da5fd7c770
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0875e2a087 |
Add the sandbox host runtime for plugin iframes (#73)
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Implements the security core of the plugin system: code-plugin surfaces run in opaque-origin iframes (sandbox="allow-scripts", never allow-same-origin) with a capability-filtered RPC bridge. - api: serve a per-plugin sandbox frame document at /plugins/:id/:version/frame with a CSP that pins every load to the plugin's own asset path (built from APP_BASE_URL, not the request Host, so a Host-rewriting proxy cannot break it) and forbids network access (connect-src 'none'). Plugin assets get Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * so the null-origin frame can load its own module bundle. - web: sandbox-host creates the frame, wires the SDK host bridge over a source-filtered postMessage transport, drives render under a 5 s deadline (hung/failed plugin -> placeholder, never a frozen page), and tears down on unmount. PluginFrame/PluginPreviewPage surface it; the built-in ui.resize handler clamps plugin-requested heights. - plugin-sdk: host bridge reports gate violations via onViolation and registers a gated handler for every v1 method, so an undeclared capability is rejected with capability_not_permitted (not unknown_method). - tests: SDK gate unit test; web sandbox unit tests (opaque origin, source filtering, timeout); and the e2e security pack with a permanent malicious fixture plugin proving no escape (DOM/cookies/storage/fetch/ undeclared capability all blocked) plus well-behaved and hung cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| ec6ca80c4d |
Add plugin SDK: manifest schema, capabilities, and RPC protocol (#70)
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The SDK is the contract every other M7 story builds on (ADR 0008,
plugin-architecture.md). New package `@dorfteich/plugin-sdk`, standalone
(only depends on zod) so a plugin author needs nothing else.
- Zod manifest schema (`validateManifest`/`parseManifest`) with actionable
`{ path, message }` issues and cross-field rules (extension-point/kind
match, unique ids, section_style declares no permissions). Fixtures:
3 valid + 14 invalid variants, asserted individually.
- `checkApiVersion` compatibility helper against the host's supported range.
- Capability names + method→capability map as the single source of truth
for the permission gate.
- Transport-agnostic postMessage RPC engine (`createRpcEndpoint`) with
request/response ids, per-request timeouts, unknown-method and
endpoint-disposed handling, plus a `windowTransport` adapter.
- Host side (`createHostBridge`): routes plugin capability calls through
the manifest permission gate; drives plugin lifecycle (render/edit/destroy).
- Plugin side (`createPlugin`): answers lifecycle calls, exposes a typed
`host` proxy. RPC roundtrip verified in a jsdom MessageChannel test
(roundtrip, args, timeout, unknown method, undeclared capability, dispose).
- README documents the protocol with a mermaid sequence diagram.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
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