apps/api/src/app.module.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { MiddlewareConsumer, Module, NestModule } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { APP_FILTER } from '@nestjs/core';
 import { LoggerModule } from 'nestjs-pino';
 
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { AuthModule } from './auth/auth.module';
 import { BackupModule } from './backup/backup.module';
 import { ApiExceptionFilter } from './common/api-exception.filter';
 import { maskTokenParam } from './common/mask-token-param';
+import { SecurityHeadersMiddleware } from './common/security-headers.middleware';
 import { CommentsModule } from './comments/comments.module';
 import { CompactionModule } from './compaction/compaction.module';
 import { AppConfig } from './config/app-config.service';
@@ -104,4 +105,10 @@ import { VersionsModule } from './versions/versions.module';
   ],
   providers: [{ provide: APP_FILTER, useClass: ApiExceptionFilter }],
 })
-export class AppModule {}
+export class AppModule implements NestModule {
+  configure(consumer: MiddlewareConsumer): void {
+    // Module-level (not main.ts) so createTestApp boots the identical
+    // security-header/CORS middleware — see security-headers.middleware.ts.
+    consumer.apply(SecurityHeadersMiddleware).forRoutes('{*path}');
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/common/security-headers.e2e.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+import { INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import request from 'supertest';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+
+import { AppModule } from '../app.module';
+
+// Boots the AppModule without a database (like health.e2e.test.ts): the
+// middleware under test runs before any route logic, so the always-on
+// healthz endpoint is a representative response (issue #197).
+describe('security response headers & CORS (e2e, issue #197)', () => {
+  let app: INestApplication;
+  const appOrigin = 'http://localhost:5173'; // APP_BASE_URL default origin
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test';
+    process.env.DATABASE_URL ??= 'postgresql://nobody:nothing@127.0.0.1:59999/absent';
+    const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({ imports: [AppModule] }).compile();
+    app = moduleRef.createNestApplication();
+    app.setGlobalPrefix('api/v1');
+    await app.init();
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await app.close();
+  });
+
+  it('stamps the full header set on a representative response', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/v1/healthz').expect(200);
+    expect(res.headers['strict-transport-security']).toBe('max-age=31536000');
+    expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
+    expect(res.headers['referrer-policy']).toBe('no-referrer');
+    // SAMEORIGIN, not DENY — the plugin sandbox frame is embedded
+    // same-origin (plugins.e2e.db.test.ts asserts the frame side).
+    expect(res.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('SAMEORIGIN');
+    expect(res.headers['permissions-policy']).toBe(
+      'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('stamps the headers on error responses too (unknown route)', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/v1/does-not-exist').expect(404);
+    expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
+    expect(res.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('SAMEORIGIN');
+  });
+
+  it('grants a foreign origin nothing (no ACAO), while varying on Origin', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .get('/api/v1/healthz')
+      .set('Origin', 'https://attacker.example')
+      .expect(200);
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-credentials']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.headers.vary).toContain('Origin');
+  });
+
+  it("echoes only the app's own origin, with the credentials rule stated", async () => {
+    const res = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .get('/api/v1/healthz')
+      .set('Origin', appOrigin)
+      .expect(200);
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBe(appOrigin);
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-credentials']).toBe('true');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a foreign preflight ungranted (no CORS response headers)', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .options('/api/v1/healthz')
+      .set('Origin', 'https://attacker.example')
+      .set('Access-Control-Request-Method', 'POST');
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-methods']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

apps/api/src/common/security-headers.middleware.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+import { Injectable, NestMiddleware } from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from 'express';
+
+import { AppConfig } from '../config/app-config.service';
+
+/**
+ * Security response headers and the CORS stance for every api response
+ * (issue #197). Hand-rolled instead of `helmet`: the header set is small
+ * enough to own, every value below is a deliberate decision, and the api
+ * gains no transitive dependency. Wired via the AppModule's
+ * MiddlewareConsumer so the test harness (createTestApp) exercises the
+ * exact production middleware — rationale per header in
+ * docs/architecture/security.md §Security response headers & CORS.
+ */
+@Injectable()
+export class SecurityHeadersMiddleware implements NestMiddleware {
+  /** The one origin the SPA is served from; the only origin CORS ever echoes. */
+  private readonly allowedOrigin: string;
+
+  constructor(config: AppConfig) {
+    this.allowedOrigin = new URL(config.env.APP_BASE_URL).origin;
+  }
+
+  use(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void {
+    // No includeSubDomains: the api cannot speak for sibling subdomains it
+    // does not control (e.g. a support desk on the same apex). Browsers
+    // ignore HSTS over plain http, so sending it unconditionally is safe.
+    res.setHeader('Strict-Transport-Security', 'max-age=31536000');
+    res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+    // Page paths are permission-scoped knowledge — leak them to no one.
+    res.setHeader('Referrer-Policy', 'no-referrer');
+    // SAMEORIGIN, deliberately not DENY: the plugin sandbox (ADR 0008)
+    // embeds /api/v1/plugins/<id>/<version>/frame same-origin, and the
+    // frame's own CSP carries no frame-ancestors — this header governs.
+    res.setHeader('X-Frame-Options', 'SAMEORIGIN');
+    // Deny the powerful features outright; nothing in the app uses them.
+    res.setHeader(
+      'Permissions-Policy',
+      'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()',
+    );
+
+    // CORS: no foreign origin is granted anything — only the app's own
+    // origin is ever echoed (where browsers do not consult CORS anyway, as
+    // same-origin; the echo states the decision rather than enabling a
+    // caller). Same-origin requests never preflight, so no OPTIONS
+    // handling is needed. Vary on every response keeps caches honest.
+    res.vary('Origin');
+    if (req.headers.origin === this.allowedOrigin) {
+      res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', this.allowedOrigin);
+      res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true');
+    }
+    next();
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/plugins/plugins.e2e.db.test.ts

