Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
9d288b2ad0 Wire real permissions into collab tokens and revocation (#53)
All checks were successful
CD / Build and push images (push) Successful in 3m4s
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (push) Successful in 2m27s
CI / Auth e2e pack (push) Successful in 3m6s
CI / Build container images (push) Has been skipped
CD / Deploy to Test (push) Successful in 9s
CD / Smoke tests against Test (push) Successful in 1m16s
CD / Promote to Int (push) Successful in 11s
Live editing now obeys the same rules as REST: the collab-token mode comes
from the shared grant resolution, anonymous visitors can join public pages,
and revoking write access flips a running session to read-only within
seconds.

- Anonymous public tokens: `GET /pages/:id/collab-token` is `@Public()` but
  still permission-guarded, so a logged-out visitor gets an `ro` token where
  a `public` grant makes the page readable (404 otherwise). The token's
  `userId` is nullable (shared schema + collab context) for anonymous
  subjects.
- Prompt revocation: the pond-level NOTIFY (#39) now also fires on label
  tree/assignment changes (LabelsService move/remove/assign/unassign), and
  the collab server closes the *actual* WebSocket instead of only sending an
  application-level close message. Hocuspocus' `closeConnections` leaves the
  socket open so the client only re-checks on its ~30s message timeout;
  `closeDocumentConnections` drops the socket so the client reconnects and
  re-authenticates with a freshly-resolved token at once — the "within
  seconds" downgrade the milestone promises.
- Tests: the #52 fixture matrix gains anonymous cases (public grant → `ro`,
  none → 404); a collab db test proves an editor downgraded to reader goes
  read-only on reconnect (its post-downgrade edits no longer reach a peer);
  a new browser `collab-permissions` pack covers the read-only participant
  and the live downgrade end to end (new plain `fixture-editor` account).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-09 18:48:42 +02:00
0c6494f209 Enforce permissions in API guards and retire interim access (#52)
All checks were successful
CD / Build and push images (push) Successful in 2m54s
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (push) Successful in 2m25s
CI / Auth e2e pack (push) Successful in 2m58s
CI / Build container images (push) Has been skipped
CD / Deploy to Test (push) Successful in 9s
CD / Smoke tests against Test (push) Successful in 1m12s
CD / Promote to Int (push) Successful in 12s
Every route now declares its access rule explicitly and is enforced
through the shared resolution algorithm (permissions.md):

- PermissionGuard + decorators (@RequiresPondRole, @RequiresPagePermission,
  @RequiresAttachmentPermission, @AuthenticatedOnly) applied to every
  route; a route-enumeration test proves full coverage alongside
  @Public()/Site-Admin-guarded routes.
- 404/403 policy (documented in README conventions): denied reads answer
  404 (existence hiding), denied writes on readable things answer 403;
  trash views need write capability (ADR 0013).
- PermissionService resolves page/pond questions via the shared resolver,
  with an in-process pond-context cache (grants + label parents) that is
  invalidated on every grant/label-tree change and TTL-bounded as a
  multi-process safety net. Grant changes also fire pond_access_changed
  for collab revalidation (#39/#53).
- shared: pond-scope resolution (hasPondRole, canSeePond) next to the
  page resolver; grant wire schemas + GrantView.
- Owner Pond-Admin grants: migration backfill for all existing ponds,
  created transactionally with every new pond (shared + personal + seed).
- Grant CRUD under /ponds/:id/grants (pond_admin-gated) with structural
  and referential validation, last-admin protection, audit logs.
- InterimAccessService deleted; page lists, search, backlinks, phantom
  links, and trash listings are filtered per page through the resolver;
  collab tokens are now truly ro for readers.
- Fixture-matrix e2e (reader/editor/pond admin/foreign, label-deny,
  authenticated-subject, revoke-then-immediate-deny cache test).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
2026-07-09 16:31:41 +02:00
91dfccf226 Add SearchProvider interface with PostgreSQL FTS (#49)
All checks were successful
CD / Build and push images (push) Successful in 3m5s
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (push) Successful in 2m19s
CI / Auth e2e pack (push) Successful in 2m51s
CI / Build container images (push) Has been skipped
CD / Deploy to Test (push) Successful in 9s
CD / Smoke tests against Test (push) Successful in 1m13s
CD / Promote to Int (push) Successful in 12s
Full-text search behind a swappable interface (ADR 0010).

- prisma: `page_content_cache.search_vector tsvector` (Unsupported column);
  migration adds it plus a GIN index (raw SQL — the index is a production
  perf optimization; correctness holds without it, so schema-pushed test DBs
  work unchanged).
- shared: `normalizeForSearch` (NFKD + strip diacritics + lowercase) folds
  both the indexed text and the query, so 'Baume' finds 'Bäume' without the
  Postgres `unaccent` extension; search query schema + result view + highlight
  sentinels.
- api search module:
  - abstract `SearchProvider` (DI token: indexPage / removePage / search /
    reindexAll) so an external engine can replace the binding — a fake proves
    the seam in a test.
  - `PostgresSearchProvider`: weighted vector (title A, labels B, body C),
    `websearch_to_tsquery`, `ts_headline` snippets, results filtered to the
    ponds the user may read; `GET /search?q=&pondId=&labels=`.
  - `search:reindex` CLI (rebuilds from the content cache, idempotent).
  - reindex hooks: page create/rename (title) and label assign/unassign/
    rename/delete (labels are weight-B).
- collab: the persistence hook maintains `search_vector` in the same
  transaction as the content cache (same weighting, normalized).
- tests: shared normalize/schema; api db (title ranks above body, highlight,
  diacritic-insensitive match, permission filter, idempotent reindex) and the
  fake-provider DI test; collab persistence already covers the write path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
2026-07-09 13:25:05 +02:00
a3a012c41d Add hierarchical labels: model, CRUD API, and validation (#43)
All checks were successful
CD / Build and push images (push) Successful in 2m56s
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (push) Successful in 2m5s
CI / Auth e2e pack (push) Successful in 2m26s
CI / Build container images (push) Has been skipped
CD / Deploy to Test (push) Successful in 9s
CD / Smoke tests against Test (push) Successful in 1m13s
CD / Promote to Int (push) Successful in 12s
Introduce pond-scoped hierarchical labels as the foundation for M4
organization and, later, M5 label-scoped permissions.

- shared: `labels.ts` with the label schemas/views and the pure tree
  helpers (buildLabelTree, collectSubtreeIds, collectAncestorIds,
  labelDepth, subtreeHeight). These are the single hierarchy walk the
  label API and the future permission resolver both build on
  (permissions.md: a grant on a label applies to all its descendants).
- prisma: `Label` (self-referential parent_id, unique per (pond, parent,
  name), cascade to subtree) and `PageLabel` assignment table; migration.
- api: `LabelsService` + controller. Tree endpoint returns the hierarchy
  in one call; create/rename/recolor/move/delete and page assign/unassign.
  Validation: cycle prevention on move, depth limit 6, unique name per
  (pond, parent) — enforced under a per-pond advisory lock so root-label
  uniqueness holds despite Postgres treating NULL parents as distinct.
  Delete cascades the subtree and requires `?force=true` when pages are
  assigned. Assignment rejects labels from a different pond. Access gated
  through InterimAccessService on the owning pond.
- i18n: label error codes and the colour validation message (de + en).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
2026-07-09 10:30:17 +02:00