Claude Fable 5
0875e2a087
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Implements the security core of the plugin system: code-plugin surfaces run in opaque-origin iframes (sandbox="allow-scripts", never allow-same-origin) with a capability-filtered RPC bridge. - api: serve a per-plugin sandbox frame document at /plugins/:id/:version/frame with a CSP that pins every load to the plugin's own asset path (built from APP_BASE_URL, not the request Host, so a Host-rewriting proxy cannot break it) and forbids network access (connect-src 'none'). Plugin assets get Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * so the null-origin frame can load its own module bundle. - web: sandbox-host creates the frame, wires the SDK host bridge over a source-filtered postMessage transport, drives render under a 5 s deadline (hung/failed plugin -> placeholder, never a frozen page), and tears down on unmount. PluginFrame/PluginPreviewPage surface it; the built-in ui.resize handler clamps plugin-requested heights. - plugin-sdk: host bridge reports gate violations via onViolation and registers a gated handler for every v1 method, so an undeclared capability is rejected with capability_not_permitted (not unknown_method). - tests: SDK gate unit test; web sandbox unit tests (opaque origin, source filtering, timeout); and the e2e security pack with a permanent malicious fixture plugin proving no escape (DOM/cookies/storage/fetch/ undeclared capability all blocked) plus well-behaved and hung cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
30 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript
30 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript
import type { RpcMessage, RpcTransport } from '@dorfteich/plugin-sdk';
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/**
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* RPC transport bound to one sandbox iframe (ADR 0008, issue #73).
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*
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* Outgoing messages go to the frame's window; `targetOrigin '*'` is the only
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* option for an opaque-origin sandbox (it has no origin to pin), and is safe
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* because the payload never contains secrets — capability *results* flow only
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* after the gate approved the call.
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*
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* Incoming messages are accepted **only** when `event.source` is this exact
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* frame's window: another plugin frame (or any other window) on the page must
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* not be able to spoof requests or responses on this channel.
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*/
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export function frameTransport(frame: HTMLIFrameElement): RpcTransport {
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return {
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post: (message) => {
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frame.contentWindow?.postMessage(message, '*');
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},
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listen: (onMessage) => {
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const listener = (event: MessageEvent): void => {
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if (event.source === null || event.source !== frame.contentWindow) return;
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onMessage(event.data as RpcMessage);
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};
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window.addEventListener('message', listener);
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return () => window.removeEventListener('message', listener);
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},
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};
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}
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