apps/api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import { InstanceSettingsService } from '../settings/instance-settings.service';
 import { SetupExempt } from '../setup/setup.guard';
 import {
   AuthedRequest,
+  LocalCredentialFlow,
   Public,
   SESSION_COOKIE,
   setSessionCookie,
@@ -55,13 +56,14 @@ export class AuthController {
   @Get('methods')
   methods(): AuthMethodsView {
     return {
-      local: true,
+      local: this.config.env.AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED,
       oidc: this.oidc.enabled ? { label: this.oidc.providerLabel } : null,
     };
   }
 
   @Public()
   @Post('signup')
+  @LocalCredentialFlow()
   @HttpCode(201)
   @RateLimit({ scope: 'signup', limit: 5, windowSeconds: 60 * 60 })
   async signup(@Body(new ZodValidationPipe(signupInputSchema)) input: SignupInput): Promise<void> {
@@ -70,6 +72,7 @@ export class AuthController {
 
   @Public()
   @Post('verify-email')
+  @LocalCredentialFlow()
   @HttpCode(204)
   @RateLimit({ scope: 'verify-email', limit: 20, windowSeconds: 60 * 60 })
   async verifyEmail(
@@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ export class AuthController {
 
   @Public()
   @Post('resend-verification')
+  @LocalCredentialFlow()
   @HttpCode(204)
   @RateLimit({ scope: 'resend-verification', limit: 5, windowSeconds: 60 * 60 })
   async resendVerification(
@@ -93,6 +97,7 @@ export class AuthController {
   @SetupExempt()
   @Public()
   @Post('login')
+  @LocalCredentialFlow()
   @HttpCode(200)
   @RateLimit({ scope: 'login', limit: 10, windowSeconds: 60 })
   async login(
@@ -136,6 +141,7 @@ export class AuthController {
 
   @Public()
   @Post('forgot-password')
+  @LocalCredentialFlow()
   @HttpCode(204)
   @RateLimit({ scope: 'forgot-password', limit: 5, windowSeconds: 60 * 60 })
   async forgotPassword(
@@ -146,6 +152,7 @@ export class AuthController {
 
   @Public()
   @Post('reset-password')
+  @LocalCredentialFlow()
   @HttpCode(204)
   @RateLimit({ scope: 'reset-password', limit: 10, windowSeconds: 60 * 60 })
   async resetPassword(

apps/api/src/auth/auth.guard.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import {
   ExecutionContext,
   ForbiddenException,
   Injectable,
+  NotFoundException,
   SetMetadata,
   UnauthorizedException,
   createParamDecorator,
@@ -22,6 +23,18 @@ const IS_PUBLIC_KEY = 'isPublic';
 /** Marks a route as reachable without a session (login, signup, healthz…). */
 export const Public = (): MethodDecorator & ClassDecorator => SetMetadata(IS_PUBLIC_KEY, true);
 
+export const LOCAL_CREDENTIAL_KEY = 'isLocalCredentialFlow';
+/**
+ * Marks a route as part of the LOCAL credential machinery (issue #216,
+ * ADR 0021): password login, signup, e-mail verification, password
+ * forgot/reset/change. With `AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED=false` every marked route
+ * answers 404 (existence hidden, the switch precedent) — and the
+ * enumeration fence in `local-auth-switch.e2e.db.test.ts` fails when an
+ * auth route is neither marked nor on its reviewed allowlist, so a new
+ * credential flow cannot ship unswitched by accident.
+ */
+export const LocalCredentialFlow = (): MethodDecorator => SetMetadata(LOCAL_CREDENTIAL_KEY, true);
+
 export interface AuthedRequest extends Request {
   user?: User;
   sessionId?: string;
@@ -90,6 +103,17 @@ export class AuthGuard implements CanActivate {
 
   async canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): Promise<boolean> {
     const request = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<AuthedRequest>();
+
+    // The hard local-auth switch (issue #216): marked credential routes
+    // disappear entirely — before any session or CSRF logic runs.
+    if (!this.config.env.AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED) {
+      const isLocalFlow = this.reflector.getAllAndOverride<boolean>(LOCAL_CREDENTIAL_KEY, [
+        context.getHandler(),
+        context.getClass(),
+      ]);
+      if (isLocalFlow) throw new NotFoundException();
+    }
+
     const rawToken = (request.cookies as Record<string, string> | undefined)?.[SESSION_COOKIE];
 
     if (rawToken && MUTATING_METHODS.has(request.method)) {

apps/api/src/auth/auth.module.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
-import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Logger, Module, OnModuleInit } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { APP_GUARD } from '@nestjs/core';
 
