fd2bdb3fb8
22 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| fd2bdb3fb8 |
Add instance legal pages with public rendering and footer links (#82)
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Imprint and privacy policy are two new Markdown instance settings (legal.imprint, legal.privacyPolicy), edited by Site Admins in a new "Legal pages" admin section with a toggleable rendered preview. The preview uses the same shared pipeline the server renders with (markdown → schema doc → escaped HTML), so stored markup can never smuggle script to visitors. The pages render publicly at /legal/imprint and /legal/privacy — as an SPA route plus, like #56, a self-contained server-rendered HTML document under /api/v1/legal/:kind. The endpoints are setup-exempt: legal information stays reachable even while the first-run wizard is pending. Unconfigured pages show a localized notice instead of 404ing, and Site Admins additionally get a warning banner linking to the settings. A new footer with both links appears on every SPA view (editor, auth screens, public pages) and in the server-rendered documents, whose shared shell moved to public/html-shell.ts and now renders its chrome in the instance default locale (ADR 0012). docs/self-hosting/legal-template.md ships imprint and privacy-policy templates in English and German whose sections mirror Dorfteich's actual processing activities (accounts, sessions, rate-limit IPs, proxy logs, transactional mail, content, export, deletion, no third-party requests), with a review checklist tied to security.md §Privacy. New `legal` i18n namespace (de+en); api and web e2e coverage including a new CI legal pack (footer navigation, notice vs. admin banner, and the admin form publishing a text end to end). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| f0a82bad20 |
Add the first-run setup wizard API with env-backed secret store (#80)
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When the api runs against a database without the setup.completedAt marker, a global SetupGuard answers every non-exempt route with 503 setup_required; only /setup/*, health probes, and the session routes stay reachable. The wizard steps (POST /setup/admin|instance|smtp| registration|complete) write straight to their production homes; the Site Admin step signs its creator in, later steps require that session. Completing sets the marker and locks every step permanently (410, also across restarts, and not reopenable via PATCH /admin/settings). SMTP entered in the wizard is verified with a live delivery test first (failure blocks the step with the transport error as detail) and then persisted to the new env-backed secret store: a mode-600 dotenv file on the new `secrets` volume (SECRETS_FILE). Explicit container env always wins over the store; empty compose-passed strings count as unset. The mail transport now resolves lazily through SmtpConfigService so wizard changes apply without a restart. SETUP_ADMIN_* env pre-seeds the whole wizard at boot for automated deploys; a backfill migration marks instances that already have a Site Admin as completed, and seed/vitest global-setup do the same for fixture databases. The setup e2e suite provisions its own fresh database (CREATE DATABASE + migrate deploy) per run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| 621aa47244 |
Add plugin storage, install API, and directory watcher (#71)
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Backend for installing plugin ZIPs (ADR 0008, plugin-architecture.md §Lifecycle, security.md §Plugins). Consumes the #70 SDK for validation. - Schema: `plugins` (id, name, version, apiVersion, kind, mode, manifest jsonb, removedAt soft-delete) + `pond_plugins` (per-pond activation) + `PluginInstanceMode` enum; migration 20260710130000_plugins. - `PluginPackageService`: pure, stateless ZIP → validated package via fflate — structure check, manifest validation (SDK), apiVersion gate, kind/bundle/styles rules, CSS sanitation (no @import / external url() / expression()), zip-slip and unpacked-size guards. Each failure carries a stable PluginErrorCode; manifest issues travel as ApiError details. - `PluginStorageService`: on-disk layout `<PLUGINS_DIR>/<id>/<version>/`; atomic writeVersion (staging dir + rename, no 404 window mid-update), removeVersion/removePlugin, traversal-safe asset resolution, dropzone + quarantine dirs. - `PluginsService`: install/update (update only to a strictly higher version, preserving the admin's instance mode; files land before the metadata pointer flips) / uninstall (refused while required; soft-delete + files removed + pond activations dropped) / list / get. - `POST/GET/DELETE /admin/plugins` (SiteAdminGuard, multer memory upload), error→HTTP-status mapping. Public version-pinned static serving at `GET /plugins/:id/:version/*rest` with immutable cache + nosniff, only for the installed current version. - `PluginWatcherService`: watches `<PLUGINS_DIR>/_dropzone/`, runs the same validation, installs valid drops and quarantines invalid ones with the error logged; inert under NODE_ENV=test (tests drive processDropped). - SDK: `compareVersions`/`isHigherVersion`. shared: `PluginView`, `PluginInstanceMode`, `PLUGIN_ERROR_CODES`, `PLUGINS_DIR` env, plugin error i18n (de+en). Compose: `plugins` volume + `PLUGINS_DIR`. - Tests: package unit test (valid + each invalid class) and an e2e DB test (GUI install + immutable serving, non-admin 403, invalid-manifest details, dropzone install + quarantine, atomic higher-only update, required-guarded uninstall that removes files and tombstones metadata). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| f500198c5d |
