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3d1f4fda53 #188: purpose-bound token keys via HKDF, jose replaces the homegrown JWT
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COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET becomes a root key: every purpose derives its own
HKDF-SHA-256 subkey (deriveTokenKey), and no code path signs with the
root key directly. Collaboration tokens are signed and verified by jose
with HS256 as an explicit allowlist; the sign/verify API turns async at
its three call sites. Unsubscribe tokens move from a purpose-prefix
string to the structural subkey, with a documented dual-verify window
(legacy derivation accepted until 2026-11-01, covering the 90-day TTL
of links in already-sent mail).

The cross-runtime property that justified the homegrown implementation
is now proven by a test: the built CJS and ESM dist artefacts round-trip
tokens in both directions in child processes (jose v6 reaches CJS via
Node's require(esm), pinned Node 22 images). Negative tests cover
cross-purpose subkeys, root-key-signed tokens, alg:none and RS256.

Refs #188 (ADR 0020)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
2026-07-30 06:41:11 +02:00
9d288b2ad0 Wire real permissions into collab tokens and revocation (#53)
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Live editing now obeys the same rules as REST: the collab-token mode comes
from the shared grant resolution, anonymous visitors can join public pages,
and revoking write access flips a running session to read-only within
seconds.

- Anonymous public tokens: `GET /pages/:id/collab-token` is `@Public()` but
  still permission-guarded, so a logged-out visitor gets an `ro` token where
  a `public` grant makes the page readable (404 otherwise). The token's
  `userId` is nullable (shared schema + collab context) for anonymous
  subjects.
- Prompt revocation: the pond-level NOTIFY (#39) now also fires on label
  tree/assignment changes (LabelsService move/remove/assign/unassign), and
  the collab server closes the *actual* WebSocket instead of only sending an
  application-level close message. Hocuspocus' `closeConnections` leaves the
  socket open so the client only re-checks on its ~30s message timeout;
  `closeDocumentConnections` drops the socket so the client reconnects and
  re-authenticates with a freshly-resolved token at once — the "within
  seconds" downgrade the milestone promises.
- Tests: the #52 fixture matrix gains anonymous cases (public grant → `ro`,
  none → 404); a collab db test proves an editor downgraded to reader goes
  read-only on reconnect (its post-downgrade edits no longer reach a peer);
  a new browser `collab-permissions` pack covers the read-only participant
  and the live downgrade end to end (new plain `fixture-editor` account).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-09 18:48:42 +02:00
d4ebcfcfbe Add collaboration token issuance and connection authentication (#34)
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The api mints a short-lived (60 s) HS256 JWT per page open after an interim
permission check; the collab server authenticates every connection with it
(ADR 0003/0007 — the only JWTs in the system).

- packages/shared: browser-safe token schema/types in `collab-token`, and the
  Node `crypto` sign/verify in `token-crypto` behind its own subpath export
  (`@dorfteich/shared/token-crypto`) so the web bundle never pulls in
  `node:crypto`. Only HS256 is produced/accepted; the signature is checked in
  constant time before any untrusted field is read.
- api: `GET /pages/:id/collab-token` (auth-required) returns
  {token, mode, expiresInSeconds}; `mode` is rw/ro via the interim access
  service; issuance is logged at debug level without the token value.
- collab: `onAuthenticate` verifies the token, checks the pageId matches the
  document name, stores {userId, mode} context, and enforces `ro` via
  Hocuspocus' read-only connection flag. Hocuspocus' own signal handling is
  disabled so index.ts remains the single shutdown owner.
- Shared COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET env for api + collab (compose, dev overlay,
  .env.example, stage docs); a dev default keeps native dev/test/CI running.

Tests: shared token round-trip/rejection; api endpoint e2e (auth required,
claims, 404 for non-members/unknown ids); collab integration via
HocuspocusProvider (valid token connects; expired/tampered/mismatched-page/
wrong-secret rejected; read-only writes dropped, verified with two clients).

Closes #34

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 15:52:19 +02:00