+import { AppConfig } from '../config/app-config.service';
+
 import { MailModule } from '../mail/mail.module';
 import { PondsModule } from '../ponds/ponds.module';
 import { UsersModule } from '../users/users.module';
@@ -27,4 +29,21 @@ import { SessionsModule } from './sessions.module';
   ],
   exports: [AuthTokensService, AuthService, OidcService],
 })
-export class AuthModule {}
+export class AuthModule implements OnModuleInit {
+  constructor(
+    private readonly config: AppConfig,
+    private readonly oidc: OidcService,
+    private readonly proxyIdentity: ProxyIdentityService,
+  ) {}
+
+  onModuleInit(): void {
+    // #216: local auth off without ANY external path means nobody can ever
+    // sign in — loudly stated at boot, because the operator will otherwise
+    // discover it at the login screen.
+    if (!this.config.env.AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED && !this.oidc.enabled && !this.proxyIdentity.enabled) {
+      new Logger(AuthModule.name).warn(
+        'AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED=false with neither OIDC nor proxy authentication configured — no sign-in path exists',
+      );
+    }
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/auth/local-auth-switch.e2e.db.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+
+import { INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { PATH_METADATA } from '@nestjs/common/constants';
+import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
+import request from 'supertest';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+
+import { createTestApp } from '../testing/test-app';
+import { createTestPrisma, hasTestDb, uniqueSuffix } from '../testing/test-db';
+import { UsersService } from '../users/users.service';
+
+import { LOCAL_CREDENTIAL_KEY } from './auth.guard';
+import { AuthController } from './auth.controller';
+import { OidcController } from './oidc.controller';
+import { SessionsService } from './sessions.service';
+
+/**
+ * The hard local-auth switch (issue #216, ADR 0021): AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED=false
+ * closes EVERY local credential flow with 404 — enumerated, not assumed —
+ * while sessions themselves, logout, and token issuance for
+ * externally-authenticated users keep working (the stated decision: PATs
+ * and feed tokens authorize API access under their own switches, they are
+ * not interactive sign-in). A fence asserts every auth route is either
+ * marked as a local flow or on the reviewed allowlist.
+ */
+describe.skipIf(!hasTestDb)('local-auth switch (e2e, issue #216)', () => {
+  let app: INestApplication;
+  let prisma: PrismaClient;
+  const suffix = uniqueSuffix();
+
+  /** Every local credential surface — the enumeration the issue demands. */
+  const LOCAL_ROUTES: { method: 'post'; path: string; body: Record<string, unknown> }[] = [
+    { method: 'post', path: '/api/v1/auth/login', body: { usernameOrEmail: 'x', password: 'y' } },
+    {
+      method: 'post',
+      path: '/api/v1/auth/signup',
+      body: {
+        username: `switch-${suffix}`,
+        email: `switch-${suffix}@example.test`,
+        displayName: 'x',
+        password: 'ein langes passwort 123',
+        locale: 'en',
+      },
+    },
+    { method: 'post', path: '/api/v1/auth/verify-email', body: { token: 'x' } },
+    {
+      method: 'post',
+      path: '/api/v1/auth/resend-verification',
+      body: { email: 'x@example.test' },
+    },
+    { method: 'post', path: '/api/v1/auth/forgot-password', body: { email: 'x@example.test' } },
+    {
+      method: 'post',
+      path: '/api/v1/auth/reset-password',
+      body: { token: 'x', password: 'ein langes passwort 123' },
+    },
+    {
+      method: 'post',
+      path: '/api/v1/users/me/change-password',
+      body: { currentPassword: 'x', newPassword: 'ein langes passwort 123' },
+    },
+  ];
+
+  const api = () => request(app.getHttpServer());
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    prisma = createTestPrisma();
+    await prisma.rateLimit.deleteMany({});