Add per-pond fonts: catalog, build, application, and admin UI (#66)
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Self-hosted Google Fonts with per-pond selection (ADR 0016), the GDPR "zero external requests" posture (security.md, CSP `font-src 'self'`). - Catalog: a curated 15-family OFL/Apache list in shared (family, weights, category, license, google-webfonts-helper id). `deploy/fonts/build-fonts.mjs` validates every entry has license info (fails the build otherwise), downloads the WOFF2 weights into apps/web/public/fonts/ (gitignored), and generates the @font-face stylesheet — run at image build time from the web Dockerfile (with retries), never from a visitor's browser. - Application: PondFontScope sets --font-heading/body/mono (+ weights) from pond.settings.fonts on the editor + read view; the existing global CSS already reads those custom properties, so headings/body/code re-resolve to the pond's fonts. A pond with no settings arrives with the defaulted values (Roboto 400 / Roboto 200 / Fira Code), so the vision defaults always render. - Admin UI: pond-settings 'Appearance' section — three slots (family + weight) with a live preview, Pond-Admin-gated (fonts added to updatePondInputSchema and merged in PondsService.update); a font catalog attribution page (/fonts) listing families and licenses. New `font` i18n namespace (de+en). - CSP: strict Content-Security-Policy in nginx.conf (default-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self'; …) — the app's scripts are all external files, inline styles cover CSS variables. - Tests: shared catalog-integrity unit test (the invariant the build enforces); e2e fonts pack — no request leaves the origin when rendering a pond (the GDPR network assertion), a font choice applies to a page and persists, and a pond without settings renders the defaults. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| 4755c18ef5 |
Add conversion job queue and pandoc sidecar integration (#62)
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Import/export conversions run asynchronously against an internal pandoc-server sidecar with limits and graceful failure (ADR 0009). This is the plumbing; the import (#63) and export (#65) features enqueue jobs onto it. Sidecar & config: - pandoc/core:3.6 in HTTP server mode added to the Compose stack, internal network only, with a wget healthcheck on /version; the api depends on it healthy and reaches it via the new PANDOC_URL env (default http://pandoc:3030). - readyz gains a warning-level `converter` check: an unreachable sidecar degrades import/export but never flips the instance to unready (new `warn` status on ReadinessCheck). Conversion flow (apps/api/src/import-export/): - ConversionJob table (per-request work queue, distinct from the name-keyed maintenance Job table): owner, formats, input/result bytes, status, attempts, lockedAt. Migration + owner cascade. - PandocConverter (abstract) + PandocServerConverter: POST / with {text,from,to,standalone}; binary input formats (docx/odt/…) are base64-encoded in `text`; 60 s AbortController timeout; input/output size caps. Failures map to distinct localized codes — converter_unavailable / converter_timeout (retryable) and conversion_failed (final). - ConversionWorker: claims one job at a time with `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` (safe against overlapping sweeps and a second process), recovers a stale RUNNING lock, retries transient failures up to 3 attempts then fails. A 2 s sweep plus wake-on-enqueue means a queued job survives an API restart. - ConversionJobService.enqueue (size-limited) + owner-scoped GET /jobs/:id (poll) and GET /jobs/:id/result (stream the output); a foreign/unknown id is 404. ConversionJobView in @dorfteich/shared. Tests: - conversion-job.e2e.db.test.ts (fake converter injected via a new createTestApp override hook): enqueue→convert→poll→result; foreign/unknown job 404; a persisted PENDING job picked up by a fresh app's worker (restart survival); sidecar-down fails after 3 retries while the API stays healthy. - pandoc.converter.test.ts: success, non-200→conversion_failed, refused→ converter_unavailable, and a delay-injecting server→converter_timeout. - Verified locally against a real pandoc/core:3.6 container: markdown→html, markdown→docx (valid PK/OOXML bytes), and a docx→markdown round-trip. Local: typecheck, lint, i18n:check, build all green; api 193 tests (9 new), shared 121, web 50. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| 42e97b9df2 |
Add Site-Admin user management (#59)
