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12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
9b1d4de426 #245: mode hidden — hide profile-violating options, mark the hiding
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In hidden (and later enforced) mode, catalog-listed controls whose only
purpose is enabling a violation are not rendered while their saved value
is compliant (the four master switches, the Nextcloud backup block);
value-listed selects keep only their compliant choices (registration
mode, new-page classification, upload policy, SVG policy). Every
affected section shows one accessible policy note (i18n de+en) so
policy is distinguishable from missing features. A value that was
already violating is surfaced exactly like in marked — never silently
hidden. The API stays unchanged; enforcement is #246. e2e: hidden half
of the marking pack (rows disappear, note visible, already-violating
row stays marked, axe WCAG A/AA clean) — verified live locally; CI runs
it against a second api (VS_NFD_MODE=hidden, same database) behind its
own static server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8
2026-07-31 19:10:51 +02:00
5fdef95f67 #244: mode marked — flag profile-violating configuration in the UI
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Every catalog-listed control on the admin surfaces carries an accessible
deviation marking in mode marked: text + icon under the control (never
colour alone), part of the control's accessible description
(aria-describedby), i18n de+en. The check runs against the CURRENT
control value, so a violating choice is marked before saving. Covered
controls: registration mode, new-page classification, upload policy,
SVG policy, the four master switches (api/mcp/feeds/plugins), the legal
texts (violating while empty), and the Nextcloud backup toggle on the
system panel. The profile card (#243) gains the warning summary and the
hardening-guide reference. e2e: new vs-nfd-marking pack (marked half in
CI — the e2e api now runs VS_NFD_MODE=marked, which also puts the
marked state into the a11y admin scan; off half in local default runs;
both halves verified live). hidden/enforced follow in #245/#246.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8
2026-07-31 18:49:26 +02:00
809e071f14 #207: print stylesheet with the classification on every printed sheet
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First @media print support at all: page size/margins, navigation and
interactive chrome suppressed, break behaviour for headings, tables,
code blocks, figures and plugin blocks. The VS-NfD marking runs as
header AND footer on every sheet via a real-table PrintFrame whose
thead/tfoot browsers repeat per page — @page margin boxes are
unimplemented and position:fixed places unreliably in both engines
(verified empirically); on screen the table chain renders as plain
blocks, so nothing changes visually. Verified as PDF-from-browser in
Chromium 140 and Firefox 153 (2 markings on every page of a multi-page
document); the repeatable procedure is documented in
apps/web/e2e/README.md. Unclassified pages print without a marking.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 06:48:44 +02:00
0875e2a087 Add the sandbox host runtime for plugin iframes (#73)
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Implements the security core of the plugin system: code-plugin surfaces
run in opaque-origin iframes (sandbox="allow-scripts", never
allow-same-origin) with a capability-filtered RPC bridge.

- api: serve a per-plugin sandbox frame document at
  /plugins/:id/:version/frame with a CSP that pins every load to the
  plugin's own asset path (built from APP_BASE_URL, not the request Host,
  so a Host-rewriting proxy cannot break it) and forbids network access
  (connect-src 'none'). Plugin assets get Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  so the null-origin frame can load its own module bundle.
- web: sandbox-host creates the frame, wires the SDK host bridge over a
  source-filtered postMessage transport, drives render under a 5 s
  deadline (hung/failed plugin -> placeholder, never a frozen page), and
  tears down on unmount. PluginFrame/PluginPreviewPage surface it; the
  built-in ui.resize handler clamps plugin-requested heights.
- plugin-sdk: host bridge reports gate violations via onViolation and
  registers a gated handler for every v1 method, so an undeclared
  capability is rejected with capability_not_permitted (not
  unknown_method).
- tests: SDK gate unit test; web sandbox unit tests (opaque origin,
  source filtering, timeout); and the e2e security pack with a permanent
  malicious fixture plugin proving no escape (DOM/cookies/storage/fetch/
  undeclared capability all blocked) plus well-behaved and hung cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-11 09:16:30 +02:00
699c003d04 Add pond ZIP + per-page docx/odt export (#65)
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Two export paths, both permission-aware (permissions.md):

