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AI clients talk to the instance directly at /api/mcp — under the /api/ path (deviation from the issue's literal /mcp) so every existing reverse proxy already routes it; no deployment changes anywhere. - Transport: official @modelcontextprotocol/sdk server, STATELESS — each POST builds a fresh server+transport pair, no session store, replicas stay trivial; GET/DELETE answer 405. Auth per PAT bearer (#104 tokens), per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After). - Own switches, independent of REST: instance mcp.enabled (admin settings, default off; off = 404, feature invisible) + pond setting mcpEnabled (pond-settings toggle, default off) — pinned independent in both directions by tests. - Tools (thin wrappers over the #104 services, same permission gates, audit-logged writes): list_ponds, list_pages, read_page, search, create_page, update_page (replace semantics through the collab-owned restore path — open editors converge), add_comment, list_labels, set_page_labels (exact replace), export_pond (link to the REST ZIP). Tool errors carry the api error codes; results carry stable slugs/ids. MCP resources stay the documented stage-2 stretch goal. - Deliberately on the SDK's low-level Server API with a hand-written tool table (mcp-tools.ts): the typed registerTool generics drove tsc out of memory in a program this size; manual Zod validation keeps the wire behavior explicit. - PublicApiService exposure filtering parameterized ('api' | 'mcp', shared pondFeatureEnabled helper) — one implementation, two switches. - Docs: "Connect Claude Code / MCP clients" section in public-api.md (claude mcp add one-liner + mcp-remote bridge for stdio clients). Verification: 8-test e2e pack driving the real MCP SDK client over Streamable HTTP against a listening api (initialize + tools/list, switch independence in both directions, anonymous/garbage 401, opt-in 404 semantics, page roundtrip incl. restore-NOTIFY, labels/comments, read scope blocked from writes with scope_required); live check through the web proxy against the seeded stack (tools list, create, read, update, search — LIVE CHECK PASSED); full api suite 61/61 files green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
104 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
104 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
# Public REST API (issue #104)
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Dorfteich instances can expose a token-authenticated REST API at
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`/api/public/v1` for scripts and integrations. It is **off by default**,
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twice: a Site Admin enables the instance switch (_Admin → Settings →
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Public API_), and every pond that should be reachable opts in separately
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(_Pond settings → Public API_). Anything not enabled answers 404 —
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indistinguishable from an instance without the feature.
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## Personal access tokens
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Every user manages their tokens under _Settings → API tokens_: a name, a
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scope (`read` or `read+write`), an optional expiry, and an optional
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restriction to selected ponds. The secret (`dt_pat_…`) is shown exactly
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once and stored hashed; tokens are revocable and show their last use.
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A token acts **as its user**: the normal permission model — grants, label
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scopes, the 404-vs-403 policy — applies unchanged. Scope and pond
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restriction only narrow it further; they never grant anything the user
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could not do in the app.
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## Using the API
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```sh
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curl -H "Authorization: Bearer dt_pat_..." \
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https://your-instance.example/api/public/v1/me
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```
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- The machine-readable description lives at
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`/api/public/v1/openapi.json` (reachable without a token while the
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instance switch is on).
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- Requests are rate-limited per token (HTTP 429 + `Retry-After`).
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- Errors carry the api's uniform body: `{ code, message, details? }`.
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- Page content is Markdown in, Markdown + rendered HTML out. A content
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update (`PATCH …/pages/{slug}` with `markdown`) **replaces** the whole
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page; it is applied through the collaborative document, so open editors
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converge live, and the previous state stays in the version history
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(the change itself appears as a manual version named "API update").
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### Endpoint overview
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| Area | Endpoints |
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| -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Identity | `GET /me` |
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| Ponds | `GET /ponds`, `GET /ponds/{slug}` |
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| Pages | `GET/POST /ponds/{slug}/pages`, `GET/PATCH/DELETE /ponds/{slug}/pages/{pageSlug}` |
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| Search | `GET /search?q=&pond=&label=` |
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| Export | `GET /ponds/{slug}/export/markdown` (ZIP) |
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| Labels | `GET/POST /ponds/{slug}/labels`, `PATCH/DELETE /ponds/{slug}/labels/{id}`, `PUT/DELETE /ponds/{slug}/pages/{pageSlug}/labels/{id}` |
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| Comments | `GET/POST /ponds/{slug}/pages/{pageSlug}/comments`, `POST/DELETE …/comments/{id}/resolve` |
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Deliberately not in v1 (stage 2): attachment upload, version endpoints,
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webhooks.
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## Connect Claude Code / MCP clients
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The instance ships its own MCP endpoint (Streamable HTTP) at `/api/mcp` —
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no extra process. It has **its own switches**, independent of the REST
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API: the instance switch under _Admin → Settings → Public API_ ("Enable
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the built-in MCP endpoint") and a per-pond opt-in in the pond settings.
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Authentication uses the same personal access tokens.
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Claude Code (or any Streamable-HTTP client):
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```sh
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claude mcp add --transport http dorfteich https://your-instance.example/api/mcp \
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--header "Authorization: Bearer dt_pat_..."
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```
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Stdio-only clients bridge with `mcp-remote`:
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```json
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{
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"mcpServers": {
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"dorfteich": {
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"command": "npx",
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"args": [
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"mcp-remote",
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"https://your-instance.example/api/mcp",
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"--header",
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"Authorization: Bearer dt_pat_..."
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]
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}
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}
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}
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```
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Tools: `list_ponds`, `list_pages`, `read_page`, `search`, `create_page`,
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`update_page` (replace semantics, collab-safe like the REST PATCH),
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`add_comment`, `list_labels`, `set_page_labels`, `export_pond`. A tool
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call acts as the token's user; write tools need the `write` scope, and
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ponds without the MCP opt-in stay invisible (404 semantics). The endpoint
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is stateless — no sessions to manage, safe behind load balancers.
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## Security notes
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- Bearer tokens only — no cookies are involved, so there is no CSRF
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surface; browser sessions cannot call the public API and tokens cannot
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manage tokens.
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- Token creation and revocation are audit-logged, as is every write
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through the API (action `api.write`, with the token attributed).
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- Treat a token like a password. Revoke it under _Settings → API tokens_
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the moment it may have leaked.
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