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Instance operators get basic user administration for support, abuse handling, and GDPR groundwork (security.md §Privacy). - api `admin/`: Site-Admin-gated `/admin/users` — a searchable, paginated list (username, e-mail, status, role, pond count, last login) plus lifecycle actions: disable/enable (a disabled user is logged out everywhere and login is refused with the distinct `account_disabled`), resend verification, delete, and grant/revoke Site Admin. Guards: you cannot act on your own account (`cannot_modify_self`) and the last Site Admin cannot be dropped (`last_site_admin`). Every action is audit-logged with the actor. - `PseudonymizationService`: account deletion scrubs the PII, removes all login identities + sessions, and trashes the personal pond — the kept row is what authorship references, so shared content the user authored shows as "Deleted user" (no orphaned/cascaded content). - web: the Admin area gains a 'Users' surface — search, pagination, and the actions (destructive ones behind an inline two-step confirm; self-actions hidden). New `users` i18n namespace (de+en). - tests: `user-admin.e2e.db.test.ts` (disable → logout + login blocked; delete → pseudonymized authorship + personal pond trashed + credentials gone; last Site Admin and self protected; Site-Admin gating); a non-destructive browser `admin-users` pack proving disable-in-UI blocks login and enable restores it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| 7f1c49db53 |
Add pond member management UI (#54)
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Pond Admins manage who participates in a pond, by role, with editor/reader seat quotas — the member-facing layer over the grant model (#51/#52). - shared: `MemberView`/`PondMembersView` + add/change-role schemas (`members.ts`), a `members` i18n namespace (de+en), and member error codes. - api `members/`: a member-centric API over pond-scope user grants — `GET /ponds/:id/members` (any member, for transparency: list grouped by effective role + seat usage + `canManage`), `POST` (add by exact username or e-mail — no directory browsing), `PATCH :userId` (change role), `DELETE :userId` (remove), all Pond-Admin-gated by the guard. Editor/reader seats are enforced against `editors_per_pond`/`readers_per_pond` (#22) inside a per-pond advisory-locked transaction so counts cannot race; the owner's membership is protected, personal ponds refuse a second admin (shared grant rule), and the last Pond Admin cannot be dropped. Every change invalidates the pond permission cache and fires the access NOTIFY (#39/#53). - web `members/`: `MemberManager` in Pond Settings — list grouped by role with a search filter and seat usage, add-by-identifier form (disabled with a localized explanation when the chosen role's seats are full), per-member role change and remove; read-only for non-admins; the personal-pond rule is surfaced. There is no invitation flow (v1): adding is immediate, and the copy says so. - tests: `members.e2e.db.test.ts` (add/change/remove, seat exhaustion, personal-pond and owner rules, read-only transparency, last-admin) and a `members` browser pack (immediate second-browser access, quota disables the add action, non-admin read-only) with its own CI step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| 4d48d72c40 |
Add grant model and shared permission-resolution algorithm (#51)
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The heart of the security model: one algorithm, implemented once, for API, collab, and UI (permissions.md — authoritative). - shared `permissions/`: pure resolution (`resolvePageCapability`) exactly per permissions.md — specificity page > label (incl. ancestor labels) > pond, deny wins within a level, default-closed, Site Admin bypass — plus the trash rule (`canAccessPage` / `canAccessTrashedPage`, ADR 0013). `grantValidationError` enforces the structural constraints. Documented, I/O-free signatures for API/collab reuse. - prisma: `RoleGrant` (+ grant enums) per data-model.md, unique on (pond, subject, role, scope); migration adds a CHECK backstop that a POND_ADMIN grant is pond-scope + user-subject. - api `grants/`: `GrantsService.createGrant` validates before insert (structural + no extra admin on a personal pond), rejects duplicates; `grantsForPond` returns the shared resolver model (what #52/#53 consume); enum mappers between the DB and the shared model. Interim "who may manage grants" stays until #52. - tests: exhaustive table-driven resolver suite — every worked example from permissions.md §Resolution, edge cases (multi-label deny-wins, ancestor inheritance, anonymous/public, most-specific-allow-beats-less-specific-deny, trash) and a property test (a less-specific grant never overrides a more-specific decision); validation unit tests; grants db test proving write-time rejection of invalid grants. - i18n: grant error codes (de + en). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY |
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| 91dfccf226 |
Add SearchProvider interface with PostgreSQL FTS (#49)
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Full-text search behind a swappable interface (ADR 0010).
