# ADR 0024: Reproducible offline deployment

- Status: proposed
- Date: 2026-07-29

## Context

A VS zone has no internet egress. "Should work offline" is the answer that
loses a first meeting; "tested, here is the procedure" is the one that
wins it — which is why the plan pulled this out of the roadmap into
Phase 1.

The current state is favourable but unverified. There is no telemetry, no
update check, no CDN; fonts are self-hosted (ADR 0016); CSP is
`default-src 'self'`; search is Postgres rather than an external engine;
the drawio plugin is vendored rather than loaded from a remote editor. What
is missing is evidence, plus two real gaps: images are referenced by tag
(including the floating `gotenberg/gotenberg:8`), and there is no
documented mirror or update path.

## Decision

1. **All third-party images are pinned by digest** (`name:tag@sha256:…`).
   The tag stays for human readability; the digest decides what runs. A CI
   check rejects any un-digested third-party reference.
2. **The image list is generated, not hand-maintained**, so a mirror
   procedure cannot silently miss a service.
3. **An internal registry is the supported source.** Compose takes the
   registry prefix from configuration; no site edits image references.
4. **Reproducibility without network is a stated choice between two
   paths**: an offline pnpm store enabling `install` + `build` with
   networking disabled, **or** prebuilt images only with no customer-side
   build. Either is acceptable; leaving it unstated is not, because it
   determines whether the customer can patch locally.
5. **The airgap claim is proven by a documented run** in a network-isolated
   environment, covering every function including the export sidecars, and
   listing every outbound connection attempt observed. This run is the
   artefact, and it also answers the plan's open question about what breaks
   offline.
6. **The offline update path is part of the decision, not an afterthought**:
   bundle, verify by digest, back up, apply, verify, roll back — with the
   irreversibility of migrations stated explicitly.

## Decisions taken in #219

- **Both paths, with stated roles**: customers OPERATE prebuilt,
  digest-pinned images (the CI release build; mirrored per #218) — no
  customer-side build for operation. ADDITIONALLY the workspace build is
  verified to work with networking disabled, so site-local patching
  remains possible (open source as an audit advantage) — the "no local
  patching" consequence therefore does not apply.
- **The offline kit** is the pnpm store plus the build user's `~/.cache`
  (the prisma postinstall pulls its engines from there instead of the
  network) — both filled by one online `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`.
- **Evidence**: `pnpm install --offline --frozen-lockfile` and
  `pnpm build` under `docker run --network none` (node:22.15.1-alpine,
  pnpm 11.9.0 — the pinned toolchain), reproduced twice from clean
  checkouts (`docs/vs-nfd/96-offline-build-protokoll.md`).
- **The one network dependency found**: the drawio plugin's installable
  ZIP fetches its pinned vendor tarball on first build. Deploy images
  contain no plugin ZIPs, so the delivery-relevant build is fully
  offline (`CI=1` skips the fetch, as in CI); for an offline ZIP build
  the tarball is pre-seeded into `packages/plugins/drawio/vendor/`.

## Decisions taken in #220 and #221

- **The airgap claim is proven** (decision 5 executed): a full deployment
  ran in an environment with no egress path at all; the complete capture
  shows the application makes exactly one outbound attempt — SMTP — which
  fails contained in the outbox while the instance stays functional.
  Evidence: `docs/vs-nfd/97-isolationslauf-protokoll.md`. The run
  surfaced and fixed one real defect (#288, restore on partitioned
  tables).
- **The update path is defined and rehearsed** (decision 6 executed):
  procedure in `docs/operations/update-runbook.md`; rehearsed in the same
  isolated environment including one deliberate failed-update rollback.
  Migration irreversibility is stated explicitly: failed migrations roll
  back their own transaction but block every further `migrate deploy`
  (P3009) until `migrate resolve --rolled-back`; successfully applied,
  semantically irreversible migrations have exactly one way back — the
  pre-update backup set. No rolling updates on a compose stage; updates
  happen in a short maintenance window. Evidence:
  `docs/vs-nfd/98-update-rollback-protokoll.md`.

## Consequences

- Digest pinning creates recurring maintenance: security updates now
  require an explicit, reviewable change. That visibility is the point.
- Digest pinning must precede the mirror and update work, so it sits in the
  `hardening & supply chain` milestone rather than this one.
- The isolated test run will surface findings; each becomes its own issue
  referenced from #220 rather than expanding that issue's scope.
- Outbound SMTP is the one connection an authority may or may not permit;
  the deployment must be functional without it, and the consequences of
  disabling it (no notifications, no verification mail — which interacts
  with `auth.local.enabled = false`) are documented.
- CD does not sync stage composes, so digest changes need an explicit
  rollout step on the stage hosts.

## Implementing issues

#203 (digest pinning), #218 (registry mirror), #219 (network-free build),
#220 (isolated test run), #221 (offline update path), #236 (pinned Node
version — added from the Ist-Aufnahme, I-26).