+    process.env.AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED = 'false';
+    app = await createTestApp();
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    delete process.env.AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED;
+    await prisma.apiToken.deleteMany({ where: { user: { username: { contains: suffix } } } });
+    await prisma.feedToken.deleteMany({ where: { user: { username: { contains: suffix } } } });
+    await prisma.user.deleteMany({ where: { username: { contains: suffix } } });
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+    await app.close();
+  });
+
+  it('answers 404 on every enumerated local credential route', async () => {
+    for (const route of LOCAL_ROUTES) {
+      const res = await api()[route.method](route.path).send(route.body);
+      expect(`${route.path}: ${res.status}`).toBe(`${route.path}: 404`);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('reports local:false so the login screen hides the form', async () => {
+    const res = await api().get('/api/v1/auth/methods').expect(200);
+    expect(res.body.local).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps sessions, logout, and PAT/feed-token issuance working for externally-authenticated users', async () => {
+    // An externally-authenticated user is simulated by creating the session
+    // through the session service — exactly what the OIDC/proxy paths do.
+    const users = app.get(UsersService);
+    const user = await users.createUser({
+      username: `ext-${suffix}`,
+      email: `ext-${suffix}@example.test`,
+      displayName: 'External',
+      password: 'nie benutzt weil lokal aus',
+      locale: 'en',
+    });
+    await users.markEmailVerified(user.id);
+    const token = await app.get(SessionsService).create(user.id, undefined);
+    const cookie = `dt_session=${token}`;
+
+    const me = await api().get('/api/v1/auth/me').set('Cookie', cookie).expect(200);
+    expect(me.body.id).toBe(user.id);
+
+    // Stated decision (#216): token issuance is API authorization, not
+    // interactive sign-in — it stays available under its own switches.
+    await api()
+      .post('/api/v1/users/me/api-tokens')
+      .set('Cookie', cookie)
+      .send({ name: `switch-${suffix}`, scope: 'read' })
+      .expect(201);
+    await api()
+      .post('/api/v1/users/me/feed-tokens')
+      .set('Cookie', cookie)
+      .send({ name: `switch-${suffix}` })
+      .expect(201);
+
+    await api().post('/api/v1/auth/logout').set('Cookie', cookie).expect(204);
+    await api().get('/api/v1/auth/me').set('Cookie', cookie).expect(401);
+  });
+
+  it('fence: every auth route is either a marked local flow or on the reviewed allowlist', () => {
+    // Routes that must stay reachable with local auth off — reviewed here.
+    const allowlist = new Set([
+      'registration', // signup-mode discovery; harmless metadata
+      'methods', // the login screen's discovery endpoint
+      'logout', // ending a session is not a credential flow
+      'me', // session introspection
+      'login', // OidcController: IdP redirect
+      'link', // OidcController: explicit identity linking
+      'callback', // OidcController: IdP return leg
+    ]);
+    for (const controller of [AuthController, OidcController]) {
+      for (const name of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(controller.prototype)) {
+        if (name === 'constructor') continue;
+        const handler = controller.prototype[name as keyof typeof controller.prototype] as (
+          ...args: unknown[]
+        ) => unknown;
+        const path = Reflect.getMetadata(PATH_METADATA, handler) as string | undefined;
+        if (path === undefined) continue; // not a route
+        const marked = Reflect.getMetadata(LOCAL_CREDENTIAL_KEY, handler) === true;
+        expect(
+          marked || allowlist.has(path),
+          `${controller.name}.${name} (path "${path}") is neither @LocalCredentialFlow nor allowlisted`,
+        ).toBe(true);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/src/users/users.controller.ts