- prisma: `page_content_cache.search_vector tsvector` (Unsupported column);
migration adds it plus a GIN index (raw SQL — the index is a production
perf optimization; correctness holds without it, so schema-pushed test DBs
work unchanged).
- shared: `normalizeForSearch` (NFKD + strip diacritics + lowercase) folds
both the indexed text and the query, so 'Baume' finds 'Bäume' without the
Postgres `unaccent` extension; search query schema + result view + highlight
sentinels.
- api search module:
- abstract `SearchProvider` (DI token: indexPage / removePage / search /
reindexAll) so an external engine can replace the binding — a fake proves
the seam in a test.
- `PostgresSearchProvider`: weighted vector (title A, labels B, body C),
`websearch_to_tsquery`, `ts_headline` snippets, results filtered to the
ponds the user may read; `GET /search?q=&pondId=&labels=`.
- `search:reindex` CLI (rebuilds from the content cache, idempotent).
- reindex hooks: page create/rename (title) and label assign/unassign/
rename/delete (labels are weight-B).
- collab: the persistence hook maintains `search_vector` in the same
transaction as the content cache (same weighting, normalized).
- tests: shared normalize/schema; api db (title ranks above body, highlight,
diacritic-insensitive match, permission filter, idempotent reindex) and the
fake-provider DI test; collab persistence already covers the write path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
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| 14e69b399c |
Add wikilink index, backlinks API, and phantom resolution (#47)
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Maintain a server-side `page_links` index on every content change so
backlinks and missing-target ("phantom") links can be queried.
- prisma: `PageLink` (from_page_id, nullable to_page_id, target_slug;
unique per (from, slug); cascade on source purge, set-null on target
purge); migration.
- shared: `extractWikilinkSlugs(doc)` (distinct target slugs) and the
`BacklinkView` / `PhantomLinkView` read shapes.
- collab: the persistence hook (#35) now rewrites the source page's outgoing
links in the same transaction as the content cache — one row per distinct
wikilink slug, resolved to a page in the same pond (null = phantom).
- api: `GET /pages/:id/backlinks` (permission-filtered — wikilinks resolve
within a pond, so seeing the pond is the read right) and
`GET /ponds/:id/phantom-links` (missing targets grouped with their
referrers). Creating or renaming a page to a slug that pages already link
to resolves those phantom rows; because links store the target's id,
backlinks survive a later rename of the target's slug.
- tests: shared extraction unit test; collab persistence db test (store
writes resolved + phantom rows and rewrites the index); api LinksService
db test (backlinks, permission filter, phantom aggregation, create/rename
resolution, id-based backlinks survive target rename).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
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| a3a012c41d |
Add hierarchical labels: model, CRUD API, and validation (#43)
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Introduce pond-scoped hierarchical labels as the foundation for M4 organization and, later, M5 label-scoped permissions. - shared: `labels.ts` with the label schemas/views and the pure tree helpers (buildLabelTree, collectSubtreeIds, collectAncestorIds, labelDepth, subtreeHeight). These are the single hierarchy walk the label API and the future permission resolver both build on (permissions.md: a grant on a label applies to all its descendants). - prisma: `Label` (self-referential parent_id, unique per (pond, parent, name), cascade to subtree) and `PageLabel` assignment table; migration. - api: `LabelsService` + controller. Tree endpoint returns the hierarchy in one call; create/rename/recolor/move/delete and page assign/unassign. Validation: cycle prevention on move, depth limit 6, unique name per (pond, parent) — enforced under a per-pond advisory lock so root-label uniqueness holds despite Postgres treating NULL parents as distinct. Delete cascades the subtree and requires `?force=true` when pages are assigned. Assignment rejects labels from a different pond. Access gated through InterimAccessService on the owning pond. - i18n: label error codes and the colour validation message (de + en). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY |
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| 1bda137ca4 |
Add version history UI: list, view, diff, restore (#42)
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Users can see who changed what and restore old states (ADR 0013). - shared: dependency-free word-level Markdown diff (diffMarkdown) with a unit test; PageVersionContentView; PAGE_RESTORE_CHANNEL + PageRestoreRequest. - api: GET /pages/:id/versions (list), GET .../:versionId (read-only HTML + Markdown for diffing), POST .../:versionId/restore. Every route requires write access — viewing history is gated like editing (permissions.md). Restore checks permission, then emits the page_restore NOTIFY; history is append-only (the api never deletes a version). - collab: a page_restore listener applies the restore on the live document via openDirectConnection — it snapshots the current state as a PRE_RESTORE version, then replaces the content in one transaction, so every connected client converges and the change persists like a normal edit. - web: HistoryPanel (version list with time/trigger/label/contributors, a read-only render of a selected version, a Markdown diff against the current page, and a restore action), toggled from the page menu. de+en strings. Tests: shared diff (added/removed/round-trip/edges); collab restore DB test (a connected client converges on the restored content; a pre-restore snapshot is appended alongside the original — append-only); api list/get/restore (newest-first, rendered content, write-permission gate, restore returns the target without mutating history). This completes M3 (real-time collaboration & history, #33–#42). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY |
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| d4ebcfcfbe |
Add collaboration token issuance and connection authentication (#34)
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The api mints a short-lived (60 s) HS256 JWT per page open after an interim
permission check; the collab server authenticates every connection with it
(ADR 0003/0007 — the only JWTs in the system).
