import { z } from 'zod';

import { parseBackupTargetAllowlist } from './backup-target-policy';
import { vsNfdModeSchema } from './vs-nfd-profile';

/**
 * Environment schemas live here so api, collab, and tooling validate their
 * configuration the same way. Every service calls `parseEnv` once at startup
 * and crashes with a readable list of problems instead of failing later at
 * first use.
 */
/** Fields every service configures the same way; keep these in sync. */
const nodeEnv = z.enum(['development', 'test', 'production']).default('development');
const logLevel = z.enum(['fatal', 'error', 'warn', 'info', 'debug', 'trace']).default('info');
/** Version shown in health responses; injected at image build time. */
const appVersion = z.string().default('0.0.0-dev');
/** PostgreSQL connection string — required, there is no sensible default. */
const databaseUrl = z
  .string()
  .min(1)
  .refine((url) => url.startsWith('postgresql://') || url.startsWith('postgres://'), {
    message: 'must be a postgresql:// connection string',
  });
/**
 * Symmetric secret shared by the api (which signs) and the collab server
 * (which verifies) for the short-lived collaboration tokens (issue #34,
 * ADR 0007). The dev default only keeps native dev/test/CI running without
 * extra setup; every real instance MUST set its own identical value in the
 * `.env` of both services (the stage setup and the M8 wizard do this).
 */
const collabTokenSecret = z.string().min(16).default('dev-insecure-collab-token-secret-change-me');

/**
 * Deploy-level allowlist of permissible backup destination HOSTS (issue
 * #192, ADR 0026), comma-separated — e.g. "cloud.example.org,172.30.1.10".
 * Empty (the default) disables EVERY remote target, WebDAV and rsync
 * mirror alike; "local only" is the VS-NfD reference configuration.
 * Deliberately env-only: a compromised Site-Admin account cannot widen it.
 * Shared by the api (settings writes, admin view) and the backup sidecar
 * (the actual egress).
 */
const backupAllowedTargets = z.string().default('').transform(parseBackupTargetAllowlist);

/**
 * SMTP delivery fields, shared by the api (transactional mail) and the
 * backup sidecar (failure alert mail, issue #83). Defaults match the
 * Mailpit container from the dev overlay; production instances configure
 * their real relay in the stage `.env` or through the M8 setup wizard,
 * whose secret store both services overlay the same way.
 */
const smtpFields = {
  SMTP_HOST: z.string().default('localhost'),
  SMTP_PORT: z.coerce.number().int().default(1025),
  SMTP_SECURE: z
    .enum(['true', 'false'])
    .default('false')
    .transform((value) => value === 'true'),
  SMTP_USER: z.string().optional(),
  SMTP_PASS: z.string().optional(),
  SMTP_FROM: z.string().default('Dorfteich <no-reply@localhost>'),
};