- `GET /ponds/:id/export/markdown` streams a ZIP of the pond's readable
  pages as Markdown (one `<slug>.md` per page, a `media/` directory,
  wikilinks rewritten to relative `[text](slug.md)` links, image sources to
  `media/<id>.<ext>`). The `reader` guard is "may see the pond"; the service
  filters to the pages the requester may actually read, so a label-restricted
  reader gets only their slice. Media is appended as read streams and pages as
  small strings, so memory stays bounded for a large pond (500-page test).
- `POST /pages/:id/export {format: docx|odt}` enqueues a `markdown → pandoc →
  file` conversion job (the #62 queue): embedded images are inlined as data
  URIs so the sidecar embeds them, wikilinks flatten to text. The client polls
  `GET /jobs/:id` and downloads `GET /jobs/:id/result`.

Frontend: office-export buttons in the page menu (`.docx`/`.odt` run the job
and download the result; PDF is a disabled placeholder for Gotenberg, #67) and
a "Download pond as ZIP" link in pond settings. New `export` i18n namespace
(de+en). Markdown copy/download stay as-is (#30).

Robustness: the pond ZIP skips an attachment whose bytes are missing on disk
(data drift) rather than letting an unhandled read-stream error crash the api;
`FileStorageService.exists` gates inclusion, with a defensive stream error
handler. The per-page export drops an unreadable image the same way.

- shared: EXPORT_FORMATS + pageExportInputSchema; export-markdown transform
  helpers (image/wikilink rewrites, MIME→extension).
- deps: archiver (streaming ZIP; v7 for CommonJS compat), fflate (dev, reads
  ZIPs in tests).
- tests: export-markdown unit + export.service.db (ZIP contents & relative
  links, label-restricted omission, docx job with inlined images, 500-page
  streaming, missing-media skip); e2e export pack (ZIP download; `.docx`
  self-skips without a pandoc sidecar, as in the import pack, #64).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 10:31:19 +02:00
e2f942c0ff Add document import UI in the sidebar (#64)
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An "Import document" action in the pond sidebar: pick a .docx/.odt/.md file
(or several), upload with per-file progress, and open the new page. A
.docx/.odt polls the conversion job (queued → converting → done); a .md
imports directly and comes back already succeeded. Failures stay listed with
the localized error and a retry; concurrent imports all complete and appear.

- web apps/web/src/import/: useImport hook (upload via apiUploadFile → poll
  GET /jobs/:id → resolve the page slug → navigate; first success of a batch
  navigates, every success refreshes the sidebar) and ImportControl (hidden
  file input, accept from shared IMPORT_EXTENSIONS, per-file status list).
  Wired into Sidebar next to "new page"; `import` i18n namespace (de+en).
- api: ImportService accepts .md/.markdown and imports in-process (no job),
  returning a succeeded ConversionJobView with the created resultPageId
  ("Markdown imports directly"); the media+parse+create tail is now shared
  between the job path and the sync path (createPageFromMarkdown), and a
  conversion error on the sync path maps to an HTTP status. shared
  IMPORT_EXTENSIONS gains md/markdown.
- e2e apps/web/e2e/import.spec.ts + CI step: .docx corpus fixture opens the
  converted page (self-skips without a reachable pandoc sidecar — CI's e2e
  stack has none, same as #63; verified locally + on stage), .md opens
  directly, an unsupported .txt shows the localized error with no page
  created, and two concurrent .md imports both complete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 09:38:31 +02:00
30891f99cf Add non-image attachments with allowlist, SVG policy, and file managers (#61)
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Extend uploads (#27, ADR 0011) beyond images to a configurable general
attachment allowlist, plus the page attachments section and the Pond Admin
file manager.

