #27
2026-07-08 10:35:03 +02:00
98e159ab50 Add page CRUD and Yjs state persistence (#23)
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Prisma models `pages`/`page_updates`/`page_content_cache` per
data-model.md. Endpoints: POST /ponds/:id/pages (title -> empty Yjs doc
state, seeded via y-prosemirror), GET /pages/:id (meta + base64 state),
PUT /pages/:id/state (client-encoded Yjs state, rejected above the 5 MiB
operations.md limit or if it doesn't decode into a valid document for
the schema), PATCH /pages/:id (title/slug — explicit slug changes
validate uniqueness per pond, title-only renames keep the slug),
DELETE (soft). Access follows InterimAccessService via the page's pond,
same 404-not-403 interim rule as ponds.

State saves decode the Yjs update with yjs + y-prosemirror and run it
through the #24 shared derivation functions (docToPlainText/
docToMarkdown/docToHtml/extractOutline) to refresh page_content_cache.
The Yjs XmlFragment name ("default") and the derivation call are
factored so the collab server's persistence hooks (#35) can reuse both.

Raised the API's JSON body limit to 8 MiB (main.ts and the e2e test
app) to fit base64-encoded page state.

Closes #23
2026-07-05 22:25:41 +02:00
64928f0ac0 Quota foundation: overrides, resolution, race-safe consumption (#22)
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- quota_overrides + pond_usage models (BigInt values, unique per
  subject+key); migration 20260705185146_quotas
- instance-default quota keys in the settings registry (editors 5,
  readers 50, additional ponds 0, storage 1 GiB, max file 25 MiB)
- QuotaService: getEffective with pond → user → instance resolution
  (zero counts as a value, not a gap); assertCanCreateSharedPond and
  checkAndConsume serialize via pg_advisory_xact_lock inside the guarded
  write's transaction; release never drops below zero
- pond creation enforces additional_ponds (personal ponds don't count);
  quota errors carry code quota_exceeded + {quotaKey, limit}, localized
- seed grants fixtures an additional_ponds override (default is 0)
- table-driven resolution tests, parallel-consumption test, e2e for the
  pond-creation limit

Closes #22

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB
2026-07-05 20:55:59 +02:00
f0850eecd3 Ponds: data model, CRUD API, personal pond on verification (#21)
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- Pond model with pond-level trash columns (ADR 0013) and settings jsonb
  holding only deviations from the defaults (sidebar sort, font slots per
  ADR 0016); migration 20260705090100_ponds
- shared: pond schemas/views and slugify (German transliteration,
  URL-safe, length-capped); deterministic -2/-3 suffixes for collisions
- InterimAccessService: single place answering pond access questions
  until the real role model lands in M5
- POST/GET /ponds, GET /ponds/:slug, PATCH/DELETE /ponds/:id, Site-Admin
  trash + restore; personal pond auto-created on e-mail verification and
  for active seed fixtures; personal ponds cannot be trashed
- e2e pack covering verify-flow pond creation, slug suffixes, rename,
  foreign-pond 404s, trash/restore; slugify unit tests

Closes #21

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB
2026-07-05 11:08:16 +02:00
0bc80c9f93 Add auth, settings, and admin UI to the SPA
The web app grows its account surface: login (with next-redirect,
unverified-hint + resend), signup (react-hook-form + shared Zod
schemas, field-level api errors, closed-registration state fed by the
new public GET /auth/registration), e-mail verification, forgot/reset
password; a settings page with profile (locale applies immediately),
password change, and active-session management; a Site-Admin page for
instance name, default locale, and registration mode. AuthProvider
holds /auth/me, applies the profile locale, and backs route guards
(RequireAuth/RequireAnonymous/RequireSiteAdmin); the top bar gains a
user menu. All strings ship in the new auth/settings namespaces (de+
en); the exception filter now preserves handler-specific error codes.
Verified live: signup → Mailpit → verify → login → profile through
the Vite proxy.

Closes #16
Closes #17
Closes #18
Closes #19

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 05:35:56 +02:00
e855192d23 Add i18n with i18next, German and English, and a key-parity check
Translation resources live in packages/shared/i18n/<lang>/<ns>.json
(common, errors) and ship with de and en. The web app initializes
react-i18next with bundled resources (?lng= wins, then the browser
language); all shell components use useTranslation and the temporary
t() stub is gone. The api localizes its uniform error bodies via a
minimal i18next instance negotiated from Accept-Language. `pnpm
i18n:check` fails CI when any key is missing in any language, backed
by tested helpers in @dorfteich/shared.

Closes #5

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 19:23:45 +02:00