export const apiEnvSchema = z.object({
  NODE_ENV: nodeEnv,
  PORT: z.coerce.number().int().min(1).max(65535).default(3000),
  LOG_LEVEL: logLevel,
  APP_VERSION: appVersion,
  DATABASE_URL: databaseUrl,
  COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET: collabTokenSecret,
  /** Set to "false" to skip `prisma migrate deploy` at startup (tests, tooling). */
  MIGRATE_ON_START: z
    .enum(['true', 'false'])
    .default('true')
    .transform((value) => value === 'true'),
  /** Public base URL of this instance — used in e-mail links. */
  APP_BASE_URL: z.string().url().default('http://localhost:5173'),
  /**
   * Session bounds (issue #190). ABSOLUTE caps a session's total lifetime
   * from login — active use never extends it. IDLE ends a session that has
   * not been used for that long; activity renews it (server-side against
   * `lastSeenAt`, not just the cookie). Defaults are deliberately well
   * below the old sliding 30 days; hardened deployments set them lower
   * (see deploy/compose/.env.example).
   */
  SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS: z.coerce
    .number()
    .positive()
    .default(7 * 24),
  SESSION_IDLE_HOURS: z.coerce
    .number()
    .positive()
    .default(3 * 24),
  ...smtpFields,
  /**
   * Filesystem root for uploaded files (ADR 0011). The compose stack
   * mounts the `uploads` volume at `/data/uploads` and sets this
   * explicitly; the relative default only serves native (non-Docker)
   * dev/test runs.
   */
  UPLOADS_DIR: z.string().min(1).default('./data/uploads'),
  /**
   * Base URL of the internal pandoc-server sidecar (ADR 0009, issue #62).
   * The default matches the compose service name; native dev/test runs point
   * it at a locally running container or leave it unreachable (the converter
   * readiness check is warning-level, so an unset sidecar never fails readyz).
   */
  PANDOC_URL: z.string().url().default('http://pandoc:3030'),
  /**
   * Base URL of the internal Gotenberg sidecar for PDF export (ADR 0009, issue
   * #67). Like the converter, its readiness check is warning-level, so an
   * unreachable renderer degrades PDF export without failing readyz. The default
   * matches the compose service name.
   */
  GOTENBERG_URL: z.string().url().default('http://gotenberg:3000'),
  /**
   * Directory of the self-hosted font catalog (WOFF2, ADR 0016), baked into the
   * api image so the PDF exporter can inline a pond's fonts as base64. Native
   * dev/test runs point this at the web app's built `public/fonts`.
   */
  FONTS_DIR: z.string().min(1).default('./fonts'),
  /**
   * Directory holding installed plugin packages (ADR 0008, issue #71). Layout
   * `<PLUGINS_DIR>/<id>/<version>/…` for unpacked bundles the sandbox iframe
   * loads, plus a `_dropzone/` a Site Admin drops ZIPs into and a
   * `_quarantine/` for rejected drops. In Docker a persistent volume mounts
   * here; the relative default serves native dev/test runs.
   */
  PLUGINS_DIR: z.string().min(1).default('./data/plugins'),
  /**
   * The backup sidecar's volume with the restore sets and `status.json`
   * (ADR 0015). The api mounts it read-only and only consumes the status
   * file (readyz freshness, issue #85; admin backup card, issue #86).
   */
  BACKUPS_DIR: z.string().min(1).default('./data/backups'),
  BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS: backupAllowedTargets,
  /**
   * Env-backed secret store (security.md §Secrets, issue #80): a mode-600
   * dotenv-style file on a persistent volume where the setup wizard writes
   * secrets entered in the browser (currently the SMTP configuration).
   * Values from this file fill environment variables that are NOT set on
   * the process — explicit container env always wins, so operators can
   * override a broken wizard entry from the stage `.env`.
   */
  SECRETS_FILE: z.string().min(1).default('./data/secrets.env'),
  /**
   * First-run pre-seeding (issue #80): when the api boots against a database
   * that still requires setup and all three SETUP_ADMIN_* values are set, it
   * creates the Site Admin, applies the optional instance values below, and
   * completes (locks) the wizard — automated deploys never see it.
   */
  SETUP_ADMIN_USERNAME: z.string().optional(),
  SETUP_ADMIN_EMAIL: z.string().optional(),
  SETUP_ADMIN_PASSWORD: z.string().optional(),
  SETUP_ADMIN_DISPLAY_NAME: z.string().optional(),
  SETUP_INSTANCE_NAME: z.string().optional(),
  SETUP_DEFAULT_LOCALE: z.enum(['de', 'en']).optional(),
  SETUP_REGISTRATION_MODE: z.enum(['open', 'closed']).optional(),
  /**
   * External authentication via OIDC (ADR 0021, issue #214). Deploy-level
   * on purpose: who authenticates users is a platform decision, not a
   * runtime setting a Site Admin can flip. OIDC is enabled when ISSUER and
   * CLIENT_ID are both set; configuration is discovery-based
   * (`<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration`). The client secret is
   * optional — a public client uses PKCE alone (always sent regardless).
   */
  OIDC_ISSUER: z.string().url().optional(),
  OIDC_CLIENT_ID: z.string().min(1).optional(),
  OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: z.string().min(1).optional(),
  OIDC_SCOPES: z.string().min(1).default('openid profile email'),
  /** Button label the login page shows, e.g. the agency SSO's name. */
  OIDC_PROVIDER_LABEL: z.string().min(1).default('Single Sign-On'),
  /**
   * Trusted reverse-proxy authentication (ADR 0021, issue #215) — for
   * environments that terminate authentication (or mTLS) at the perimeter.
   * OFF unless BOTH the header name and the peer allowlist are set: a
   * trusted header is a loaded gun, so nothing about it is guessed. The
   * peer check runs against the TCP peer address (never a forwarded
   * header); a request carrying the header from any other peer is
   * rejected and audited.
   */
  /**
   * The hard local-authentication switch (ADR 0021, issue #216) — the
   * deploy-level realization of the planned `auth.local.enabled`. FALSE
   * closes EVERY local credential flow with 404 (login, signup, e-mail
   * verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change); authentication
   * then comes exclusively from OIDC (#214) or the trusted proxy (#215).
   * Deploy-level on purpose: a compromised Site Admin must not be able to
   * reopen the local path at runtime. Bootstrap order: complete the
   * first-run setup (or SETUP_ADMIN_* pre-seed) BEFORE flipping to false.
   */
  AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED: z
    .enum(['true', 'false'])
    .default('true')
    .transform((value) => value === 'true'),
  AUTH_PROXY_HEADER: z.string().min(1).optional(),
  AUTH_PROXY_TRUSTED_PEERS: z
    .string()
    .optional()
    .transform((value) =>
      (value ?? '')
        .split(',')
        .map((peer) => peer.trim())
        .filter(Boolean),
    ),
  /** How the header value maps to a local account: as its username or its
   * e-mail address. No just-in-time creation — the account must exist. */
  AUTH_PROXY_MAP: z.enum(['username', 'email']).default('username'),
  /** `mtls-dn`: the header carries a client-certificate subject DN (as the
   * proxy forwards it) and the identity is the configured attribute. */
  AUTH_PROXY_MODE: z.enum(['plain', 'mtls-dn']).default('plain'),
  AUTH_PROXY_DN_ATTRIBUTE: z.string().min(1).default('CN'),
  /**
   * How the UI and API treat configuration options violating the VS-NfD
   * reference profile (issue #243, ADR 0027): off | marked | hidden |
   * enforced. Default `off` — outside a VS context the profile is not a
   * topic and nothing is marked. Deploy-level like BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS:
   * a compromised Site Admin must not be able to widen the mode.
   */
  VS_NFD_MODE: vsNfdModeSchema.default('off'),
});

export type ApiEnv = z.infer<typeof apiEnvSchema>;

/**
 * Configuration for the collaboration server (Hocuspocus, ADR 0003). It is a
 * thin real-time front-end to the same PostgreSQL database as the api; it does
 * not run migrations (the api owns the schema) and needs no SMTP or uploads.
 */
export const collabEnvSchema = z.object({
  NODE_ENV: nodeEnv,
  PORT: z.coerce.number().int().min(1).max(65535).default(3000),
  LOG_LEVEL: logLevel,
  APP_VERSION: appVersion,
  DATABASE_URL: databaseUrl,
  COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET: collabTokenSecret,
});

export type CollabEnv = z.infer<typeof collabEnvSchema>;

/**
 * Configuration for the backup sidecar (ADR 0015, issue #83). It talks to
 * the same database and mounts the same data volumes as the api, plus its
 * own `backups` volume for the nightly restore sets and `status.json`.
 */
export const backupEnvSchema = z.object({
  NODE_ENV: nodeEnv,
  LOG_LEVEL: logLevel,
  APP_VERSION: appVersion,
  DATABASE_URL: databaseUrl,
  /** Where restore sets and `status.json` are written (the `backups` volume). */
  BACKUPS_DIR: z.string().min(1).default('./data/backups'),
  /** Same mounts as the api — archived together as one restore set. */
  UPLOADS_DIR: z.string().min(1).default('./data/uploads'),
  PLUGINS_DIR: z.string().min(1).default('./data/plugins'),
  /** Daily run time as HH:MM, interpreted in the container's TZ. */
  BACKUP_TIME: z
    .string()
    .regex(/^([01]\d|2[0-3]):[0-5]\d$/, 'must be HH:MM (24h)')
    .default('03:00'),
  /** Local retention in days: 30 for Prod, 7 for Test/Int (ADR 0015). */
  BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS: z.coerce.number().int().min(1).default(30),
  BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS: backupAllowedTargets,
  /** Failure-alert recipient; unset disables the mail (logged instead). */
  BACKUP_MAIL_TO: z.string().optional(),
  /** Language of the failure mail (ADR 0012 — both exist, operator picks). */
  BACKUP_MAIL_LOCALE: z.enum(['de', 'en']).default('en'),
  /** Instance label in the mail subject, e.g. "dorfteich-test". */
  BACKUP_INSTANCE_LABEL: z.string().optional(),
  /**
   * Optional rsync mirror to a private host (issue #84, ADR 0015), e.g.
   * `dorfteich-backup@172.30.1.10:/home/RAID/BACKUPS/dorfteich-prod/`.
   * Unset disables the mirror entirely. Deliberately env-only (operator
   * territory), unlike the admin-configured Nextcloud target (#103).
   */
  BACKUP_MIRROR_TARGET: z.string().optional(),
  /** Private SSH key file for the mirror; mount it via the secrets volume
   * (e.g. `/data/secrets/basel_ed25519`), mode 600, never in the image. */
  BACKUP_MIRROR_SSH_KEY: z.string().optional(),
  BACKUP_MIRROR_SSH_PORT: z.coerce.number().int().min(1).max(65535).default(22),
  ...smtpFields,
  /** Read-only view of the wizard-written secret store (issue #80). */
  SECRETS_FILE: z.string().min(1).default('./data/secrets.env'),
});

export type BackupEnv = z.infer<typeof backupEnvSchema>;

export function parseEnv<Schema extends z.ZodTypeAny>(
  schema: Schema,
  env: Record<string, string | undefined>,
): z.infer<Schema> {
  const result = schema.safeParse(env);
  if (!result.success) {
    const problems = result.error.issues
      .map((issue) => `  - ${issue.path.join('.') || '(root)'}: ${issue.message}`)
      .join('\n');
    throw new Error(`Invalid environment configuration:\n${problems}`);
  }
  return result.data;
}