dorfteich/docs/architecture/operations.md
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#193: pond purge — retention job and manual Site-Admin endpoint
Deletion now actually deletes: a trashed pond past the trash retention
(same clock as pages, extended trash-purge job) or purged manually via
DELETE /ponds/:id/purge (Site-Admin-only, like pond restore) is removed
with everything it holds. Files go first (idempotent rm, resumable on a
crash), then one transaction ordered around the FK actions: attachments
and labels (Restrict) precede the pond; the page delete cascades
versions, comments, content cache incl. the search vector, update log,
mentions, label assignments, favorites, outgoing links and open collab
sessions; the pond delete cascades grants, usage counters (that is the
quota correction), pond-plugin opt-ins and conversion jobs; polymorphic
watches and pond quota overrides are deleted explicitly. A purge racing
a restore or another purge is a no-op; both paths record a pond.purged
audit event.

Known residues by design, documented in operations.md: target_slug in
other ponds' page links (#235) and backups within their retention.

Refs #193

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
2026-07-30 12:44:52 +02:00

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Markdown

# Operations concept
Pragmatic monitoring (kickoff decision): health checks, external uptime
monitoring, structured logs, backup alerting — no dedicated metrics stack.
## Health & monitoring
- **Health endpoints**: `api` exposes `/healthz` (liveness: process up) and
`/readyz` (readiness: DB reachable + migrations applied = hard failures
→ 503; converter/renderer reachability and backup freshness < 26 h are
warning-level overall `status: degraded`, still HTTP 200). `collab`
exposes `/healthz` (process + DB). `web` serves a static `/healthz`.
- **Docker healthchecks** use the liveness endpoints only never `readyz`
so a degraded instance is not restart-looped (`restart: unless-stopped`
restarts on process exit, an `unhealthy` mark just shows in
`docker compose ps`).
- **External uptime monitoring**: the operator's existing Uptime-Kuma runs
the monitor set defined in `deploy/monitoring.md` (web healthz, api
readyz for down, a keyword monitor on the readyz body for degraded, and
a collab WebSocket check), with notification on failure for Prod.
Test/Int get reduced monitors (no paging).
- **Backup alerting**: the backup sidecar writes
`backups/status.json` after every run; `readyz` reads it (issue #85) and
degrades when the last successful backup is older than 26 h, which
surfaces through Uptime-Kuma without extra tooling. Additionally the
sidecar sends a failure e-mail via the instance SMTP.
## Logging
- All services log **structured JSON to stdout** (pino); Docker's json-file
driver with rotation (`max-size: 10m`, `max-file: 5`).
- Log content rules: request logs with method/route/status/duration/user id
(no request bodies), auth events (login success/failure, permission
denials), admin actions (grants, plugin installs, quota changes) as an
**audit trail**, collab session open/close. Never log passwords, tokens,
session ids, or page content.
- **Persistent audit trail** (issue #86): the auth events and admin actions
additionally land as rows in `audit_log` via `AuditService` queryable in
the Site-Admin System panel (filter by actor/action/time, paginated).
Content activity (pages, files, exports, labels) stays log-only by design.
- Reading logs = `docker compose logs` / `docker logs` on the host; no
central log stack at this scale (revisit if a second Prod host appears).
## Backup & restore (operational view of ADR 0015)
- Nightly at 03:00 stage-local time (sidecar `backup`, issue #83; env
`BACKUP_TIME`/`TZ`): `pg_dump -Fc` uploads/plugins volume archive (one
tar, same backup id `YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS`) optional Nextcloud upload
(issue #103, see below) prune (`BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS`, 30 default /
7 Test+Int; a Site-Admin setting overrides the env; the newest complete
set always survives) `status.json` on the `backups` volume on
failure a mail directly via the instance SMTP to `BACKUP_MAIL_TO`.
- **Private mirror** (issue #84): with `BACKUP_MIRROR_TARGET` +
`BACKUP_MIRROR_SSH_KEY` set (Prod: BASEL over WireGuard), every
successful run rsyncs the set files after the prune (`--delete` aligns
the remote retention); outcome in `status.json → mirror`, failures mail
like run failures. Setup: `deploy/backup-basel.md`.
- **Off-host copies** (issue #103): with a Nextcloud target configured in
the admin UI (WebDAV base URL + username + folder in instance settings,
