Any authenticated user can invite an e-mail address; the mailed
single-use token lets exactly one signup through even while
registration is closed. Open (pending, unexpired) invitations count
against the new instance setting invitations.maxOpenPerUser (default 5,
0 disables inviting) — plus a 20/day per-user rate limit so a
revoke-and-recreate loop cannot become a mail cannon. Only the SHA-256
token hash is stored (auth-tokens pattern); a failed signup (taken
username) un-redeems the token so the invitee can retry.
Surfaces: invitations section in the user settings (list, invite,
revoke, quota line; wide table in a focusable .table-scroll region),
signup page reads ?invitation=<token> (preview banner, e-mail prefill,
closed-mode gate opens only for a previewed-valid token), admin general
card gets the quota field (flat RHF name per #322; VS-NfD marked and
hideable).
Governance: audit actions invitation.created/revoked/accepted
(catalogue 1.10), VS-NfD profile entry (compliant: 0) + hardening-guide
row, i18n de+en including the invitation mail template.
Tests: api e2e-db (mail link, closed-mode single-use signup with
un-redeem on failure, quota + revoke frees slot, quota 0 = 403, auth
matrix), new web e2e pack invitations.spec.ts (full UI loop through
Mailpit, wired into ci.yml with its own rate-limit reset), a11y scan
waits for the new section. Full api suite (107 files / 607 tests),
auth/admin-settings/a11y packs green against a fresh local stack.
Closes#332
External authentication (ADR 0021) built on jose (#188's vetted library)
plus fetch — no new dependency enters the supply chain for a security
base function. Discovery-configured; ID tokens validate against the
IdP's JWKS under an explicit RS256/ES256 allowlist with issuer,
audience, expiry and nonce binding. State, nonce and the PKCE verifier
travel in a signed HttpOnly Lax cookie keyed by a dedicated HKDF
purpose (oidc-state, ADR 0020).
Deploy-level configuration (OIDC_ISSUER/CLIENT_ID/CLIENT_SECRET/SCOPES/
PROVIDER_LABEL): who authenticates users is a platform decision. The
login page discovers the provider via GET /auth/methods and renders the
SSO button (i18n de+en).
Identities use the existing slot (provider oidc:<issuer>, subject from
the token). First login creates the account just-in-time — ACTIVE and
mail-verified only when the IdP asserts a verified address. An existing
local account is NEVER adopted silently by e-mail (account-takeover
path): login refuses with oidc_link_required and the owner links
explicitly via GET /auth/oidc/link (audited auth.identity_linked,
catalogue v1.3). Sessions come from the one existing session service.
Tests run the full flow against a protocol-faithful fake IdP: PKCE
verifier at the token endpoint, JIT creation incl. personal pond,
invalid state/nonce/signature/issuer/audience/expiry each rejected, the
linking refusal and the explicit link flow. Verified end-to-end against
a real Keycloak 26.0 (repeatable procedure documented in security.md
§External authentication).
Refs #214.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8
New per-user digestFrequency (hourly default | daily | off) on the
profile and in the settings UI. A scheduler job (15 min cadence) mails a
user once their oldest unread, unmailed notification exceeds the cadence
window: one localized mail per batch, grouped per pond then per page
with actor names and change/comment counts, enqueued through the mail
outbox. Sending marks the batch mailed — never read — and re-checks page
read permission per entry at send time; entries the user can no longer
read are dropped from the mail but still marked handled, so revoked
content cannot queue forever. Every mail carries a signed, single-purpose
unsubscribe link: it only flips the setting to off, renders a session-free
confirmation page, and sets no cookie.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
New watches table (polymorphic target, unique per user+target; page purge
removes its rows via the trash service, and the list endpoint drops
targets the user can no longer read). Endpoints: idempotent PUT/DELETE
/watches/{page|pond}/:id gated by read access (404 hides the target),
GET state for the header toggles, and GET /users/me/watches resolving
names and links. Auto-watch hooks: creating a page and commenting
subscribe the actor, each behind a new user preference
(autoWatchOwnPages / autoWatchOnComment, default on) editable via the
profile PATCH and surfaced as checkboxes in the settings. UI: watch
toggle on the page header and the pond settings header, watch list with
unwatch in the account settings; new watches i18n namespace (de+en).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
Composing z.object() in the web app around a schema imported from
@dorfteich/shared mixes two zod type instances and breaks the
zodResolver overload on fresh installs (CI). Like the other forms,
the schema now lives in the shared package.
Part of #20
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The web app grows its account surface: login (with next-redirect,
unverified-hint + resend), signup (react-hook-form + shared Zod
schemas, field-level api errors, closed-registration state fed by the
new public GET /auth/registration), e-mail verification, forgot/reset
password; a settings page with profile (locale applies immediately),
password change, and active-session management; a Site-Admin page for
instance name, default locale, and registration mode. AuthProvider
holds /auth/me, applies the profile locale, and backs route guards
(RequireAuth/RequireAnonymous/RequireSiteAdmin); the top bar gains a
user menu. All strings ship in the new auth/settings namespaces (de+
en); the exception filter now preserves handler-specific error codes.
Verified live: signup → Mailpit → verify → login → profile through
the Vite proxy.
Closes#16Closes#17Closes#18Closes#19
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Prisma models per data-model.md: users (status enum, site-admin flag),
user_identities (password provider now, OIDC later — subject is the
stable user id), sessions (hashed ids), auth_tokens (hashed, single-
use), plus rate_limits and mail_outbox for the upcoming M1 stories.
UsersService creates accounts transactionally with Argon2id-hashed
password identities (OWASP parameters, rehash detection) and maps
uniqueness violations to field-level conflicts. Database-backed suites
run when TEST_DATABASE_URL is set — locally against the dev db, in CI
via a new postgres service container; shared auth schemas (username,
password policy incl. common-password blocklist) ship with tests.
Closes#10
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
