dorfteich/apps/api/src/search/reindex.cli.ts
Claude Fable 5 0c6494f209
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Enforce permissions in API guards and retire interim access (#52)
Every route now declares its access rule explicitly and is enforced
through the shared resolution algorithm (permissions.md):

- PermissionGuard + decorators (@RequiresPondRole, @RequiresPagePermission,
  @RequiresAttachmentPermission, @AuthenticatedOnly) applied to every
  route; a route-enumeration test proves full coverage alongside
  @Public()/Site-Admin-guarded routes.
- 404/403 policy (documented in README conventions): denied reads answer
  404 (existence hiding), denied writes on readable things answer 403;
  trash views need write capability (ADR 0013).
- PermissionService resolves page/pond questions via the shared resolver,
  with an in-process pond-context cache (grants + label parents) that is
  invalidated on every grant/label-tree change and TTL-bounded as a
  multi-process safety net. Grant changes also fire pond_access_changed
  for collab revalidation (#39/#53).
- shared: pond-scope resolution (hasPondRole, canSeePond) next to the
  page resolver; grant wire schemas + GrantView.
- Owner Pond-Admin grants: migration backfill for all existing ponds,
  created transactionally with every new pond (shared + personal + seed).
- Grant CRUD under /ponds/:id/grants (pond_admin-gated) with structural
  and referential validation, last-admin protection, audit logs.
- InterimAccessService deleted; page lists, search, backlinks, phantom
  links, and trash listings are filtered per page through the resolver;
  collab tokens are now truly ro for readers.
- Fixture-matrix e2e (reader/editor/pond admin/foreign, label-deny,
  authenticated-subject, revoke-then-immediate-deny cache test).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
2026-07-09 16:31:41 +02:00

33 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { PermissionService } from '../permissions/permission.service';
import { PondPermissionCache } from '../permissions/pond-permission-cache';
import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
import { PostgresSearchProvider } from './postgres-search.provider';
/**
* `search:reindex` CLI (ADR 0010, issue #49): rebuilds the whole search index
* from `page_content_cache`, idempotently — safe to run after a schema change,
* a reseed, or a provider swap. It instantiates the PostgreSQL provider
* directly (no Nest DI): the CLI is run with `tsx`, whose esbuild transform does
* not emit the decorator metadata Nest injection relies on. The provider itself
* is still the one bound in the app (proven by the DI test) — only the CLI's
* wiring is manual.
*/
async function main(): Promise<void> {
const prisma = new PrismaService();
// Reindexing never asks permission questions, but the provider's search
// path needs the service — wire it manually like everything here.
const permissions = new PermissionService(prisma, new PondPermissionCache());
const provider = new PostgresSearchProvider(prisma, permissions);
try {
const count = await provider.reindexAll();
console.log(`search:reindex — indexed ${count} page(s)`);
} finally {
await prisma.$disconnect();
}
}
void main().catch((error) => {
console.error('search:reindex failed:', error);
process.exitCode = 1;
});