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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude Fable 5	0d95e1304e	#245: mode hidden — hide profile-violating options, mark the hiding ... In hidden (and later enforced) mode, catalog-listed controls whose only purpose is enabling a violation are not rendered while their saved value is compliant (the four master switches, the Nextcloud backup block); value-listed selects keep only their compliant choices (registration mode, new-page classification, upload policy, SVG policy). Every affected section shows one accessible policy note (i18n de+en) so policy is distinguishable from missing features. A value that was already violating is surfaced exactly like in marked — never silently hidden. The API stays unchanged; enforcement is #246. e2e: hidden half of the marking pack (rows disappear, note visible, already-violating row stays marked, axe WCAG A/AA clean) — verified live locally; CI runs it against a second api (VS_NFD_MODE=hidden, same database) behind its own static server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 19:27:17 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	5fdef95f67	#244: mode marked — flag profile-violating configuration in the UI ... Every catalog-listed control on the admin surfaces carries an accessible deviation marking in mode marked: text + icon under the control (never colour alone), part of the control's accessible description (aria-describedby), i18n de+en. The check runs against the CURRENT control value, so a violating choice is marked before saving. Covered controls: registration mode, new-page classification, upload policy, SVG policy, the four master switches (api/mcp/feeds/plugins), the legal texts (violating while empty), and the Nextcloud backup toggle on the system panel. The profile card (#243) gains the warning summary and the hardening-guide reference. e2e: new vs-nfd-marking pack (marked half in CI — the e2e api now runs VS_NFD_MODE=marked, which also puts the marked state into the a11y admin scan; off half in local default runs; both halves verified live). hidden/enforced follow in #245/#246. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 18:49:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	da5fd7c770	#243: VS_NFD_MODE and the machine-readable hardening-profile catalog ... The deployment declares through VS_NFD_MODE (off | marked | hidden | enforced, default off) how the application treats configuration that violates the VS-NfD reference profile — deploy-level like BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS, so a compromised Site Admin cannot widen it. The catalog in shared (vs-nfd-profile.ts) is the single source of truth: every profile-relevant setting with a decidable compliant value, judgement calls in an explicit advisory list, and a fence test parsing the hardening guide's reference tables so neither can drift (pattern #201). The api evaluates the catalog against the typed settings registry and validated env and exposes mode + verdict on GET /admin/system/vs-nfd-profile; the admin settings view shows the card whenever the mode is not off. Display only — the treatments land with #244–#246 (ADR 0027, proposed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 18:24:04 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	18239e2fa9	#221: offline update path incl. migrations, rehearsed with rollback ... Adds docs/operations/update-runbook.md (obtain, verify by digest, back up, apply, verify, roll back) with the migration behaviour stated explicitly: a failed migration rolls back its own transaction but is recorded in _prisma_migrations and blocks every further migrate deploy (P3009) — including a re-deployed old image — until migrate resolve --rolled-back; semantically irreversible migrations have exactly one way back, the pre-update backup set. No rolling updates on a compose stage. Rehearsed in the isolated environment of #220: regular update to a v2 image set, then a deliberate failed-update (P3018 division by zero, schema change proven rolled back) with image-rollback-alone shown insufficient and the documented recovery executed. Protocol: docs/vs-nfd/98-update-rollback-protokoll.md. ADR 0024 decisions 5+6 recorded as executed; operations handbook and restore runbook updated; plan checkbox P1-3 ticked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 17:26:50 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	ccffcaadd6	#220: protocol of the isolated deployment run ... Full deployment exercised in a compose stack whose networks are all internal: true — setup, login, live collaboration, search, upload, all export formats, backup and restore. tcpdump full capture on both bridges: zero packets leave the isolated subnets; the only outbound attempt the application makes is SMTP, which fails contained in the outbox (5 retries, then FAILED) while the instance stays fully functional. The restore finding became #288, fixed earlier in this chain and re-verified in the same stack. Plan checkbox P1-3 and the I-28 open question ticked; operations handbook airgap section updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 17:05:08 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4f6596e8a2	#288: reset schema before pg_restore — partitioned tables broke --clean ... Since #224 read_events is partitioned; the dump carries per-partition primary keys as own entries, and pg_restore --clean emitted DROP CONSTRAINT against inherited constraints, which PostgreSQL refuses. The restore then reported FAILED although the content was restored. Dropping and recreating the public schema first makes every --clean drop a no-op and the restore faithful: objects created after the backup no longer survive. Verified in the isolated environment of #220 (set 20260731-132200, exit 0, readyz green). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 17:00:05 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	a758c9d78b	#219: verified reproducible build without network access ... The ADR 0024 §4 decision, taken explicitly and both ways: customers OPERATE prebuilt digest-pinned images (no customer-side build), and ADDITIONALLY the workspace build is verified to work with networking disabled - so site-local patching stays possible without internet. Evidence (docs/vs-nfd/96-offline-build-protokoll.md): pnpm install --offline --frozen-lockfile plus pnpm build under docker run --network none (node:22.15.1-alpine + pnpm 11.9.0, the pinned toolchain), reproduced twice from clean checkouts with identical results. The offline kit is the pnpm store (~870 MB) plus the build user's ~/.cache (~460 MB - the prisma engines live there; without the cache the prisma postinstall fails offline). The one network dependency found and bounded: the drawio plugin's installable ZIP fetches its pinned vendor tarball on first build. Deploy images contain no plugin ZIPs, so the delivery-relevant build is fully offline (CI=1 skips the fetch, as in CI); an offline ZIP build pre-seeds the tarball into packages/plugins/drawio/vendor/. Also catches up the operations manual's scheduler-job table to 10 (read-trail-maintenance was added in #224 without the row here). Refs #219. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 14:39:35 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	2f7ba65eef	#218: mirror procedure into an internal registry ... Airgapped sites pull from their own registry (ADR 0024). The image list is GENERATED (deploy/scripts/list-images.sh resolves the compose file incl. the caddy profile) so a mirror can never silently miss a service; third-party images gain a configurable ${REGISTRY_PREFIX:-} in the compose file (digest pins unchanged - Docker verifies the same sha256 regardless of which registry serves it), own images keep IMAGE_PREFIX; no image reference is ever edited per site. Step-by-step procedure in deploy/stages.md 5b: generate list, copy digest-preservingly (docker buildx imagetools create; plain pull/tag/push as the documented fallback - the digest comparison closes the loop either way), verify the digest in the mirror against the pin, point the deployment via REGISTRY_PREFIX/IMAGE_PREFIX. Executed once end-to-end and recorded as assessor-facing evidence (docs/vs-nfd/95-mirror-protokoll.md): all four third-party images mirrored digest-identically into a local registry:2, plus dorfteich-api:v0.12.0 (sha256:576f1646... identical on both sides; the imagetools stall against the Gitea registry is recorded with its workaround). Operations manual's airgap section now lists the mirror part as available. Refs #218. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 14:33:04 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	6aac785841	#217: map IdP groups and roles onto the permission model ... Declarative instance setting idpMapping.rules turns ID-token claims into pond roles and the site-admin flag on every OIDC login — configuration, not code. Mapped grants travel through the SAME GrantsService path as manual ones (permission cache invalidated, collab access notify fires so live sessions revalidate — asserted by test), never raw rows. Ownership makes precedence explicit: role_grants.origin marks mapped rows, users.is_site_admin_managed marks a mapping-set admin flag. The mapping only creates and revokes what it owns — manual wins: hand-made grants and hand-promoted admins are never revoked by a missing claim (a manual toggle clears the marker and takes ownership). Removal of a claim revokes the mapped grant and the managed flag on the next login. Every mapping-driven change is audited with origin idp_mapping. Failure containment: unknown pond slugs and the last-Pond-Admin protection log-and-skip — a mapping problem must never become a login lockout. Tests drive real OIDC logins against the fake IdP with group claims: grant + working access, revocation incl. notify, manual-wins, managed site-admin promote/demote/hands-off. Documented in permissions.md (own section), ADR 0021, data-model.md and the hardening guide (care rule: same PR). Refs #217. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 13:09:11 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	13f0311d8e	#216: hard AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED switch over every local credential flow ... The deploy-level realization of auth.local.enabled (ADR 0021): FALSE answers 404 on every local credential flow — login, signup, e-mail verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change — enforced centrally in the auth guard via the @LocalCredentialFlow() marker before any session or CSRF logic runs. Deploy-level on purpose: a compromised Site Admin cannot reopen the local path, so the runtime-flip residual risk from ADR 0021 does not materialize (R-02 closed in the risk list). An enumeration fence fails when an auth route is neither marked nor on the reviewed allowlist, so a new credential flow cannot ship unswitched. Stated decisions, each tested: sessions/logout keep working for externally authenticated users; PAT and feed-token issuance stays available (API authorization under its own switches, not interactive sign-in). Bootstrap: complete setup (or SETUP_ADMIN_* pre-seed) before flipping; the api warns at boot when local auth is off with neither OIDC nor proxy auth configured. GET /auth/methods reports local:false and the login page hides the local form and credential links. Hardening guide: the planned auth.local.enabled row moves from 1.3 into the live deploy table with the bootstrap ordering, and the verification checklist gains the login-404 probe. Refs #216. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:58:07 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4c7f001cab	#215: trusted reverse-proxy header / mTLS client-certificate path ... For perimeters that authenticate before the application (ADR 0021 §4). Off unless BOTH AUTH_PROXY_HEADER and AUTH_PROXY_TRUSTED_PEERS are set — nothing about the header is guessed. The peer check runs against the TCP peer address only (a forwarded header is attacker-influenced): a request carrying the header from any other peer is rejected outright and audited as auth.proxy_rejected (catalogue v1.4) — that is a spoof attempt, not a misconfiguration — even when a valid session cookie rides along. From a trusted peer the header IS the identity; a session cookie never escalates beyond it; with the feature off the header is inert. Mapping is explicit (AUTH_PROXY_MAP: username or e-mail); deliberately no just-in-time creation — the header carries no verified address. The mTLS variant (AUTH_PROXY_MODE=mtls-dn) maps the configured attribute (default CN) out of the certificate subject DN the TLS terminator forwards, under the same peer rules. Session-less proxy requests key the read trail per user (user:<id>). The trust boundary is stated in security.md (the section an assessor reads closest), the VS-NfD security documentation and the hardening guide's deploy table. Tests cover all four decisions: off = inert, trusted peer authenticates (username and DN mapping), untrusted peer rejected + audited, no escalation past a session cookie. Refs #215. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:50:09 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	5796b7a5dd	#214: OIDC Authorization Code with PKCE, Keycloak as reference IdP ... External authentication (ADR 0021) built on jose (#188's vetted library) plus fetch — no new dependency enters the supply chain for a security base function. Discovery-configured; ID tokens validate against the IdP's JWKS under an explicit RS256/ES256 allowlist with issuer, audience, expiry and nonce binding. State, nonce and the PKCE verifier travel in a signed HttpOnly Lax cookie keyed by a dedicated HKDF purpose (oidc-state, ADR 0020). Deploy-level configuration (OIDC_ISSUER/CLIENT_ID/CLIENT_SECRET/SCOPES/ PROVIDER_LABEL): who authenticates users is a platform decision. The login page discovers the provider via GET /auth/methods and renders the SSO button (i18n de+en). Identities use the existing slot (provider oidc:<issuer>, subject from the token). First login creates the account just-in-time — ACTIVE and mail-verified only when the IdP asserts a verified address. An existing local account is NEVER adopted silently by e-mail (account-takeover path): login refuses with oidc_link_required and the owner links explicitly via GET /auth/oidc/link (audited auth.identity_linked, catalogue v1.3). Sessions come from the one existing session service. Tests run the full flow against a protocol-faithful fake IdP: PKCE verifier at the token endpoint, JIT creation incl. personal pond, invalid state/nonce/signature/issuer/audience/expiry each rejected, the linking refusal and the explicit link flow. Verified end-to-end against a real Keycloak 26.0 (repeatable procedure documented in security.md §External authentication). Refs #214. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:44:52 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4af5e6e81f	#225: read-trail master switch and written purpose limitation ... New instance switch readTrail.enabled, default OFF: read logging is employee monitoring in a works council's eyes — an ordinary instance must not surveil reads. Off means no event is written ANYWHERE (no row, no stdout line, verified by test); the api announces the switch position once per boot, so an eventless trail is never ambiguous — a gap reads as "was off", never "was lost". The written purpose limitation ships as section 7 of the VS-NfD security documentation (#228): what is recorded (no content, no titles, no IPs, no fingerprinting), why (evidence for reads of marked content only — variant A is the technical anchor of the promise), who may read it (Site Admin, API-only), for how long (readTrail.retentionDays, audited pruning), and what it may NOT be used for (no performance or behaviour monitoring). The hardening guide's reference configuration turns the trail on (reference value true) and points to that text; the existing trail suites now enable the switch explicitly. Refs #225. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:35:18 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	2bdb0ec2cf	#224: read-trail storage — partitioning, retention, admin query path ... Convert read_events to monthly RANGE partitions on occurred_at, with a DEFAULT partition as safety net: a lagging maintenance job must never turn the trail's hard-failure semantics into an outage for classified reads. The dedup unique pair (#223) moves to per-partition indexes (PostgreSQL cannot carry it on the parent); a bucket spanning a month boundary may record one duplicate — over-recording is acceptable, gaps are not. New daily job read-trail-maintenance (job-count fence 9 -> 10) creates months ahead — each with its dedup index — and applies the trail's own retention readTrail.retentionDays (default 365, deliberately independent of audit.retentionDays): whole expired months are DROPped without scanning, remainders deleted by range, every run audited as read_trail.pruned (catalogue v1.2; the fence regex now admits an underscore namespace). Site-Admin query path GET /admin/system/read-events answers "who read page X" and "what did user Y read" within a period — API-only by design, documented. Growth measured and documented in data-model.md: ~1 MB per 1000 events including indexes. Tests: retention pruning + audited deletion + admin queries on the shared database; the partitioned shape, per-partition P2002 dedup, months-ahead creation and DROP-based pruning against a fresh database built by the real migration chain. Refs #224. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:21:45 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	fd4fd60c99	#223: dedup window for the read trail ... One event per (session, page, channel) within an aligned window of readTrail.dedupWindowMinutes (default 5): buckets are floor(epoch / windowSeconds), and a unique (dedup_key, window_bucket) pair collapses concurrent duplicates race-free at insert time — the first access in a window is always recorded, a later duplicate lands on the unique violation and is skipped quietly (a skipped duplicate is not a gap; only real write failures still abort the read). Each row carries windowSeconds, so the evidence states it represents a window, never a request count. Reconnects within a window stay one event; a new session records again even for the same user; channels never collapse into each other; the page-less attachment key uses the documented `-` placeholder. Load evidence: 30 collab-token renewals inside one window produce exactly one event (test), bounding a live editing session at ~12 events/hour/page. Window semantics documented in ADR 0023, the VS-NfD security documentation (#228) and as a hardening-guide line for the new setting (care rule: same PR). Refs #223. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:13:21 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	05a979bac3	#222: read-access trail for classified pages ... Instrument every full-content read channel for pages with classification = vs_nfd (ADR 0023, variant A): SPA state fetch and read rendering, public JSON content, no-JS shell, expanded embeds, public API GET (incl. the MCP read_page path and write echoes), attachment download under the #212 effective classification, all export shapes (markdown, pond ZIP, account data export, queued docx/odt/pdf at enqueue), and collab-token issuance as the api-side proxy for the WS join. Events land in the new read_events table (no FKs — evidence survives page purges and hard user deletions) with actor, session key (session:/token:/job:/anon), page, pond, channel and the classification at read time. Recording failures are NOT swallowed: a failed write aborts the read (hard failure, the deliberate contrast to AuditService — decision recorded in ADR 0023 and security.md §Logging, together with the recorded residuals: content fragments and feeds). One e2e test per channel proves both the event and its absence for unclassified pages, plus the hard-failure semantics. Refs #222. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:12:55 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	919201d9b0	#230: IT-Grundschutz mapping for APP.3.1 and CON.11.1 ... docs/vs-nfd/80-grundschutz-mapping.md against the Edition 2023 texts of both building blocks (fetched from the BSI single PDFs, edition and retrieval date stated; the dropped requirements of APP.3.1 are listed as such, CON.11.1's 18 requirements are all Basis). Every requirement classified as product / operator / n.a.: product rows point at code, configuration and tests (auth+rate limits, upload controls, security headers with the honest HSTS-at-the-proxy split, marking = the whole of M26 under CON.11.1.A7 incl. the answered does-the-marking-carry-a- security-function question); operator rows say what we hand over (copy list, procedures, network plan, SBOMs); n.a. rows are argued via the delimitation statement (no §52 security functions, no built-in remote maintenance). Open requirements point at their closing issues (M27/M28/M29/M32), so the document doubles as the gap list; the never-scheduled external pentest is stated honestly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 10:35:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	87c1c5ee88	#231: residual-risk list ... docs/vs-nfd/90-restrisiken.md: nine entries, each with risk, why it is accepted, compensating control and decider — unmarked attachment content (#212), local auth not yet switchable incl. the open runtime- flippability question (#216), deferred plugin hash pinning (#232), the one-time git-history secret check with its pattern caveat (#198), digest-mail titles (I-23, revisit M32), page_links slug residue (I-24), the IndexedDB endpoint copy (I-25), deliberately unscheduled features, and the Site-Admin read bypass. Binding same-PR maintenance rule stated; referenced from the delimitation statement and consumed by the Grundschutz mapping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 10:35:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	2c6eff85f3	#227: hardening guide with the VS-NfD reference configuration ... docs/vs-nfd/50-haertungsleitfaden.md: one adoptable profile — every entry with the exact switch name, value, default and the reason, split into instance settings (registration closed, api/mcp off, feeds off, plugins off, classification defaults vs_nfd + upload block, svg reject, minimal extension list) and deploy-level configuration (empty BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS enforces backup-local-only outside Site-Admin reach; tightened session hours; SMTP deliberately unconfigured with the consequence stated honestly). auth.local.enabled is listed as the one pending row (#216) with its compensation until then; the guide states the binding updated-in-same-PR rule for every future switch. Includes an operator verification checklist (four unauthenticated 404 curls + readyz + admin spot checks). Cross-referenced from the delimitation statement (file names made concrete) and consumed by the Grundschutz mapping (#230). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 10:35:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	040f3fbeae	#229: operations manual (install, update, backup/restore, deletion, roles) ... docs/vs-nfd/70-betriebshandbuch.md: installation as run on the real stages (airgap variant explicitly pending #218-#221 with what already exists as groundwork), update/rollback incl. the no-down-migrations caveat, backup/restore with the ADR-0026 target allowlist and the rehearsed monthly restore drill (evidence: logs on #98), the full scheduler-job table (cadences verified against code), the deletion-and- destruction chapter built on the #228 copy list (per content type: what deletion reaches, what remains, immediate-destruction path, decommissioning), and role separation incl. the deliberate limits of a Site Admin and the honest note that Site Admin read-bypass makes the content/platform split non-absolute app-side. Every procedure carries its evidence level (erprobt / nicht geprobt / offen) — nothing claimed above what was actually executed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 10:35:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	f0c6af4412	#228: security documentation (architecture, data flows, network plan) ... docs/vs-nfd/60-sicherheitsdokumentation.md: component diagram with per- service purpose and privileges, network plan digit-exact against the deploy compose (127.0.0.1-only app bindings, internal-only data zone), data-flow diagrams (auth, realtime editing incl. LISTEN/NOTIFY and the 60s collab token, export via the pinned sidecars, backup incl. the ADR-0026 allowlist, and every read channel), named trust boundaries (reverse proxy, plugin sandbox, outbound SMTP/mirror), and the complete list of content copies — in-database, on-volume and outside the instance — that the deletion concept in #229 builds on. Mermaid only, German (assessor audience), with the maintained-in-same-PR rule stated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 10:35:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	868b79c8bc	#213: warn on uploads to classified pages; instance policy can block ... The attachments panel of a classified page shows a persistent notice naming the consequence (de+en): the file inherits the page's classification but its content carries no marking (#212). The new instance setting classification.uploadPolicy (default warn, documented; the VS-NfD reference configuration blocks, #227) hardens the warning into a server-side rejection (403 classified_upload_blocked) — enforced in the upload service, not only in the UI. Tests: warning visible in the local attachments