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Author SHA1 Message Date
c4c84b33f9 #200: hard instance-wide plugins.enabled kill switch
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plugins.enabled (instance setting, default on — plugins predate the
switch; the VS-NfD reference configuration turns it off) makes every
plugin surface answer 404 via a shared guard: Site-Admin
install/list/mode, pond activation and plugin list, the sandbox frame
and asset routes. The dropzone watcher quarantines drops instead of
installing. Deliberately NOT guarded: the authenticated
fallback-metadata route — it serves no plugin code and existing
plugin_block nodes need it to render their declared fallback (an image
fallback degrades to the neutral placeholder while off, because its
bytes live on the disabled asset surface). The editor offers no plugin
blocks because the pond plugin list is one of the 404ing surfaces.
Admin settings panel gets the toggle (i18n de+en) with the documented
api-restart note (in-process settings cache).

Answers "code execution inside the zone?" with one verifiable
off-switch instead of per-plugin trust machinery (#232, ADR 0025).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
2026-07-31 04:42:42 +02:00
afef45732a #191: feeds.enabled instance switch, feed-token log masking
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Chosen path: an instance master switch following the api.enabled/
mcp.enabled pattern — while off, both feed routes AND the feed-token
management answer 404 (existence hidden). Default ON: feeds predate the
switch, existing instances and their subscribed readers keep working;
the VS-NfD reference configuration (#227) turns it off. Admin UI gets
the toggle next to the API/MCP switches (i18n de+en).

Moving the token out of the query string is documented as rejected: a
path segment lands in the same proxy and request logs, and feed readers
cannot send headers — that is why the credential is in the URL at all.
What DID leak was our own request log (pino logs req.url): the req
serializer now masks ?token= values (common/mask-token-param.ts), so no
code path logs the credential.

Refs #191

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
2026-07-30 11:34:43 +02:00
7252bd16e0 #149: Atom-Feeds für Teiche und Seiten, privat via Feed-Token
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GET /public/:pond/feed.xml (zuletzt geänderte Seiten) und
GET /public/:pond/:page/feed.xml (Versions-Historie), @Public mit
404-Semantik; öffentliche Teiche anonym, nicht-öffentliche über neues
read-only Feed-Token je Nutzer als ?token=dt_feed_… (neue Tabelle
feed_tokens + Migration, Verwaltung in den Nutzer-Einstellungen,
FeedTokensSection). Öffentliche HTML-Seiten annoncieren den Teich-Feed
per link rel=alternate. DB-Tests (anonym/privat/Token-Lifecycle) und
User-Guide-Doku en+de.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0155v2aT8AG1kZDQEZiCLBWC
2026-07-20 00:49:53 +02:00
04e21a0aac Built-in MCP endpoint (Streamable HTTP) on top of the public API (#105)
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AI clients talk to the instance directly at /api/mcp — under the /api/
path (deviation from the issue's literal /mcp) so every existing reverse
proxy already routes it; no deployment changes anywhere.

- Transport: official @modelcontextprotocol/sdk server, STATELESS — each
  POST builds a fresh server+transport pair, no session store, replicas
  stay trivial; GET/DELETE answer 405. Auth per PAT bearer (#104 tokens),
  per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After).
- Own switches, independent of REST: instance mcp.enabled (admin
  settings, default off; off = 404, feature invisible) + pond setting
  mcpEnabled (pond-settings toggle, default off) — pinned independent in
  both directions by tests.
- Tools (thin wrappers over the #104 services, same permission gates,
  audit-logged writes): list_ponds, list_pages, read_page, search,
  create_page, update_page (replace semantics through the collab-owned
  restore path — open editors converge), add_comment, list_labels,
  set_page_labels (exact replace), export_pond (link to the REST ZIP).
  Tool errors carry the api error codes; results carry stable slugs/ids.
  MCP resources stay the documented stage-2 stretch goal.
- Deliberately on the SDK's low-level Server API with a hand-written tool
  table (mcp-tools.ts): the typed registerTool generics drove tsc out of
  memory in a program this size; manual Zod validation keeps the wire
  behavior explicit.
- PublicApiService exposure filtering parameterized ('api' | 'mcp',
  shared pondFeatureEnabled helper) — one implementation, two switches.
- Docs: "Connect Claude Code / MCP clients" section in public-api.md
  (claude mcp add one-liner + mcp-remote bridge for stdio clients).

Verification: 8-test e2e pack driving the real MCP SDK client over
Streamable HTTP against a listening api (initialize + tools/list, switch
independence in both directions, anonymous/garbage 401, opt-in 404
semantics, page roundtrip incl. restore-NOTIFY, labels/comments, read
scope blocked from writes with scope_required); live check through the
web proxy against the seeded stack (tools list, create, read, update,
search — LIVE CHECK PASSED); full api suite 61/61 files green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-12 11:36:02 +02:00
0c85293830 Public REST API v1: personal access tokens, instance switch + per-pond opt-in (#104)
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Token-authenticated machine access at /api/public/v1 — the foundation for
the built-in MCP endpoint (#105).

Personal access tokens:
- api_tokens table (SHA-256 hash, scope read|write, optional pond
  restriction, expiry, revocation, throttled last-used) + migration;
  secrets are dt_pat_<random>, shown exactly once
- lifecycle endpoints under /users/me/api-tokens (session-only — a leaked
  token can never mint more tokens) with audit entries
  api.token_created/api.token_revoked
- settings UI section (create with scope/expiry/pond restriction,
  one-time reveal with copy, list with status + revoke), de+en

Activation (404 semantics per #60 on both levels):
- instance setting api.enabled (default off, admin settings switch)
- pond setting apiEnabled (default off, pond settings toggle; the
  PondsService settings-merge learned the key — the #92 lesson)

Surface (/api/public/v1, excluded from the SPA's global prefix):
- me, ponds, pages (list/read as Markdown+HTML, create from Markdown via
  the shared pipeline, PATCH title/content, DELETE to trash), search
  (permission-filtered + narrowed to exposed ponds, highlights as **…**),
  markdown ZIP export, labels (tree, create/rename/recolour/move/delete,
  assign/unassign), comments (threads, create, resolve/reopen)
- content replacement travels the collab-owned document path: the new
  state lands as a MANUAL version "API update", then the established
  restore NOTIFY applies it — open editors converge, history stays
  append-only, no second lineage (VersionsService.replaceContent)
- hand-maintained OpenAPI 3.1 document at /openapi.json, pinned to the
  controller by a route-coverage test in both directions

Enforcement:
- PublicApiGuard: instance switch → bearer PAT auth (request.user is the
  token's user) → per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After) → scope
  (403 scope_required) → pond opt-in + token restriction
- the shared PermissionGuard then applies the unchanged permission model;
  PageParamSource gained pondSlugParam for the slug+slug routes
- no cookies anywhere → no CSRF surface (pinned by a hostile-Origin test)
- every write audit-logged as api.write with the token attributed

Tests/verification:
- 12-test e2e pack: lifecycle, switches, permission matrix
  (reader/editor/outsider × scopes), restriction, page roundtrip incl.
  restore-NOTIFY assertion, labels, comments incl. policy, search
  narrowing, ZIP export, rate limit; full api suite 60/60 green
  (quota fixture via per-user override — never the instance default)
- new collab-pack test proves an open editor converges onto an API
  content replacement (green against a local seeded stack)
- UI smoke against the built SPA: token create/reveal/revoke, pond
  opt-in persists, admin switch persists (10/10)
- docs/self-hosting/public-api.md + README link

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-12 11:17:03 +02:00