- packages/shared: browser-safe token schema/types in `collab-token`, and the
Node `crypto` sign/verify in `token-crypto` behind its own subpath export
(`@dorfteich/shared/token-crypto`) so the web bundle never pulls in
`node:crypto`. Only HS256 is produced/accepted; the signature is checked in
constant time before any untrusted field is read.
- api: `GET /pages/:id/collab-token` (auth-required) returns
{token, mode, expiresInSeconds}; `mode` is rw/ro via the interim access
service; issuance is logged at debug level without the token value.
- collab: `onAuthenticate` verifies the token, checks the pageId matches the
document name, stores {userId, mode} context, and enforces `ro` via
Hocuspocus' read-only connection flag. Hocuspocus' own signal handling is
disabled so index.ts remains the single shutdown owner.
- Shared COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET env for api + collab (compose, dev overlay,
.env.example, stage docs); a dev default keeps native dev/test/CI running.
Tests: shared token round-trip/rejection; api endpoint e2e (auth required,
claims, 404 for non-members/unknown ids); collab integration via
HocuspocusProvider (valid token connects; expired/tampered/mismatched-page/
wrong-secret rejected; read-only writes dropped, verified with two clients).
Closes #34
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 0fae699018 |
Add file storage service and image upload API (#27)
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Implements the FileStorage abstraction (uploads/<pondId>/<fileId> on the mounted volume), the attachments model, and POST /ponds/:id/files, GET /media/:fileId, DELETE /files/:id. Uploads are validated by sniffing magic bytes rather than trusting the client's Content-Type/filename (catches a renamed .html-as-.png), checked against the max_file_bytes and storage_bytes quotas, and served with nosniff + immutable caching. Closes #27 |
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| 98e159ab50 |
Add page CRUD and Yjs state persistence (#23)
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Prisma models `pages`/`page_updates`/`page_content_cache` per data-model.md. Endpoints: POST /ponds/:id/pages (title -> empty Yjs doc state, seeded via y-prosemirror), GET /pages/:id (meta + base64 state), PUT /pages/:id/state (client-encoded Yjs state, rejected above the 5 MiB operations.md limit or if it doesn't decode into a valid document for the schema), PATCH /pages/:id (title/slug — explicit slug changes validate uniqueness per pond, title-only renames keep the slug), DELETE (soft). Access follows InterimAccessService via the page's pond, same 404-not-403 interim rule as ponds. State saves decode the Yjs update with yjs + y-prosemirror and run it through the #24 shared derivation functions (docToPlainText/ docToMarkdown/docToHtml/extractOutline) to refresh page_content_cache. The Yjs XmlFragment name ("default") and the derivation call are factored so the collab server's persistence hooks (#35) can reuse both. Raised the API's JSON body limit to 8 MiB (main.ts and the e2e test app) to fit base64-encoded page state. Closes #23 |
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| b89aa6bed0 |
Add editor document schema in packages/shared (#24)
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ProseMirror schema (headings 1-4, lists incl. task lists, blockquote, code block, tables via prosemirror-tables, images, hard breaks; bold/ italic/code/strikethrough/link marks) plus docToMarkdown, markdownToDoc, docToPlainText, docToHtml, and extractOutline built on it. Markdown parsing extends markdown-it's default preset with a token-stream transform for GFM task lists and table-cell paragraph wrapping. docToHtml hand-rolls escaping and link-protocol allowlisting with zero DOM dependencies, so it runs in the API/collab server as well as the browser. Node names `wikilink` and `plugin_block` are reserved for later stories. Closes #24 |
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| 64928f0ac0 |
Quota foundation: overrides, resolution, race-safe consumption (#22)
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- quota_overrides + pond_usage models (BigInt values, unique per
subject+key); migration 20260705185146_quotas
- instance-default quota keys in the settings registry (editors 5,