app password in the secret store), each successful set is bundled into
ONE `dorfteich-backup-<id>.tar.gz` (dump + files archive + manifest) and
uploaded per schedule (daily/weekly/manual); remote prune mirrors the
local guarantee. The api and the sidecar talk over pg NOTIFY/LISTEN
(`backup_command`); upload failures mail like run failures, staleness
shows up as the `backup_remote` readyz check.
- **Target policy** (issue #192, ADR 0026): `BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS` is a
deploy-level, comma-separated allowlist of permissible destination
hosts, enforced by the api (settings writes, connection test, admin
view) and by the sidecar at the point of egress (WebDAV upload and
rsync mirror alike). **Empty the default disables every remote
target: backups stay local only, which is the VS-NfD reference
configuration.** Existing deployments with a remote target must list
its host, or uploads and mirror stop (called out in the release notes).
The admin UI shows "unavailable by policy" as distinct from
"not configured". Deliberately not a runtime setting: a compromised
Site-Admin account cannot widen it.
- **On-demand run**: `docker compose run --rm -e BACKUP_RUN_ONCE=1 backup`
(exit code = outcome); list sets with `docker compose exec backup ls /backups`.
- **Restore runbook** (also the Prod-relocation procedure) automated by
`deploy/backup/restore.sh <backup-id>`, run from the stage directory:
1. stop the app services (`web`, `api`, `collab`; the db stays up),
2. restore DB: `pg_restore --clean --if-exists` into the `db` container,
3. restore volume: unpack the matching uploads/plugins archive,
4. `docker compose up -d`, verify `/readyz`, spot-check a page + a file.
- **Drills** (issue #87): monthly automated restore of the latest backup
set into a scratch environment via `.gitea/workflows/drill.yml`
`deploy/backup/drill.sh` (sanity checks + report on the pinned "Restore
drills" issue); manual procedure and relocation notes in
`docs/operations/restore-runbook.md`. Quarterly manual full-runbook
drill on Test.
- **Admin UI** (issue #103): Site Admin triggers on-demand backups
("Back up now") and restores a local or Nextcloud set in-app a
type-to-confirm prompt, then the sidecar orchestrates: maintenance mode
(global 503 with an exempt status endpoint), collab sessions closed via
the `backup_maintenance` NOTIFY channel, connections terminated,
`pg_restore` + volume extract, api restart. `restore.sh` remains the
disaster fallback when the app itself is gone.
## Maintenance jobs (in-app scheduler, `jobs` table)
| Job | Cadence | Purpose |
| --------------------- | ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
| trash purge | daily | delete pages/ponds past trash retention (ADR 0013) |
| version thinning | daily | auto-version retention policy (ADR 0013) |
| update-log compaction | hourly, idle pages only | bound Yjs log growth |
| quota reconciliation | nightly | recompute `pond_usage`, report drift |
| orphan file sweep | nightly | volume DB consistency (ADR 0011) |
| mail outbox retry | every minute | e-mail delivery with backoff |
Job outcomes are visible in the Site Admin UI (last run, status) that
panel is the operator's single glance for instance health.
Pond purge (issue #193): a trashed pond past the trash retention is
removed with everything it holds pages (cascading versions, comments,
content cache incl. the search vector, update log, mentions, label
assignments, favorites, outgoing links, open collab sessions),
attachments (rows and files on disk), labels, grants, usage counters,
watches, pond quota overrides, pond-plugin opt-ins, and conversion jobs.
A Site Admin can purge a trashed pond immediately
(`DELETE /ponds/:id/purge`); both paths record a `pond.purged` audit
event. Known residues by design: `page_links.target_slug` in OTHER
ponds' pages (#235) and backups within their retention.
## Update strategy
- **Own stages**: pipeline-driven (see `deployment.md`); Prod only via
approved release tags.
- **Self-hosters**: semver releases; `docker compose pull && up -d`;
migrations auto-apply; release notes flag manual steps and `migration`
label. Supported downgrade window: one minor release.
- **Base image / dependency hygiene**: monthly dependency-update story
(renovate-style batch PR); security advisories for pinned images tracked
in the release checklist.
## Capacity & limits (initial values, instance-tunable)
| Limit | Default |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
| max page document size | 5 MiB Yjs state |
| max upload size | 25 MiB (quota ladder, ADR 0011) |
| collab connections per instance | 500 concurrent |
| rate limits | login 10/min/IP, signup 5/h/IP, API 100/min/user |