Claude Fable 5
0c85293830
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Token-authenticated machine access at /api/public/v1 — the foundation for the built-in MCP endpoint (#105). Personal access tokens: - api_tokens table (SHA-256 hash, scope read|write, optional pond restriction, expiry, revocation, throttled last-used) + migration; secrets are dt_pat_<random>, shown exactly once - lifecycle endpoints under /users/me/api-tokens (session-only — a leaked token can never mint more tokens) with audit entries api.token_created/api.token_revoked - settings UI section (create with scope/expiry/pond restriction, one-time reveal with copy, list with status + revoke), de+en Activation (404 semantics per #60 on both levels): - instance setting api.enabled (default off, admin settings switch) - pond setting apiEnabled (default off, pond settings toggle; the PondsService settings-merge learned the key — the #92 lesson) Surface (/api/public/v1, excluded from the SPA's global prefix): - me, ponds, pages (list/read as Markdown+HTML, create from Markdown via the shared pipeline, PATCH title/content, DELETE to trash), search (permission-filtered + narrowed to exposed ponds, highlights as **…**), markdown ZIP export, labels (tree, create/rename/recolour/move/delete, assign/unassign), comments (threads, create, resolve/reopen) - content replacement travels the collab-owned document path: the new state lands as a MANUAL version "API update", then the established restore NOTIFY applies it — open editors converge, history stays append-only, no second lineage (VersionsService.replaceContent) - hand-maintained OpenAPI 3.1 document at /openapi.json, pinned to the controller by a route-coverage test in both directions Enforcement: - PublicApiGuard: instance switch → bearer PAT auth (request.user is the token's user) → per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After) → scope (403 scope_required) → pond opt-in + token restriction - the shared PermissionGuard then applies the unchanged permission model; PageParamSource gained pondSlugParam for the slug+slug routes - no cookies anywhere → no CSRF surface (pinned by a hostile-Origin test) - every write audit-logged as api.write with the token attributed Tests/verification: - 12-test e2e pack: lifecycle, switches, permission matrix (reader/editor/outsider × scopes), restriction, page roundtrip incl. restore-NOTIFY assertion, labels, comments incl. policy, search narrowing, ZIP export, rate limit; full api suite 60/60 green (quota fixture via per-user override — never the instance default) - new collab-pack test proves an open editor converges onto an API content replacement (green against a local seeded stack) - UI smoke against the built SPA: token create/reveal/revoke, pond opt-in persists, admin switch persists (10/10) - docs/self-hosting/public-api.md + README link Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
43 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript
43 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { Body, Controller, Delete, Get, HttpCode, Param, Post, Req } from '@nestjs/common';
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import {
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createApiTokenInputSchema,
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type ApiTokenCreatedView,
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type ApiTokenView,
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type CreateApiTokenInput,
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} from '@dorfteich/shared';
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import { AuthedRequest } from '../auth/auth.guard';
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import { ZodValidationPipe } from '../common/zod-validation.pipe';
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import { AuthenticatedOnly } from '../permissions/permission.decorators';
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import { ApiTokensService } from './api-tokens.service';
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/**
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* Personal-access-token lifecycle for the settings UI (issue #104) —
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* session-authenticated and owner-scoped; the public API itself never
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* manages tokens (a leaked token must not be able to mint more).
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*/
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@Controller('users/me/api-tokens')
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@AuthenticatedOnly()
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export class ApiTokensController {
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constructor(private readonly tokens: ApiTokensService) {}
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@Get()
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list(@Req() request: AuthedRequest): Promise<ApiTokenView[]> {
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return this.tokens.list(request.user!);
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}
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@Post()
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create(
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@Body(new ZodValidationPipe(createApiTokenInputSchema)) input: CreateApiTokenInput,
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@Req() request: AuthedRequest,
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): Promise<ApiTokenCreatedView> {
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return this.tokens.create(request.user!, input);
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}
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@Delete(':id')
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@HttpCode(204)
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async revoke(@Param('id') id: string, @Req() request: AuthedRequest): Promise<void> {
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await this.tokens.revoke(request.user!, id);
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}
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}
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