readers 50, additional ponds 0, storage 1 GiB, max file 25 MiB)
- QuotaService: getEffective with pond → user → instance resolution
(zero counts as a value, not a gap); assertCanCreateSharedPond and
checkAndConsume serialize via pg_advisory_xact_lock inside the guarded
write's transaction; release never drops below zero
- pond creation enforces additional_ponds (personal ponds don't count);
quota errors carry code quota_exceeded + {quotaKey, limit}, localized
- seed grants fixtures an additional_ponds override (default is 0)
- table-driven resolution tests, parallel-consumption test, e2e for the
pond-creation limit
Closes #22
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB
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| f0850eecd3 |
Ponds: data model, CRUD API, personal pond on verification (#21)
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- Pond model with pond-level trash columns (ADR 0013) and settings jsonb holding only deviations from the defaults (sidebar sort, font slots per ADR 0016); migration 20260705090100_ponds - shared: pond schemas/views and slugify (German transliteration, URL-safe, length-capped); deterministic -2/-3 suffixes for collisions - InterimAccessService: single place answering pond access questions until the real role model lands in M5 - POST/GET /ponds, GET /ponds/:slug, PATCH/DELETE /ponds/:id, Site-Admin trash + restore; personal pond auto-created on e-mail verification and for active seed fixtures; personal ponds cannot be trashed - e2e pack covering verify-flow pond creation, slug suffixes, rename, foreign-pond 404s, trash/restore; slugify unit tests Closes #21 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB |
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| 36608177f6 |
Add user, identity, session, and auth-support data model
Prisma models per data-model.md: users (status enum, site-admin flag), user_identities (password provider now, OIDC later — subject is the stable user id), sessions (hashed ids), auth_tokens (hashed, single- use), plus rate_limits and mail_outbox for the upcoming M1 stories. UsersService creates accounts transactionally with Argon2id-hashed password identities (OWASP parameters, rehash detection) and maps uniqueness violations to field-level conflicts. Database-backed suites run when TEST_DATABASE_URL is set — locally against the dev db, in CI via a new postgres service container; shared auth schemas (username, password policy incl. common-password blocklist) ship with tests. Closes #10 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| e855192d23 |
Add i18n with i18next, German and English, and a key-parity check
Translation resources live in packages/shared/i18n/<lang>/<ns>.json (common, errors) and ship with de and en. The web app initializes react-i18next with bundled resources (?lng= wins, then the browser language); all shell components use useTranslation and the temporary t() stub is gone. The api localizes its uniform error bodies via a minimal i18next instance negotiated from Accept-Language. `pnpm i18n:check` fails CI when any key is missing in any language, backed by tested helpers in @dorfteich/shared. Closes #5 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| c12acbdb2c |
Add NestJS API skeleton with config, logging, and /healthz
apps/api boots a NestJS application with: Zod-validated environment configuration (schema in @dorfteich/shared, fails fast listing every invalid variable), structured pino request logging via nestjs-pino (pretty in development, JSON otherwise, auth headers redacted), a global exception filter producing the uniform ApiErrorBody shape, and GET /api/v1/healthz. Vitest runs Nest through SWC for decorator metadata; supertest covers healthz and the 404 error shape. Closes #2 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| b16d23297e |
Scaffold pnpm monorepo with lint, format, and test tooling
pnpm workspace with apps/web, apps/api, apps/collab, and packages/shared; strict TypeScript base config, repo-wide ESLint (flat) + Prettier, Vitest per package, and root scripts lint/typecheck/test/ build. @dorfteich/shared ships a first health-response helper consumed by apps/api to prove workspace linking. Existing markdown docs are reformatted once by the new Prettier setup. Closes #1 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |