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An operator holding a font licence could only use it by baking the file into a custom image, which tied every change to a rebuild and left the file out of the backup. ADR 0016 said there is no runtime font management. It also listed this exact case under "Alternatives considered" — *may become a Site-Admin- level feature later*. The amendment takes that option and answers the two objections it raised: licensing risk (Site Admins only, licence recorded with the family) and file-format attack surface (magic-byte check and a size cap, never a parse). - `CUSTOM_FONTS_DIR` (default `./data/fonts`) — a sibling of uploads and plugins, NOT inside the image-baked `FONTS_DIR`, where a deploy would overwrite it and no backup would ever see it. - One list of data directories (`apps/backup/src/data-dirs.ts`) now feeds both the nightly archive and the restore, so they cannot drift. #306 and #307 add one line each instead of a second mechanism. - Both Dockerfiles bake the path. The backup image sets its volume paths itself ("self-sufficient without compose env" — #71's lesson) and reads no *_DIR from compose; without the ENV entry the archive would have skipped the directory silently. - The PDF path already read WOFF2 from disk at request time, so it only had to pick the other base directory for a custom family. - `fontStack`/`fontEntry` take the instance's uploaded families as an argument — they are runtime data. The catalog is searched first, and a colliding family name is rejected at upload, so a custom font can never shadow a catalog one. - Deletion is never blocked by usage: an unknown family already falls back to the system stack, so affected ponds degrade instead of breaking. The count of affected ponds travels into the audit entry. - Audit catalogue v1.6 (`font.uploaded`, `font.deleted`). Verified: api full suite against a fresh database, 102 files / 571 tests. The upload suite writes into a real temp directory and reads the bytes back off disk, so the storage layer is exercised rather than mocked. |
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| .. | ||
| 0001-typescript-monorepo.md | ||
| 0002-postgresql.md | ||
| 0003-yjs-crdt-collaboration.md | ||
| 0004-tiptap-editor.md | ||
| 0005-react-vite-frontend.md | ||
| 0006-nestjs-prisma-backend.md | ||
| 0007-auth-sessions-oidc-ready.md | ||
| 0008-plugin-sandbox.md | ||
| 0009-import-export-converters.md | ||
| 0010-postgres-fulltext-search.md | ||
| 0011-file-storage-quotas.md | ||
| 0012-i18n.md | ||
| 0013-versioning-and-trash.md | ||
| 0014-gitea-actions-cicd.md | ||
| 0015-backup-strategy.md | ||
| 0016-self-hosted-fonts.md | ||
| 0017-accessibility-by-default.md | ||
| 0018-color-theming.md | ||
| 0019-no-security-base-functions.md | ||
| 0020-token-crypto-key-separation.md | ||
| 0021-external-authentication.md | ||
| 0022-page-classification.md | ||
| 0023-read-access-audit-trail.md | ||
| 0024-reproducible-offline-deployment.md | ||
| 0025-plugin-trust-model.md | ||
| 0026-backup-target-restriction.md | ||
| 0027-vs-nfd-hardening-profile-mode.md | ||