Claude Fable 5
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Token-authenticated machine access at /api/public/v1 — the foundation for the built-in MCP endpoint (#105). Personal access tokens: - api_tokens table (SHA-256 hash, scope read|write, optional pond restriction, expiry, revocation, throttled last-used) + migration; secrets are dt_pat_<random>, shown exactly once - lifecycle endpoints under /users/me/api-tokens (session-only — a leaked token can never mint more tokens) with audit entries api.token_created/api.token_revoked - settings UI section (create with scope/expiry/pond restriction, one-time reveal with copy, list with status + revoke), de+en Activation (404 semantics per #60 on both levels): - instance setting api.enabled (default off, admin settings switch) - pond setting apiEnabled (default off, pond settings toggle; the PondsService settings-merge learned the key — the #92 lesson) Surface (/api/public/v1, excluded from the SPA's global prefix): - me, ponds, pages (list/read as Markdown+HTML, create from Markdown via the shared pipeline, PATCH title/content, DELETE to trash), search (permission-filtered + narrowed to exposed ponds, highlights as **…**), markdown ZIP export, labels (tree, create/rename/recolour/move/delete, assign/unassign), comments (threads, create, resolve/reopen) - content replacement travels the collab-owned document path: the new state lands as a MANUAL version "API update", then the established restore NOTIFY applies it — open editors converge, history stays append-only, no second lineage (VersionsService.replaceContent) - hand-maintained OpenAPI 3.1 document at /openapi.json, pinned to the controller by a route-coverage test in both directions Enforcement: - PublicApiGuard: instance switch → bearer PAT auth (request.user is the token's user) → per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After) → scope (403 scope_required) → pond opt-in + token restriction - the shared PermissionGuard then applies the unchanged permission model; PageParamSource gained pondSlugParam for the slug+slug routes - no cookies anywhere → no CSRF surface (pinned by a hostile-Origin test) - every write audit-logged as api.write with the token attributed Tests/verification: - 12-test e2e pack: lifecycle, switches, permission matrix (reader/editor/outsider × scopes), restriction, page roundtrip incl. restore-NOTIFY assertion, labels, comments incl. policy, search narrowing, ZIP export, rate limit; full api suite 60/60 green (quota fixture via per-user override — never the instance default) - new collab-pack test proves an open editor converges onto an API content replacement (green against a local seeded stack) - UI smoke against the built SPA: token create/reveal/revoke, pond opt-in persists, admin switch persists (10/10) - docs/self-hosting/public-api.md + README link Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
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Public REST API (issue #104)
Dorfteich instances can expose a token-authenticated REST API at
/api/public/v1 for scripts and integrations. It is off by default,
twice: a Site Admin enables the instance switch (Admin → Settings →
Public API), and every pond that should be reachable opts in separately
(Pond settings → Public API). Anything not enabled answers 404 —
indistinguishable from an instance without the feature.
Personal access tokens
Every user manages their tokens under Settings → API tokens: a name, a
scope (read or read+write), an optional expiry, and an optional
restriction to selected ponds. The secret (dt_pat_…) is shown exactly
once and stored hashed; tokens are revocable and show their last use.
A token acts as its user: the normal permission model — grants, label scopes, the 404-vs-403 policy — applies unchanged. Scope and pond restriction only narrow it further; they never grant anything the user could not do in the app.
Using the API
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer dt_pat_..." \
https://your-instance.example/api/public/v1/me
- The machine-readable description lives at
/api/public/v1/openapi.json(reachable without a token while the instance switch is on). - Requests are rate-limited per token (HTTP 429 +
Retry-After). - Errors carry the api's uniform body:
{ code, message, details? }. - Page content is Markdown in, Markdown + rendered HTML out. A content
update (
PATCH …/pages/{slug}withmarkdown) replaces the whole page; it is applied through the collaborative document, so open editors converge live, and the previous state stays in the version history (the change itself appears as a manual version named "API update").
Endpoint overview
| Area | Endpoints |
|---|---|
| Identity | GET /me |
| Ponds | GET /ponds, GET /ponds/{slug} |
| Pages | GET/POST /ponds/{slug}/pages, GET/PATCH/DELETE /ponds/{slug}/pages/{pageSlug} |
| Search | GET /search?q=&pond=&label= |
| Export | GET /ponds/{slug}/export/markdown (ZIP) |
| Labels | GET/POST /ponds/{slug}/labels, PATCH/DELETE /ponds/{slug}/labels/{id}, PUT/DELETE /ponds/{slug}/pages/{pageSlug}/labels/{id} |
| Comments | GET/POST /ponds/{slug}/pages/{pageSlug}/comments, POST/DELETE …/comments/{id}/resolve |
Deliberately not in v1 (stage 2): attachment upload, version endpoints, webhooks.
Security notes
- Bearer tokens only — no cookies are involved, so there is no CSRF surface; browser sessions cannot call the public API and tokens cannot manage tokens.
- Token creation and revocation are audit-logged, as is every write
through the API (action
api.write, with the token attributed). - Treat a token like a password. Revoke it under Settings → API tokens the moment it may have leaked.