pack; block enforced server-side with warn/block both ways and open pages unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 07:33:34 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	e505fc74dc	#212: mark attachment downloads by filename prefix and companion file ... Downloads whose effective classification is vs_nfd carry the documented VS-NfD_ filename prefix (single source classificationFilenamePrefix() in shared; ADR 0022 records the short form for file names). Effective classification: the linked page's level; an attachment with unset pageId (paste-then-insert, pond-level) FAILS CLOSED to the highest level of any live page in its pond. The pond export ZIP adds a sibling <file>.classification.txt companion with the full marking for classified media, next to the manifest entry (#210). Documented in operations.md, incl. the deliberate residual risk: the file's own content carries no marking (recorded on #231, not hidden). Tests: prefixed classified download, unchanged open download, fail-closed orphan both ways, ZIP companion + manifest level. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 07:29:16 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	521ea514b4	#211: classification through feeds, public API, search and the no-JS shell ... Feeds: classified entries carry a standard Atom <category> (term=level, scheme=urn:dorfteich:classification, label=the fixed wording); the feed document states the highest contained level once; all-open feeds carry none. Public API: page representations (list+get) gain the classification field, OpenAPI + public-api.md documented. Search: every hit carries the level and the palette renders the marking with the snippet (compact form of the banner, text token only). No-JS shell: banner above and below the content, own markup for the separate render path; unclassified pages unchanged everywhere. One test per channel (feed categories + count, public API list/get with the switch on, search hit levels, shell top+bottom). Also: fidelity CI sidecars get per-job container names — the fixed names collided across parallel runs on the shared host (run 547's red fidelity job; a fixed-name cleanup could even kill a sibling's live sidecars). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 07:23:53 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	68497046e9	#210: mark the Markdown ZIP export with frontmatter, imprint and manifest ... A classified page's .md carries the level in YAML frontmatter AND the marking line at top and bottom; unclassified files are byte-identical to before. Every pond archive (incl. the per-pond folders of the account data export) ships a manifest.json listing each file with its level and stating the highest level once at archive level — media inherits the highest classification among the readable pages referencing it (fail-closed). Round trip: the importer recognizes exactly our frontmatter block, strips it plus the imprint lines, and creates the page at least at the imported level (content must not escape its marking by traveling through a ZIP) — pinned by unit and e2e round-trip tests. Foreign frontmatter passes through unchanged; the Obsidian vault import keeps its own frontmatter modes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 07:13:53 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	74a9e495e4	#209: pandoc reference documents carry the VS-NfD marking for DOCX/ODT ... reference-vs-nfd.docx/.odt ship as derived binaries: the pinned pandoc's default reference documents plus a header and footer with the marking — part of the document's page setup, so it repeats on every page in Word and LibreOffice and is not deletable body text. Source of truth is scripts/gen-classified-reference-docs.mjs (wording from shared classificationMarking(); maintenance documented in assets/README.md). The converter passes reference docs to pandoc-server via in-request files + reference-doc; the worker attaches them for marked docx/odt jobs (job option {marking}, as in #208). Unclassified exports pass nothing and are unchanged (pinned by fake-converter test). Fidelity suite asserts against real pandoc 3.6 that marked outputs carry the header/footer parts and unmarked ones do not; per-page repetition verified via LibreOffice 25.8 headless PDF (5/5 pages, 2 markings each, both formats). Word: quick manual look pending (sample files in the workspace), procedure documented in assets/README.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 07:09:47 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	c2df7c0c23	#208: VS-NfD marking in the Gotenberg per-page header and footer ... A classified page's PDF export carries its marking as a job option; the renderer hands it to Gotenberg's Chromium header/footer templates, so it repeats on every page — bold centered in the running header and next to the existing page numbers in the footer. Unclassified pages send exactly the pre-#208 forms (unchanged PDF, asserted by the fidelity smoke and a lastMarking=null check). New real-Gotenberg fidelity test asserts the marking appears twice on EVERY page of a multi-page render while the document-level header keeps working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 06:55:52 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	809e071f14	#207: print stylesheet with the classification on every printed sheet ... First @media print support at all: page size/margins, navigation and interactive chrome suppressed, break behaviour for headings, tables, code blocks, figures and plugin blocks. The VS-NfD marking runs as header AND footer on every sheet via a real-table PrintFrame whose thead/tfoot browsers repeat per page — @page margin boxes are unimplemented and position:fixed places unreliably in both engines (verified empirically); on screen the table chain renders as plain blocks, so nothing changes visually. Verified as PDF-from-browser in Chromium 140 and Firefox 153 (2 markings on every page of a multi-page document); the repeatable procedure is documented in apps/web/e2e/README.md. Unclassified pages print without a marking. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 06:48:44 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	adceca7358	#206: show the VS-NfD marking in web view header and footer ... ClassificationBanner renders the fixed ADR-0022 wording above and below the content in reading view, editor and public page view; unclassified pages show nothing. Announced to assistive tech via a localized hidden prefix (de+en); styled from the plain text token only, so contrast holds in both themes and under every accent with no new color pair. Public content endpoint now carries the classification. New seed fixture classified-note; a11y pack asserts banner top+bottom and axe-clean in light and dark. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 06:18:47 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	488d0d06f1	#205: classification inherits down the tree; lowering is a guarded, audited act ... New pages take max(instance default, parent level); moving a subtree under a higher-classified parent raises every member below that level. No move-like path (reposition, trash-promote, purge-promote) lowers a level as a side effect — pinned by test. Raising is ordinary editorial work; lowering requires the dedicated capability canLowerClassification (pond-wide Pond Admin) in the central permission model. Both directions are audited (page.classification_raised/_lowered, catalogue v1.1) with old value, new value, actor and page. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 06:12:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	183faf7710	#204: classification as first-class page metadata (ADR 0022) ... Enum field on Page (UNCLASSIFIED default, VS_NFD), migration backfills existing pages. New pages take the instance-wide default from classification.newPageDefault (admin-visible, de+en). The value rides in every PageView, so no channel needs an extra request. The field is a marking, not a protection mechanism: a test pins that permission decisions are unchanged by it. The marking wording is fixed in ADR 0022 and sourced solely from classificationMarking() in @dorfteich/shared. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 06:01:50 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	db4f517e44	#203: pin all third-party deploy images by digest ... The four third-party images in the deploy compose (postgres, pandoc, gotenberg — previously a floating MAJOR tag —, caddy) are now name:tag@sha256 pins; the tag stays for readability, the digest decides what runs. The pinned digests are exactly what the stages already run (verified against the live containers' RepoDigests on ONE), so the next recreation is byte-identical. A new early CI step fails on any third-party compose image without a digest; compose.dev.yml is a local convenience and deliberately exempt (its node helpers now follow the #236 pin). Update + rollout procedure in deploy/stages.md — CD does not sync stage composes, so the hand rollout to test/int/prod is part of this issue's definition of done. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 05:13:13 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	000d110727	#201: stable audit event catalogue for syslog/SIEM export ... The 36 audit action ids become a typed union (AUDIT_EVENTS in audit-actions.ts) — an uncatalogued id is now a compile error; every existing id keeps its name. The published, versioned catalogue (docs/architecture/audit-events.md, v1.0) documents per event: trigger, severity, actor and target semantics, and every field, plus the compatibility promise (ids are never repurposed; retiring keeps the row forever) and the stable stdout field set. audit-catalogue.test.ts is the fence: it parses the document's event tables and fails when ids or severities drift from the code (negative case verified). Audit stdout lines now carry the catalogue severity as a routing hint — pino level stays 30 so transport is unaffected; no DB migration. Forwarding path documented: container stdout -> operator's collector; deliberately no application-side syslog client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:51:09 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	c4c84b33f9	#200: hard instance-wide plugins.enabled kill switch ... plugins.enabled (instance setting, default on — plugins predate the switch; the VS-NfD reference configuration turns it off) makes every plugin surface answer 404 via a shared guard: Site-Admin install/list/mode, pond activation and plugin list, the sandbox frame and asset routes. The dropzone watcher quarantines drops instead of installing. Deliberately NOT guarded: the authenticated fallback-metadata route — it serves no plugin code and existing plugin_block nodes need it to render their declared fallback (an image fallback degrades to the neutral placeholder while off, because its bytes live on the disabled asset surface). The editor offers no plugin blocks because the pond plugin list is one of the 404ing surfaces. Admin settings panel gets the toggle (i18n de+en) with the documented api-restart note (in-process settings cache). Answers "code execution inside the zone?" with one verifiable off-switch instead of per-plugin trust machinery (#232, ADR 0025). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:42:42 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	74970f6073	#199: SHA-256 integrity hashes for attachments ... Every upload stores the SHA-256 of its bytes, computed from the in-memory buffer that is written — never by re-reading disk. Every download re-hashes the stored object BEFORE the first byte leaves (memory bounded by the max_file_bytes quota that gated the upload) and fails closed on mismatch with attachment_integrity_failure; the mismatch lands in the audit trail as file.integrity_failed with both hashes. Detection of payload manipulation is the one integrity duty par. 52 VSA leaves with the application — only it knows what the file should be. Pre-#199 rows are hashed by a bounded, idempotent backfill that rides the existing nightly orphan-file-sweep job (no new scheduler job, job fence untouched); unreadable files are logged and retried, never silently skipped, and null-hash rows are served unverified only until the backfill reaches them. Operator runbook note in security.md (restore from backup, re-download, audit entry carries both hashes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:32:29 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	d3289b2167	#202: SBOM and license report in CI ... The release run now generates CycloneDX 1.6 SBOMs with a pinned anchore/syft container — one per released image (scanned from the freshly built image tar, OS packages included) and one for the pnpm workspace (from the lockfile) — plus the full pnpm licenses report, and attaches everything as build artefacts BEFORE