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import {
   updateProfileInputSchema,
 } from '@dorfteich/shared';
 
-import { AuthedRequest, toCurrentUser } from '../auth/auth.guard';
+import { AuthedRequest, toCurrentUser, LocalCredentialFlow } from '../auth/auth.guard';
 import { SessionsService } from '../auth/sessions.service';
 import { ZodValidationPipe } from '../common/zod-validation.pipe';
 import { AuthenticatedOnly } from '../permissions/permission.decorators';
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ export class UsersController {
   }
 
   @Post('change-password')
+  @LocalCredentialFlow()
   @HttpCode(204)
   async changePassword(
     @Body(new ZodValidationPipe(changePasswordInputSchema))

apps/web/src/pages/auth/LoginPage.tsx

@@ -68,17 +68,27 @@ export function LoginPage(): React.JSX.Element {
           <a className="button button--block" href="/api/v1/auth/oidc/login">
             {t('auth:oidc.signIn', { provider: methods.data.oidc.label })}
           </a>
+          {methods.data.local && (
             <p className="auth-card__separator" aria-hidden="true">
               {t('auth:oidc.or')}
             </p>
+          )}
         </>
       )}
+      {/* AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED=false (#216): the local form and its
+          credential links disappear — the api answers 404 there anyway. */}
+      {(methods.data?.local ?? true) && (
+        <>
           <form onSubmit={onSubmit} noValidate>
             <FormError error={error} />
             {unverified && !resent && (
               <p className="form-banner">
                 {t('auth:login.resendHint')}{' '}
-            <button type="button" className="linklike" onClick={() => void resendVerification()}>
+                <button
+                  type="button"
+                  className="linklike"
+                  onClick={() => void resendVerification()}
+                >
                   {t('auth:login.resendLink')}
                 </button>
               </p>
@@ -91,7 +101,11 @@ export function LoginPage(): React.JSX.Element {
               <input type="text" autoComplete="username" {...form.register('usernameOrEmail')} />
             </Field>
             <Field label={t('auth:login.password')} error={form.formState.errors.password?.message}>
-          <input type="password" autoComplete="current-password" {...form.register('password')} />
+              <input
+                type="password"
+                autoComplete="current-password"
+                {...form.register('password')}
+              />
             </Field>
             <button type="submit" className="button" disabled={form.formState.isSubmitting}>
               {t('auth:login.submit')}
@@ -103,6 +117,8 @@ export function LoginPage(): React.JSX.Element {
           <p className="auth-card__links">
             {t('auth:login.noAccount')} <Link to="/signup">{t('auth:login.signupLink')}</Link>
           </p>
+        </>
+      )}
     </div>
   );
 }

docs/architecture/adr/0021-external-authentication.md

@@ -81,6 +81,25 @@ expect the application to trust a header or a client certificate.
   terminator forwards the certificate subject DN and the configured
   attribute (default CN) is the identity, under the same peer rules.
 
+## Decisions taken in #216
+
+- **Deploy-level, not runtime**: the switch is the environment variable
+  `AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED` (default true). A compromised Site Admin cannot
+  reopen the local path — the runtime-flip residual risk from the
+  consequences below therefore does NOT materialize (R-02 closed).
+- **404 semantics** on every marked flow (login, signup, verification,
+  resend, password forgot/reset/change), enforced centrally in the auth
+  guard via the `@LocalCredentialFlow()` marker; an enumeration fence
+  fails when an auth route is neither marked nor on the reviewed
+  allowlist, so a new credential flow cannot ship unswitched.
+- **Bootstrap**: complete the first-run setup (or the `SETUP_ADMIN_*`
+  pre-seed, which does not run through HTTP routes) BEFORE flipping to
+  false — the wizard needs no permanent exemption. The api warns at boot
+  when local auth is off and neither OIDC nor proxy auth is configured.
+- **PAT and feed-token issuance stay available** to (IdP-)authenticated
+  sessions: they authorize API access under their own switches
+  (`api.enabled`, `feeds.enabled`), they are not interactive sign-in.
+
 ## Consequences
 
 - Bootstrapping needs a documented answer: the first-run wizard creates a

docs/architecture/security.md

@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ or sloppy plugin authors, compromised dependencies.
   is deliberately NOT implemented: sessions are short-bounded, and the
   claim-mapping revocation path (#217) plus the account-disable flag
   cover the leaver case — recorded in ADR 0021.
+- **The hard local-auth switch (issue #216)**: `AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED=false`
+  closes every local credential flow with 404 — login, signup, e-mail
+  verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change — enforced centrally
+  in the auth guard via a route marker with an enumeration fence.
+  Deploy-level on purpose (a compromised Site Admin cannot flip it back).
+  Sessions, logout and PAT/feed-token issuance for externally
+  authenticated users keep working; stored password hashes remain
+  (documented, ADR 0021). Bootstrap: complete setup before flipping.
 - **Trusted-proxy / mTLS path (issue #215)** — for perimeters that
   authenticate before the application. **The trust boundary, precisely:**
   the identity header (`AUTH_PROXY_HEADER`) is honoured if and only if

docs/vs-nfd/20-massnahmenplan.md

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ _Meilenstein: `M27 — VS-NfD: external authentication`_
       ausbauen), Keycloak als Referenz-IdP · 5–6 AT · #214
 - [x] Alternativpfad vertrauenswürdiger Reverse-Proxy-Header bzw. mTLS-
       Client-Zertifikat · 2 AT · #215
-- [ ] **Harter Schalter `auth.local.enabled = false`** inkl. Reset- und
+- [x] **Harter Schalter `auth.local.enabled = false`** inkl. Reset- und
       Registrierungs-Flows, PATs und Feed-Tokens · 2 AT · #216
 - [ ] Gruppen-/Rollen-Mapping aus IdP-Claims auf das Permission-Modell · 2–3 AT · #217
 