Backend:
- Two instance settings: `upload.allowedExtensions` (lowercase, dot-stripped,
  images always allowed regardless) and `upload.svgPolicy` (reject | sanitize).
- FilesService.resolveUpload: raster images still decided by magic bytes; SVG
  is sanitized with DOMPurify (scripts, event handlers, foreignObject stripped)
  or rejected per policy; everything else is admitted only if its extension is
  on the allowlist. A sanitized SVG's stored bytes are re-accounted so
  pond_usage matches disk.
- Downloads set `Content-Disposition: attachment` for every non-raster type
  (office files, PDFs, SVG) with `nosniff`, so they can never execute inline;
  raster images stay inline for page embeds.
- New endpoints: `GET /ponds/:id/files` (pond_admin: all files + usage + orphan
  flag), `POST /pages/:id/files` and `GET /pages/:id/files` (page-write/read:
  the attachments section). New error code `upload_type_not_allowed` (de+en).

Frontend:
- Page attachments section (AttachmentsPanel): upload, list with type glyph,
  size, and uploader, insert-as-link into the document (an internal media link
  that downloads, never renders inline), and delete. Toggled in the editor.
- Pond file manager (PondFileManager) in pond settings for Pond Admins: every
  file with its referencing page (or an orphan flag) and storage usage.
- Admin uploads settings form (allowlist + SVG policy). New `files` i18n
  namespace (de+en).

Tests:
- files.e2e.db.test.ts: allowlisted non-image accepted and served as a
  download; disallowed extension rejected; renamed-.html-as-.png still fails;
  SVG sanitized (scripts/handlers stripped) and reject-mode rejects; page
  attachment listing; pond file manager usage/orphan; non-admin denied.
- New e2e pack apps/web/e2e/attachments.spec.ts (+ CI step): upload → list →
  insert link (verified attachment disposition + nosniff), disallowed-type
  error, pond file manager usage/orphan.

Local: typecheck, lint, i18n:check, build all green; api-db 184, shared 121,
web 50; attachments pack 3/3, members 3/3, content 5/5. Adds dompurify + jsdom
to the api for server-side SVG sanitization.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 02:52:40 +02:00
ae8cdd0e1e Add cross-feature permission hardening matrix (#60)
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Permissions cut across every M2–M5 feature; this pack pins the security-relevant
subject × surface combinations so a weakened guard is caught.

- `apps/web/e2e/permission-matrix.spec.ts`: an API-level (the UI adds nothing
  over the resolved status code) parameterized suite over the subjects — site
  admin, pond admin/owner, editor, the same editor label-restricted by a
  `secret`-label deny, reader, public (anonymous), and the foreign user (new
  `fixture-outsider`, a member of nothing) — across the surfaces: page read,
  edit (collab-token `rw`/`ro`), sidebar list, search, versions, media, and the
  public HTML endpoint. It enforces the 404-vs-403 policy: an unauthorized read
  is 404 (existence hidden), an unauthorized write on something readable is 403.
- wired into the pipeline as its own CI step; documented in
  `apps/web/e2e/README.md` (with the subject/surface list) so later features
  extend the matrix rather than writing bespoke permission tests.
- seeded-regression check (acceptance criterion): temporarily forcing the
  collab-token to always `rw` (ignoring write permission) makes the pack go red
  on the "reader gets `ro`" and public/foreign cells — verified locally, then
  reverted. Runs in ~1 s (well under the 10-minute budget).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-10 00:43:16 +02:00
406886c56c Add label- and page-scope access rules UI including deny (#55)
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Pond Admins configure the vision's fine-grained cases through a plain-language
surface, on top of the base roles from #54.

- shared: `AccessRuleView` (a grant enriched with subject/scope display names)
  and pure conflict helpers `scopeSpecificity`/`sameGrantSubject`/
  `isRuleShadowed` (unit-tested) for the client-side shadowed-rule hint. New
  `access` i18n namespace (de+en) with sentence templates (ADR 0012).
- api: `GET /ponds/:id/grants/access-rules` (Pond-Admin) returns the pond's
  grants enriched with each user's display name and each label/page scope's
  name, resolved in one batched query per kind.
- web `access/`: `AccessRulesManager` in Pond Settings — the pond's rules
  grouped by subject and rendered as readable de/en sentences ("Anna may not
  edit pages labeled “Confidential”"), an add form (subject = member or the
  `signed-in`/`public` pseudo-subjects; scope = label from the tree or a
  specific page; role; allow/deny) that warns when a rule would be shadowed by
  a more specific existing one (shared algorithm) and requires an explicit
  confirmation before granting anything to `public`. Semantics are the shared
  resolver's — the UI only reflects permissions.md.
- tests: shared `conflicts.test.ts`; an api db case for the enriched endpoint;
  a browser `access-rules` pack that configures BOTH vision patterns through
  the UI and verifies their effect end to end — "deny label X" (an editor
  loses a labelled page) and "only label Y" (a signed-in non-member, new
  `fixture-viewer`, reads only the labelled pages) — plus the shadow hint and
  the public confirmation, with its own CI step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-09 21:45:31 +02:00
9d288b2ad0 Wire real permissions into collab tokens and revocation (#53)
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Live editing now obeys the same rules as REST: the collab-token mode comes
from the shared grant resolution, anonymous visitors can join public pages,
and revoking write access flips a running session to read-only within
seconds.