@@ -145,6 +145,13 @@ describe.skipIf(!hasTestDb)('plugins install (e2e, issue #71)', () => {
     expect(csp).toMatch(/connect-src https?:\/\/[^ ]+\/api\/v1\/plugins\/framer\/1\.0\.0\//);
     expect(csp).toMatch(/frame-src https?:\/\/[^ ]+\/api\/v1\/plugins\/framer\/1\.0\.0\//);
 
+    // Framing stays possible under the global security headers (issue #197):
+    // the host app embeds this document same-origin, X-Frame-Options is
+    // SAMEORIGIN (never DENY), and the frame's CSP carries no
+    // frame-ancestors that could override it.
+    expect(frame.headers['x-frame-options']).toBe('SAMEORIGIN');
+    expect(csp).not.toContain('frame-ancestors');
+
     // Only the installed current version has a frame; anything else 404s.
     await api().get('/api/v1/plugins/framer/9.9.9/frame').expect(404);
     await api().get('/api/v1/plugins/ghost/1.0.0/frame').expect(404);

docs/architecture/security.md

@@ -73,6 +73,39 @@ or sloppy plugin authors, compromised dependencies.
   vectors. (The plaintext cache row itself remains until purge; the index
   is the concern here because it is queryable.)
 
+## Security response headers & CORS (issue #197)
+
+Every api response carries this header set, stamped by a hand-rolled
+15-line middleware (`apps/api/src/common/security-headers.middleware.ts`)
+rather than `helmet` — the set is small enough to own, each value is a
+deliberate decision, and the api gains no transitive dependency. It is
+wired through the AppModule's `MiddlewareConsumer`, so the e2e harness
+boots the exact production middleware.
+
+| Header                      | Value                                                          | Why                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
+| --------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `Strict-Transport-Security` | `max-age=31536000`                                             | One year, **no** `includeSubDomains` — the api cannot speak for sibling subdomains it does not control. Browsers ignore HSTS over plain http, so it is sent unconditionally.                          |
+| `X-Content-Type-Options`    | `nosniff`                                                      | No MIME sniffing, anywhere (the uploads path relies on this too, see above).                                                                                                                          |
+| `Referrer-Policy`           | `no-referrer`                                                  | Page paths are permission-scoped knowledge; leak them to no destination.                                                                                                                              |
+| `X-Frame-Options`           | `SAMEORIGIN`                                                   | Deliberately **not** `DENY`: the plugin sandbox (ADR 0008) embeds `/api/v1/plugins/<id>/<version>/frame` same-origin, and the frame's CSP has no `frame-ancestors` — this header governs its framing. |
+| `Permissions-Policy`        | `camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()` | Powerful browser features denied outright; nothing in the app uses them.                                                                                                                              |
+
+**CORS** is a stated decision, not an implicit default: no foreign origin
+is granted anything. The middleware echoes `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`
+(plus `Allow-Credentials: true`) only for the `APP_BASE_URL` origin
+itself — where browsers never consult CORS anyway, since the SPA calls
+the api same-origin (the dev server proxies `/api`). The echo documents
+the stance rather than enabling a caller; consequently there is no
+preflight handling (same-origin requests never preflight), and every
+response carries `Vary: Origin` for cache correctness. Cross-origin API
+access is cookie-less by design anyway (PAT/Bearer, see Public API), and
+non-browser clients are unaffected by CORS.
+
+Regression fence: `apps/api/src/common/security-headers.e2e.test.ts`
+(header set, foreign origin gets no ACAO) and the frame assertion in
+`plugins.e2e.db.test.ts`. TLS termination itself is the reverse proxy's
+job (out of scope, below).
+
 ## Plugin sandboxing (ADR 0008, operational)
 
 - Code plugins: opaque-origin iframes, no network (`connect-src 'none'`),

docs/vs-nfd/20-massnahmenplan.md

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ chain`_
       oder entfernen · 2 AT · #194
 - [x] **Papierkorb aus dem Suchindex** entfernen statt query-seitig filtern · 2 AT · #195
 - [x] **Retention-Job für `audit_log`** · 1 AT · #196
-- [ ] **Security-Header** (helmet), CORS explizit restriktiv · 1 AT · #197
+- [x] **Security-Header** (helmet), CORS explizit restriktiv · 1 AT · #197
 - [ ] **SBOM in CI** (CycloneDX/syft) + Lizenzreport als Artefakt · 1–2 AT · #202
 - [ ] `deploy/compose/.env` prüfen, Beispieldatei statt Realdatei · 0,5 AT · #198
 - [ ] **Attachment-Integritätshashes** · +2–3 AT · #199 ⟵ neu aus Roadmap