docs/vs-nfd/50-haertungsleitfaden.md

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Settings-Cache ist in-process (operations.md).
 ### 1.2 Deploy-Konfiguration (`.env` / Compose — nur Plattformzugriff, bewusst nicht per Admin-UI)
 
 | Variable                                                                                                        | Referenzwert                                                  | Warum                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
-| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | `BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS`                                                                                        | leer lassen **oder** exakt der eine freigegebene Spiegel-Host | leere Allowlist schaltet ALLE Fernziele hart ab (ADR 0026, #192) — „Backup nur lokal" ist damit deploy-seitig erzwungen und vom Site-Admin nicht aufweichbar (Rollentrennung, Betriebshandbuch §6).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
 | `SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS`                                                                                        | `12` (Default 168)                                            | eine Sitzung überdauert keinen Arbeitstag; Neuanmeldung am nächsten Tag ist der Preis.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
 | `SESSION_IDLE_HOURS`                                                                                            | `2` (Default 72)                                              | unbeaufsichtigte, noch angemeldete Arbeitsplätze fallen schnell zurück auf die Anmeldemaske.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
@@ -56,12 +56,14 @@ Settings-Cache ist in-process (operations.md).
 | `LOG_LEVEL`                                                                                                     | `info`                                                        | Audit-Zeilen (`audit: `-Präfix) müssen den Collector erreichen; `debug` nur zur Störungssuche.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
 | `OIDC_ISSUER`, `OIDC_CLIENT_ID`, `OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, `OIDC_SCOPES`, `OIDC_PROVIDER_LABEL`                     | IdP der Behörde konfigurieren                                 | Fremdauthentisierung (#214, ADR 0021): Authorization Code + PKCE gegen den IdP der Umgebung; deploy-seitig, weil die Authentisierungshoheit Plattformsache ist. Erst-Login legt Konten just-in-time an; bestehende lokale Konten werden NIE stillschweigend per E-Mail übernommen (expliziter Link-Flow). Konfigurationsdetails: security.md §External authentication.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
 | `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER`, `AUTH_PROXY_TRUSTED_PEERS`, `AUTH_PROXY_MAP`, `AUTH_PROXY_MODE`, `AUTH_PROXY_DN_ATTRIBUTE` | nur bei Perimeter-Authentisierung setzen                      | Alternativpfad (#215): Identität aus dem Proxy-Header, gültig NUR vom TCP-Peer der Allowlist; fremder Peer mit Header wird abgewiesen und auditiert (`auth.proxy_rejected`). Der Proxy MUSS den Header aus eingehendem Verkehr strippen. mTLS-Variante über weitergereichten Zertifikats-DN (`mtls-dn`). Ohne Perimeter-Auth: unkonfiguriert lassen (Header wirkungslos).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| `AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED`                                                                                            | `false` (Default `true`)                                      | **der** harte Schalter aus ADR 0021 (#216, deploy-seitige Realisierung von `auth.local.enabled`): `false` schaltet JEDEN lokalen Credential-Flow auf 404 (Login, Signup, Verifikation, Passwort vergessen/zuruecksetzen/aendern) — Anmeldung ausschliesslich ueber OIDC (#214) bzw. Perimeter-Auth (#215). Deploy-seitig, damit ein kompromittierter Site-Admin ihn nicht zurueckdrehen kann. Reihenfolge: erst Setup/Bootstrap (SETUP_ADMIN_*), dann auf `false`. PAT-/Feed-Token-Ausgabe bleibt fuer IdP-authentisierte Nutzer verfuegbar (eigene Schalter `api.enabled`/`feeds.enabled`; bewusste Entscheidung #216). |
 
 ### 1.3 Noch nicht verfügbar (Regel: landet hier im selben PR)
 
+Derzeit leer — `auth.local.enabled` ist mit #216 als `AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED` (1.2) scharfgestellt.
+
 | Schalter | Referenzwert (geplant) | Status |
-| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| -------- | ---------------------- | ------ |
-| `auth.local.enabled` | `false` — lokale Passwort-Auth aus, Anmeldung nur über die Fremdauthentisierung der Behörde | ⏳ kommt mit #216 (M27); bis dahin bleibt lokale Auth der einzige Anmeldeweg und `auth.registrationMode=closed` + Session-Verkürzung sind die Kompensation. Zeile wird im #216-PR scharfgestellt. |
 