publishing the release, so a red gate stops the release. Runner constraints dictated the mechanics (documented in the workflow): the job talks to the HOST daemon, so files travel into the syft container via docker cp and images via docker save to a tar copied the same way (syft cannot read a tar from stdin — verified). scripts/check-licenses.mjs is the documented license policy: permissive allowlist, MPL-2.0/CC-BY-4.0 with recorded reasoning, per-package exception table (khroma: MIT text shipped, metadata missing). CI runs the gate on every PR (pnpm licenses:check); positive and negative case tested locally, both SBOM paths tested against real images/lockfile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:21:58 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	9326177534	#236: also pin the node helper images in workflows ... release.yml and drill.yml ran throwaway `docker run node:22.15-alpine` helpers outside the pin; the drift check now also fails on any node:<other>-alpine reference in .gitea/workflows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:16:07 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	6a520e27b1	#236: pin the Node version ... .node-version (22.15.1) becomes the single authoritative Node version: CI/CD select Node only via node-version-file, every Dockerfile pins node:22.15.1-alpine, and the engines floor in package.json states the same version (open-ended upwards so a newer local Node keeps working — reproducibility rests on images and CI). An early CI step fails on any drift between those places; update procedure in operations.md (Update strategy). Precondition for the reproducibility claim in #219. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:14:55 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	9a43a2f6bb	#235: keep page_links rows pointing at purged pages — recorded decision ... The row is only the index of a wikilink whose text (slug = title) remains visible in the linking page's own content either way; deleting the index would remove nothing the system still shows while breaking phantom-link re-resolution. Kept as an accepted residue, reasoning in operations.md (deletion/purge section) and recorded on #231. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 22:18:39 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	69d9072d2c	#234: retention for mail_outbox ... Sent mails were kept forever, and digest bodies name page titles and actors — an unbounded copy of content-adjacent data. A new daily mail-outbox-retention job deletes SENT rows (by sentAt) and permanently FAILED rows (by nextAttemptAt, the last attempt's stamp) once they pass mail.outboxRetentionDays (instance setting, default 30). PENDING rows — including failed-but-retryable ones — stay the retry loop's alone. Decision recorded (security.md §Privacy, residual-risk note for #231): digest mails keep carrying page titles for now — there is no per-page classification marking yet to key a suppression on (ADR 0022 / M32 revisits), and a VS-NfD reference configuration can leave SMTP unconfigured entirely. Job-count fence in system.spec: 8 -> 9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 22:17:28 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	ff505bc752	#233: prune conversion job payloads for every job kind ... The raw input/result bytes of import/export conversion jobs were kept forever; a deleted classified page could live on inside its last export. A new daily conversion-payload-prune job nulls both once a finished (succeeded or failed) job passes conversion.payloadRetentionDays (instance setting, default 30) — the row survives for status/audit. PENDING and RUNNING rows keep their payload, so the worker's stale-lock recovery path is untouched; a hand-requeued pruned job fails finally via conversionInputOf instead of crashing the worker. The input column becomes nullable; the migration backfills by clearing payloads of jobs already finished longer ago than the default period (recent results stay downloadable until they age out). Job-count fence in system.spec: 7 -> 8 (new scheduler registration). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 22:12:32 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	ff842f97e2	#198: CI fence — no tracked .env or secret material, example is authoritative ... Verification result: only deploy/compose/.env.example was ever tracked (full-history check), zero hits for obvious secret patterns across all added lines in history — recorded on issue #231 (residual-risk list). The new CI step in the checks job fails if any .env other than .env.example is tracked or a tracked file matches an obvious secret pattern (private key blocks, AWS/GitHub/GitLab/Slack token shapes). .env.example already documents every variable the compose files reference (verified: comm of compose ${VAR} refs vs example keys is empty). README states the example as the authoritative reference. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 17:16:00 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	3c62b7b773	#197: security response headers and an explicitly restrictive CORS policy ... Hand-rolled middleware instead of helmet: the header set is small enough to own, every value is a deliberate decision, and the api gains no transitive dependency. HSTS (no includeSubDomains — the api cannot speak for sibling subdomains), nosniff, Referrer-Policy no-referrer, X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN (not DENY: the plugin sandbox frame embeds same-origin and its CSP has no frame-ancestors, so this header governs), and a minimal deny-all Permissions-Policy. CORS grants no foreign origin anything; only the APP_BASE_URL origin is ever echoed (where browsers do not consult CORS anyway), with Vary: Origin on every response. No preflight handling — same-origin requests never preflight, and cross-origin API access is cookie-less by design (PAT/Bearer). Wired via the AppModule MiddlewareConsumer so createTestApp boots the identical middleware. Fences: security-headers.e2e.test.ts (header set, foreign origin gets no ACAO) and a frame assertion in plugins.e2e.db.test.ts (framing stays possible). Rationale table in security.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 17:13:24 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	ed2225bb77	#196: audit-trail retention job ... audit.retentionDays (instance setting, default 365) bounds the audit_log: the daily audit-retention job deletes entries past the period and records the deletion itself (audit.pruned with count, cutoff and period) so a gap in the trail is always explainable. Lives in its own AuditRetentionService because the settings service audits its writes - folding retention into AuditService would close a constructor cycle. The read-access trail (#222-#225) is deliberately not covered; it gets its own period. security.md gains the Logging section the schema has cited for a while; the maintenance-job fence moves 6 -> 7 (the deliberate new row). Refs #196 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 14:59:28 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	960a806ee3	#195: trashed content leaves the search index itself ... Trashing a page (promote and subtree modes) clears the affected search vectors, restoring rebuilds them; pond trash clears every page vector of the pond, pond restore reindexes only the live pages (pages trashed inside stay out); the GDPR pseudonymization's personal-pond trash does the same. reindexAll now converges to the invariant (clears trashed, rebuilds live), and a one-off migration backfills vectors of already-trashed content. The query-side deleted_at guards stay untouched as the independent second layer - the test proves both layers separately, including writing a vector back onto a trashed page (simulating a future path that forgot the clear) and asserting the query still hides it. New provider methods removePond/reindexPond behind the SearchProvider seam. Refs #195 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 14:07:34 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	02c1f18fe1	adjust the maintenance-job count fence: 6 jobs with the orphan sweep ... The system panel spec pins the registered-job count on purpose; the orphan-file-sweep registration (#194) is the deliberate sixth row (CI run 493 caught exactly this, 14x resolved to 6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 13:31:03 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	0bc36aa58c	#194: orphan-file sweep, drop the unused Attachment.deletedAt ... Nightly sweep with two directions: attachments still unclaimed (pageId null) after a 24 h grace period - claimed by no collab persist, page upload, or import - are reclaimed (row, file, quota released); files on the uploads volume without a database row (drift after a crashed upload) are removed once older than the grace period. The grace period protects the paste-then-insert window. Deliberate deviation from the issue's content-reference idea, documented in schema comment and operations.md: claimed attachments whose page content no longer embeds them are NOT auto-deleted. The page attachments panel lists claimed files as user-managed objects (inserting into the document is optional there), so 'not embedded' is not 'unused' - an auto-delete would destroy panel assets. Humans clean those up in the panel or the pond file manager, which flags orphans already. Attachment.deletedAt is removed by migration - deletion is hard everywhere (sweep, purge, manual), there is no soft-delete state; the never-true deletedAt:null filters in files/export queries went with it. Refs #194 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 13:19:58 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	402b22e05f	#193: pond purge — retention job and manual Site-Admin endpoint ... Deletion now actually deletes: a trashed pond past the trash retention (same clock as pages, extended trash-purge job) or purged manually via DELETE /ponds/:id/purge (Site-Admin-only, like pond restore) is removed with everything it holds. Files go first (idempotent rm, resumable on a crash), then one transaction ordered around the FK actions: attachments and labels (Restrict) precede the pond; the page delete cascades versions, comments, content cache incl. the search vector, update log, mentions, label assignments, favorites, outgoing links and open collab sessions; the pond delete cascades grants, usage counters (that is the quota correction), pond-plugin opt-ins and conversion jobs; polymorphic watches and pond quota overrides are deleted explicitly. A purge racing a restore or another purge is a no-op; both paths record a pond.purged audit event. Known residues by design, documented in operations.md: target_slug in other ponds' page links (#235) and backups within their retention. Refs #193 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 12:44:52 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	394d1c811d	#192: deploy-level backup target allowlist ... BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS (comma-separated destination hosts) constrains where backups may go, enforced twice: the api rejects settings writes and connection tests towards non-allowlisted hosts with admin-visible error codes and resolves a non-allowlisted configured target to null, and the sidecar enforces the same policy at the point of egress for the WebDAV upload and the rsync mirror alike (shared policy helpers in packages/shared/src/backup-target-policy.ts). BREAKING: the empty default disables every remote target - backups stay local only, the VS-NfD reference configuration (ADR 0026). Existing deployments with a remote target must list its host or uploads and mirror stop. The admin UI distinguishes unavailable-by-policy from unconfigured (i18n de+en) and shows the permitted hosts. Refs #192 (ADR 0026) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 12:17:14 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	afef45732a	#191: feeds.enabled instance switch, feed-token log masking ... Chosen path: an instance master switch following the api.enabled/ mcp.enabled pattern — while off, both feed routes AND the feed-token management answer 404 (existence hidden). Default ON: feeds predate the switch, existing instances and their subscribed readers keep working; the VS-NfD reference configuration (#227) turns it off. Admin UI gets the toggle next to the API/MCP switches (i18n de+en). Moving the token out of the query string is documented as rejected: a path segment lands in the same proxy and request logs, and feed readers cannot send headers — that is why the credential is in the URL at all. What DID leak was our own request log (pino logs req.url): the req serializer now masks ?token= values (common/mask-token-param.ts), so no code path logs the credential. Refs #191 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 11:34:43 +02:00