- Anonymous public tokens: `GET /pages/:id/collab-token` is `@Public()` but
  still permission-guarded, so a logged-out visitor gets an `ro` token where
  a `public` grant makes the page readable (404 otherwise). The token's
  `userId` is nullable (shared schema + collab context) for anonymous
  subjects.
- Prompt revocation: the pond-level NOTIFY (#39) now also fires on label
  tree/assignment changes (LabelsService move/remove/assign/unassign), and
  the collab server closes the *actual* WebSocket instead of only sending an
  application-level close message. Hocuspocus' `closeConnections` leaves the
  socket open so the client only re-checks on its ~30s message timeout;
  `closeDocumentConnections` drops the socket so the client reconnects and
  re-authenticates with a freshly-resolved token at once — the "within
  seconds" downgrade the milestone promises.
- Tests: the #52 fixture matrix gains anonymous cases (public grant → `ro`,
  none → 404); a collab db test proves an editor downgraded to reader goes
  read-only on reconnect (its post-downgrade edits no longer reach a peer);
  a new browser `collab-permissions` pack covers the read-only participant
  and the live downgrade end to end (new plain `fixture-editor` account).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-09 18:48:42 +02:00
12035e2231 Add M2 fixtures and content regression pack (#32)
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Seed script extends the fixture matrix with a shared "Content Fixtures"
pond (owned by fixture-user): an "Every Element" page covering every
editor schema node and mark (#24), and a "Fixture Image" page with one
real, servable uploaded image. "Every Element" loads a checked-in Yjs
snapshot (prisma/fixtures/content-page.yjs) generated from a
human-readable Markdown source (content-page.md) via a deterministic
regeneration script (pinned Y.Doc clientID; refuses to write a
snapshot that isn't a fixed point of the Markdown round-trip).

New apps/web/e2e/content.spec.ts consolidates the M2 content
regression pack: page lifecycle, editor basics, image paste, trash,
and — the pack's actual regression pin — a byte-for-byte comparison of
the fixture page's exported Markdown against the checked-in fixture.
Verified this catches regressions: temporarily mutated
docToMarkdown's heading serializer, rebuilt, re-seeded, confirmed the
comparison failed, then reverted.

This pack now runs in CI (a second step in the existing auth-e2e job,
reusing its already-built-and-seeded stack) alongside the existing
local-only feature packs.

Closes #32
2026-07-08 13:14:48 +02:00
1cea675983 Add auth e2e regression pack with fixtures and CI stack
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The seed script now provisions the documented fixture matrix
(fixture-admin / fixture-user / fixture-pending, idempotent upserts,
rate-limit reset for disposable databases). A six-test Playwright pack
drives the real UI against a full local stack with Mailpit: complete
signup→mail→verify→first-login journey, wrong-password error, guarded
route redirect honoring ?next (race between the login page and the
anonymous guard fixed by teaching the guard about ?next), menu logout,
site-admin gating, and a profile rename reflected in the top bar. The
pack self-skips without E2E_MAILPIT_URL, so the CD smoke stage (now
pinned to smoke.spec.ts) stays untouched; a new CI job boots api +
web dev server against postgres/mailpit service containers and runs
the pack on every PR and push. Also fixed: the web api client choked
on empty 201 bodies. e2e/README.md documents targets and fixtures.

Closes #20

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 05:43:05 +02:00