dorfteich/apps/api/src/auth/csrf.e2e.db.test.ts
Claude Fable 5 d32c8c3730
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#189: make the CSRF origin check fail closed
A cookie-carrying mutation without Origin and Referer (or with an
unparsable one) is now rejected with 403 csrf_origin_mismatch instead
of passing unchecked. The exception for non-browser clients stays
structural: PAT/bearer requests carry no session cookie and never reach
the check, and a request that does carry the cookie is always checked.

The test harness injects the matching Origin (supertest simulates a
browser page of this instance) with an explicit suppression header for
the negative cases; the Playwright fixture contexts send the header on
their manual seeding calls; release-qa.sh pins APP_BASE_URL and sends
the matching Origin. Dedicated spec covers: missing headers 403,
mismatch 403, unparsable 403, match passes, GETs untouched, PAT
mutation without headers passes, cookie+bearer still checked.

Refs #189

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
2026-07-30 09:34:44 +02:00

179 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import request from 'supertest';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { InstanceSettingsService } from '../settings/instance-settings.service';
import { SUPPRESS_ORIGIN_HEADER, createTestApp, sessionCookieOf } from '../testing/test-app';
import { createTestPrisma, hasTestDb, uniqueSuffix } from '../testing/test-db';
import { UsersService } from '../users/users.service';
/**
* CSRF origin check, fail closed (issue #189): a cookie-carrying mutation
* without `Origin` and `Referer` is rejected exactly like a mismatch, and
* the exception for non-browser clients is structural — PAT/bearer requests
* carry no cookie and never reach the check. Cookie-authenticated requests
* never benefit from any header-based bypass.
*/
describe.skipIf(!hasTestDb)('csrf origin check (e2e, issue #189)', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
let prisma: PrismaClient;
const suffix = uniqueSuffix();
const password = 'csrf fail closed pass 1';
const ids: Record<string, string> = {};
const cookies: Record<string, string> = {};
let pondId: string;
let pondSlug: string;
let patToken: string;
const api = () => request(app.getHttpServer());
async function makeUser(handle: string): Promise<void> {
const users = app.get(UsersService);
const username = `csrf-${handle}-${suffix}`;
const user = await users.createUser({
username,
email: `${username}@example.org`,
displayName: `Csrf ${handle}`,
password,
locale: 'en',
});
await users.markEmailVerified(user.id);
ids[handle] = user.id;
cookies[handle] = sessionCookieOf(
await api()
.post('/api/v1/auth/login')
.send({ usernameOrEmail: username, password })
.expect(200),
);
}
beforeAll(async () => {
prisma = createTestPrisma();
await prisma.rateLimit.deleteMany({});
app = await createTestApp();
for (const handle of ['owner', 'siteadmin']) {
await makeUser(handle);
}
await prisma.user.update({ where: { id: ids.siteadmin! }, data: { isSiteAdmin: true } });
// Per-user quota override, never the instance default (shared database).
await api()
.put(`/api/v1/admin/quotas/user/${ids.owner!}/additional_ponds`)
.set('Cookie', cookies.siteadmin!)
.send({ value: 5 })
.expect(200);
// A pond opted into the public API, and a write-scope PAT for it.
const pond = await api()
.post('/api/v1/ponds')
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.send({ name: `CSRF Pond ${suffix}` })
.expect(201);
pondId = pond.body.id;
pondSlug = pond.body.slug;
await app.get(InstanceSettingsService).set('api.enabled', true, ids.siteadmin!);
await api()
.patch(`/api/v1/ponds/${pondId}`)
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.send({ apiEnabled: true })
.expect(200);
const pat = await api()
.post('/api/v1/users/me/api-tokens')
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.send({ name: 'csrf-write', scope: 'write' })
.expect(201);
patToken = pat.body.token;
});
afterAll(async () => {
const all = Object.values(ids);
await prisma.instanceSetting.deleteMany({ where: { key: 'api.enabled' } });
await prisma.quotaOverride.deleteMany({ where: { subjectId: { in: all } } });
await prisma.auditEntry.deleteMany({ where: { actorId: { in: all } } });
await prisma.apiToken.deleteMany({ where: { userId: { in: all } } });
const ponds = await prisma.pond.findMany({
where: { ownerId: { in: all } },
select: { id: true },
});
const pondIds = ponds.map((p) => p.id);
await prisma.pageVersion.deleteMany({ where: { page: { pondId: { in: pondIds } } } });
await prisma.page.deleteMany({ where: { pondId: { in: pondIds } } });
await prisma.roleGrant.deleteMany({ where: { pondId: { in: pondIds } } });
await prisma.pondUsage.deleteMany({ where: { pondId: { in: pondIds } } });
await prisma.pond.deleteMany({ where: { id: { in: pondIds } } });
await prisma.session.deleteMany({ where: { userId: { in: all } } });
await prisma.userIdentity.deleteMany({ where: { userId: { in: all } } });
await prisma.rateLimit.deleteMany({});
await prisma.user.deleteMany({ where: { id: { in: all } } });
await prisma.$disconnect();
await app.close();
});
it('rejects a cookie mutation that sends neither Origin nor Referer', async () => {
const res = await api()
.patch(`/api/v1/ponds/${pondId}`)
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.set(SUPPRESS_ORIGIN_HEADER, '1')
.send({ name: `CSRF Pond ${suffix}` })
.expect(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('csrf_origin_mismatch');
});
it('rejects a cookie mutation from a mismatching origin (kept behaviour)', async () => {
const res = await api()
.patch(`/api/v1/ponds/${pondId}`)
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.set('Origin', 'https://evil.example')
.send({ name: `CSRF Pond ${suffix}` })
.expect(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('csrf_origin_mismatch');
});
it('rejects a cookie mutation with an unparsable Origin instead of erroring', async () => {
const res = await api()
.patch(`/api/v1/ponds/${pondId}`)
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.set('Origin', 'not a url')
.send({ name: `CSRF Pond ${suffix}` })
.expect(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('csrf_origin_mismatch');
});
it('accepts a cookie mutation from the matching origin', async () => {
await api()
.patch(`/api/v1/ponds/${pondId}`)
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.send({ name: `CSRF Pond ${suffix}` })
.expect(200);
});
it('leaves cookie reads untouched — the check binds to mutations', async () => {
await api()
.get('/api/v1/auth/me')
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.set(SUPPRESS_ORIGIN_HEADER, '1')
.expect(200);
});
it('lets a PAT mutation through without either header — no cookie, no check', async () => {
await api()
.post(`/api/public/v1/ponds/${pondSlug}/pages`)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${patToken}`)
.set(SUPPRESS_ORIGIN_HEADER, '1')
.send({ title: `CSRF PAT page ${suffix}` })
.expect(201);
});
it('enforces the check when a request carries both cookie and bearer token', async () => {
// Cookie-authenticated requests never benefit from the bearer exception.
const res = await api()
.patch(`/api/v1/ponds/${pondId}`)
.set('Cookie', cookies.owner!)
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${patToken}`)
.set(SUPPRESS_ORIGIN_HEADER, '1')
.send({ name: `CSRF Pond ${suffix}` })
.expect(403);
expect(res.body.code).toBe('csrf_origin_mismatch');
});
});