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New /admin/system panel (operations.md §Maintenance jobs): the maintenance job list shows every registered job with truthful last-run data (new Job.lastDurationMs recorded by the scheduler) and a manual trigger that respects the run-mutex and is itself audit-logged; a backup card mirrors the sidecar's status.json including the freshness verdict; an audit-log viewer filters by actor, action, and time range with pagination; and a storage overview lists the largest ponds. Auth events and admin actions (grants, members, user/quota admin, plugins, settings, setup) now land in a new audit_log table through a central AuditService — which keeps emitting the established stdout log line — while content activity stays log-only by design. All endpoints are Site-Admin-only; covered by API DB tests and a Playwright pack in CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
159 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript
159 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript
import {
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BadRequestException,
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ForbiddenException,
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Injectable,
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UnauthorizedException,
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} from '@nestjs/common';
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import { SignupInput } from '@dorfteich/shared';
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import { User } from '@prisma/client';
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import { PinoLogger } from 'nestjs-pino';
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import { AppConfig } from '../config/app-config.service';
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import { MailService } from '../mail/mail.service';
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import { PondsService } from '../ponds/ponds.service';
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import { AuditService } from '../audit/audit.service';
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import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
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import { RateLimitService } from '../rate-limit/rate-limit.service';
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import { InstanceSettingsService } from '../settings/instance-settings.service';
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import { UsersService } from '../users/users.service';
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import { AuthTokensService } from './auth-tokens.service';
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import { SessionsService } from './sessions.service';
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const VERIFY_TTL_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60;
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const RESET_TTL_SECONDS = 60 * 60;
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// Account-scoped login backoff: 5 failures per 15 minutes, reset on success.
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const LOGIN_BACKOFF = { limit: 5, windowSeconds: 15 * 60 };
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@Injectable()
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export class AuthService {
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constructor(
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private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
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private readonly users: UsersService,
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private readonly tokens: AuthTokensService,
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private readonly sessions: SessionsService,
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private readonly mail: MailService,
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private readonly ponds: PondsService,
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private readonly rateLimits: RateLimitService,
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private readonly audit: AuditService,
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private readonly config: AppConfig,
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private readonly settings: InstanceSettingsService,
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private readonly logger: PinoLogger,
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) {
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this.logger.setContext(AuthService.name);
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}
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async signup(input: SignupInput): Promise<void> {
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if ((await this.settings.get('auth.registrationMode')) === 'closed') {
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throw new ForbiddenException({ code: 'registration_closed' });
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}
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const user = await this.users.createUser(input);
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await this.sendVerificationMail(user);
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await this.audit.record({ action: 'auth.signup', actorId: user.id });
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}
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async verifyEmail(token: string): Promise<void> {
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const userId = await this.tokens.consume(token, 'EMAIL_VERIFICATION');
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if (!userId) throw new BadRequestException({ code: 'token_invalid' });
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const user = await this.users.findById(userId);
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if (!user) throw new BadRequestException({ code: 'token_invalid' });
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if (user.status === 'PENDING_VERIFICATION') {
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await this.users.markEmailVerified(userId);
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await this.audit.record({ action: 'auth.email_verified', actorId: userId });
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}
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// Every verified account owns a personal pond (issue #21). Idempotent,
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// so re-verification attempts and races cannot create duplicates.
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await this.ponds.ensurePersonalPond(user);
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}
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/** Always succeeds outwardly — never reveals whether the address exists. */
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async resendVerification(email: string): Promise<void> {
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const user = await this.users.findByEmail(email);
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if (user?.status === 'PENDING_VERIFICATION') {
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await this.sendVerificationMail(user);
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}
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}
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async login(
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usernameOrEmail: string,
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password: string,
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userAgent: string | undefined,
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): Promise<{ sessionToken: string; user: User }> {
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const user = await this.users.findByUsernameOrEmail(usernameOrEmail);
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// Backoff before the (expensive) hash check; keyed by account so a
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// distributed guesser cannot sidestep it by rotating IPs.
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if (user) {
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const backoff = await this.rateLimits.hit(
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'login-account',
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user.id,
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LOGIN_BACKOFF.limit,
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LOGIN_BACKOFF.windowSeconds,
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);
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if (!backoff.allowed) {
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throw new UnauthorizedException({ code: 'login_backoff' });
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}
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}
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const passwordOk = user ? await this.users.checkPassword(user.id, password) : false;
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if (!user || !passwordOk) {
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// Same generic error for unknown user and wrong password.
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await this.audit.record({ action: 'auth.login_failed', actorId: user?.id ?? null });
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throw new UnauthorizedException({ code: 'login_failed' });
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}
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if (user.status === 'DISABLED') {
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throw new ForbiddenException({ code: 'account_disabled' });
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}
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if (user.status === 'PENDING_VERIFICATION') {
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throw new ForbiddenException({ code: 'email_unverified' });
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}
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await this.rateLimits.reset('login-account', user.id);
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const sessionToken = await this.sessions.create(user.id, userAgent);
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await this.prisma.user.update({ where: { id: user.id }, data: { lastLoginAt: new Date() } });
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await this.audit.record({ action: 'auth.login_succeeded', actorId: user.id });
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return { sessionToken, user };
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}
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/** Always succeeds outwardly — never reveals whether the address exists. */
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async forgotPassword(email: string): Promise<void> {
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const user = await this.users.findByEmail(email);
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if (!user || user.status === 'DISABLED') return;
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const token = await this.tokens.issue(user.id, 'PASSWORD_RESET', RESET_TTL_SECONDS);
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await this.mail.enqueue(
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user.email,
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'resetPassword',
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{
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displayName: user.displayName,
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link: `${this.config.env.APP_BASE_URL}/reset-password?token=${token}`,
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},
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asLocale(user.locale),
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);
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}
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async resetPassword(token: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
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const userId = await this.tokens.consume(token, 'PASSWORD_RESET');
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if (!userId) throw new BadRequestException({ code: 'token_invalid' });
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await this.users.setPassword(userId, password);
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// Whoever held old sessions (possibly an attacker) is logged out.
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await this.sessions.destroyAllForUser(userId);
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await this.audit.record({ action: 'auth.password_reset', actorId: userId });
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}
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private async sendVerificationMail(user: User): Promise<void> {
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const token = await this.tokens.issue(user.id, 'EMAIL_VERIFICATION', VERIFY_TTL_SECONDS);
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await this.mail.enqueue(
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user.email,
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'verifyEmail',
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{
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displayName: user.displayName,
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link: `${this.config.env.APP_BASE_URL}/verify-email?token=${token}`,
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},
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asLocale(user.locale),
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);
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}
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}
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function asLocale(locale: string): 'de' | 'en' {
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return locale === 'de' ? 'de' : 'en';
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}
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