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0c85293830 Public REST API v1: personal access tokens, instance switch + per-pond opt-in (#104)
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Token-authenticated machine access at /api/public/v1 — the foundation for
the built-in MCP endpoint (#105).

Personal access tokens:
- api_tokens table (SHA-256 hash, scope read|write, optional pond
  restriction, expiry, revocation, throttled last-used) + migration;
  secrets are dt_pat_<random>, shown exactly once
- lifecycle endpoints under /users/me/api-tokens (session-only — a leaked
  token can never mint more tokens) with audit entries
  api.token_created/api.token_revoked
- settings UI section (create with scope/expiry/pond restriction,
  one-time reveal with copy, list with status + revoke), de+en

Activation (404 semantics per #60 on both levels):
- instance setting api.enabled (default off, admin settings switch)
- pond setting apiEnabled (default off, pond settings toggle; the
  PondsService settings-merge learned the key — the #92 lesson)

Surface (/api/public/v1, excluded from the SPA's global prefix):
- me, ponds, pages (list/read as Markdown+HTML, create from Markdown via
  the shared pipeline, PATCH title/content, DELETE to trash), search
  (permission-filtered + narrowed to exposed ponds, highlights as **…**),
  markdown ZIP export, labels (tree, create/rename/recolour/move/delete,
  assign/unassign), comments (threads, create, resolve/reopen)
- content replacement travels the collab-owned document path: the new
  state lands as a MANUAL version "API update", then the established
  restore NOTIFY applies it — open editors converge, history stays
  append-only, no second lineage (VersionsService.replaceContent)
- hand-maintained OpenAPI 3.1 document at /openapi.json, pinned to the
  controller by a route-coverage test in both directions

Enforcement:
- PublicApiGuard: instance switch → bearer PAT auth (request.user is the
  token's user) → per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After) → scope
  (403 scope_required) → pond opt-in + token restriction
- the shared PermissionGuard then applies the unchanged permission model;
  PageParamSource gained pondSlugParam for the slug+slug routes
- no cookies anywhere → no CSRF surface (pinned by a hostile-Origin test)
- every write audit-logged as api.write with the token attributed

Tests/verification:
- 12-test e2e pack: lifecycle, switches, permission matrix
  (reader/editor/outsider × scopes), restriction, page roundtrip incl.
  restore-NOTIFY assertion, labels, comments incl. policy, search
  narrowing, ZIP export, rate limit; full api suite 60/60 green
  (quota fixture via per-user override — never the instance default)
- new collab-pack test proves an open editor converges onto an API
  content replacement (green against a local seeded stack)
- UI smoke against the built SPA: token create/reveal/revoke, pond
  opt-in persists, admin switch persists (10/10)
- docs/self-hosting/public-api.md + README link

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-12 11:17:03 +02:00
9d288b2ad0 Wire real permissions into collab tokens and revocation (#53)
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Live editing now obeys the same rules as REST: the collab-token mode comes
from the shared grant resolution, anonymous visitors can join public pages,
and revoking write access flips a running session to read-only within
seconds.

- Anonymous public tokens: `GET /pages/:id/collab-token` is `@Public()` but
  still permission-guarded, so a logged-out visitor gets an `ro` token where
  a `public` grant makes the page readable (404 otherwise). The token's
  `userId` is nullable (shared schema + collab context) for anonymous
  subjects.
- Prompt revocation: the pond-level NOTIFY (#39) now also fires on label
  tree/assignment changes (LabelsService move/remove/assign/unassign), and
  the collab server closes the *actual* WebSocket instead of only sending an
  application-level close message. Hocuspocus' `closeConnections` leaves the
  socket open so the client only re-checks on its ~30s message timeout;
  `closeDocumentConnections` drops the socket so the client reconnects and
  re-authenticates with a freshly-resolved token at once — the "within
  seconds" downgrade the milestone promises.
- Tests: the #52 fixture matrix gains anonymous cases (public grant → `ro`,
  none → 404); a collab db test proves an editor downgraded to reader goes
  read-only on reconnect (its post-downgrade edits no longer reach a peer);
  a new browser `collab-permissions` pack covers the read-only participant
  and the live downgrade end to end (new plain `fixture-editor` account).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-09 18:48:42 +02:00
0c6494f209 Enforce permissions in API guards and retire interim access (#52)
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Every route now declares its access rule explicitly and is enforced
through the shared resolution algorithm (permissions.md):

- PermissionGuard + decorators (@RequiresPondRole, @RequiresPagePermission,
  @RequiresAttachmentPermission, @AuthenticatedOnly) applied to every
  route; a route-enumeration test proves full coverage alongside
  @Public()/Site-Admin-guarded routes.
- 404/403 policy (documented in README conventions): denied reads answer
  404 (existence hiding), denied writes on readable things answer 403;
  trash views need write capability (ADR 0013).
- PermissionService resolves page/pond questions via the shared resolver,
  with an in-process pond-context cache (grants + label parents) that is
  invalidated on every grant/label-tree change and TTL-bounded as a
  multi-process safety net. Grant changes also fire pond_access_changed
  for collab revalidation (#39/#53).
- shared: pond-scope resolution (hasPondRole, canSeePond) next to the
  page resolver; grant wire schemas + GrantView.
- Owner Pond-Admin grants: migration backfill for all existing ponds,
  created transactionally with every new pond (shared + personal + seed).
- Grant CRUD under /ponds/:id/grants (pond_admin-gated) with structural
  and referential validation, last-admin protection, audit logs.
- InterimAccessService deleted; page lists, search, backlinks, phantom
  links, and trash listings are filtered per page through the resolver;
  collab tokens are now truly ro for readers.
- Fixture-matrix e2e (reader/editor/pond admin/foreign, label-deny,
  authenticated-subject, revoke-then-immediate-deny cache test).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
2026-07-09 16:31:41 +02:00