 ## 2 Verifikations-Checkliste
 
@@ -73,6 +75,7 @@ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://HOST/api/public/v1/ponds   # 40
 curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST https://HOST/api/mcp       # 404 (mcp.enabled=false)
 curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://HOST/api/v1/public/IRGENDEIN-TEICH/feed.xml   # 404 (feeds.enabled=false)
 curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://HOST/api/v1/admin/plugins  # 401/404, nie 200 ohne Session
+curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST https://HOST/api/v1/auth/login   # 404 (AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED=false)
 curl -s https://HOST/api/v1/readyz                                          # status ok
 ```
 

docs/vs-nfd/90-restrisiken.md

@@ -33,21 +33,21 @@ nachvollziehbar.
   Empfänger.
 - **Entscheidung:** Projektleitung, PR #271 / Issue #212, 31.07.2026.
 
-## R-02 Lokale Passwort-Authentifizierung noch nicht abschaltbar
+## R-02 Lokale Passwort-Authentifizierung noch nicht abschaltbar — ERLEDIGT (#216, 31.07.2026)
 
-- **Risiko:** Bis #216 (M27) existiert kein Schalter
+- **Status: geschlossen.** Der harte Schalter existiert als Deploy-Variable
-  `auth.local.enabled=false`; die Anwendung führt eigene
+  `AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED=false` (#214–#216, ADR 0021): jeder lokale
-  Passwort-Konten, obwohl die Behördenumgebung Fremdauthentisierung
+  Credential-Flow (Login, Signup, Verifikation, Passwort
-  vorsieht. Zusätzlich ist noch offen, ob der Schalter zur Laufzeit
+  vergessen/zurücksetzen/ändern) antwortet 404; Anmeldung läuft über
-  umschaltbar sein wird oder einen Neustart verlangt — das entscheidet
+  OIDC (#214) bzw. Perimeter-Auth (#215). Die im Risiko offene Frage
-  #216 und trägt es hier nach.
+  „Laufzeit oder Deploy-Ebene" ist zugunsten der Deploy-Ebene
-- **Warum akzeptiert:** Reihenfolge der Umsetzung (M26 vor M27);
+  entschieden — ein kompromittierter Site-Admin kann den lokalen Pfad
-  produktiver VS-NfD-Betrieb beginnt erst nach M27.
+  nicht wieder öffnen; damit entsteht KEIN Laufzeit-Restrisiko.
-- **Kompensation:** Referenzkonfiguration (`50-haertungsleitfaden.md`):
+  Verbleibender Hinweis (dokumentiert, ADR 0021): bestehende
-  Registrierung geschlossen, kurze Sessions (12 h absolut / 2 h idle),
+  Argon2id-Passwort-Hashes bleiben nach dem Umschalten in der Datenbank
-  Argon2id-Hashes, Rate-Limits, Audit der Anmeldungen.
+  stehen; ihre Löschung ist bewusst nicht Teil von #216.
-- **Entscheidung:** Projektleitung, Maßnahmenplan Rev. 2 (M27-Planung),
+- **Entscheidung:** Projektleitung, Issue #216, 31.07.2026 (ursprüngliche
-  30.07.2026.
+  Aufnahme: Maßnahmenplan Rev. 2, 30.07.2026).
 
 ## R-03 Plugin-Hash-Pinning verschoben
 

packages/shared/src/env.ts

@@ -177,6 +177,20 @@ export const apiEnvSchema = z.object({
    * header); a request carrying the header from any other peer is
    * rejected and audited.
    */
+  /**
+   * The hard local-authentication switch (ADR 0021, issue #216) — the
+   * deploy-level realization of the planned `auth.local.enabled`. FALSE
+   * closes EVERY local credential flow with 404 (login, signup, e-mail
+   * verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change); authentication
+   * then comes exclusively from OIDC (#214) or the trusted proxy (#215).
+   * Deploy-level on purpose: a compromised Site Admin must not be able to
+   * reopen the local path at runtime. Bootstrap order: complete the
+   * first-run setup (or SETUP_ADMIN_* pre-seed) BEFORE flipping to false.
+   */
+  AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED: z
+    .enum(['true', 'false'])
+    .default('true')
+    .transform((value) => value === 'true'),
   AUTH_PROXY_HEADER: z.string().min(1).optional(),
   AUTH_PROXY_TRUSTED_PEERS: z
     .string()