Any authenticated user can invite an e-mail address; the mailed
single-use token lets exactly one signup through even while
registration is closed. Open (pending, unexpired) invitations count
against the new instance setting invitations.maxOpenPerUser (default 5,
0 disables inviting) — plus a 20/day per-user rate limit so a
revoke-and-recreate loop cannot become a mail cannon. Only the SHA-256
token hash is stored (auth-tokens pattern); a failed signup (taken
username) un-redeems the token so the invitee can retry.
Surfaces: invitations section in the user settings (list, invite,
revoke, quota line; wide table in a focusable .table-scroll region),
signup page reads ?invitation=<token> (preview banner, e-mail prefill,
closed-mode gate opens only for a previewed-valid token), admin general
card gets the quota field (flat RHF name per #322; VS-NfD marked and
hideable).
Governance: audit actions invitation.created/revoked/accepted
(catalogue 1.10), VS-NfD profile entry (compliant: 0) + hardening-guide
row, i18n de+en including the invitation mail template.
Tests: api e2e-db (mail link, closed-mode single-use signup with
un-redeem on failure, quota + revoke frees slot, quota 0 = 403, auth
matrix), new web e2e pack invitations.spec.ts (full UI loop through
Mailpit, wired into ci.yml with its own rate-limit reset), a11y scan
waits for the new section. Full api suite (107 files / 607 tests),
auth/admin-settings/a11y packs green against a fresh local stack.
Closes#332
New /admin/system panel (operations.md §Maintenance jobs): the maintenance
job list shows every registered job with truthful last-run data (new
Job.lastDurationMs recorded by the scheduler) and a manual trigger that
respects the run-mutex and is itself audit-logged; a backup card mirrors
the sidecar's status.json including the freshness verdict; an audit-log
viewer filters by actor, action, and time range with pagination; and a
storage overview lists the largest ponds. Auth events and admin actions
(grants, members, user/quota admin, plugins, settings, setup) now land in
a new audit_log table through a central AuditService — which keeps
emitting the established stdout log line — while content activity stays
log-only by design. All endpoints are Site-Admin-only; covered by API DB
tests and a Playwright pack in CI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
- Pond model with pond-level trash columns (ADR 0013) and settings jsonb
holding only deviations from the defaults (sidebar sort, font slots per
ADR 0016); migration 20260705090100_ponds
- shared: pond schemas/views and slugify (German transliteration,
URL-safe, length-capped); deterministic -2/-3 suffixes for collisions
- InterimAccessService: single place answering pond access questions
until the real role model lands in M5
- POST/GET /ponds, GET /ponds/:slug, PATCH/DELETE /ponds/:id, Site-Admin
trash + restore; personal pond auto-created on e-mail verification and
for active seed fixtures; personal ponds cannot be trashed
- e2e pack covering verify-flow pond creation, slug suffixes, rename,
foreign-pond 404s, trash/restore; slugify unit tests
Closes#21
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB
Server halves of #17/#18/#19: PATCH /users/me and change-password
(verifies the current password, logs out every other session),
GET/DELETE /users/me/sessions with current-session flag and protection
against revoking oneself; InstanceSettingsService as a typed, cached,
Zod-validated registry over instance_settings (schema-default fallback
for invalid stored values, audit-logged writes) consumed by the signup
flow; /admin/settings behind the new SiteAdminGuard with strict
unknown-key rejection. SessionsService moves to its own module to keep
Auth/Users acyclic. Three new e2e suites bring the api to 42 tests.
Part of #17, #18, #19
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AuthModule implements the M1 core as one coherent unit:
Signup (#13): POST signup/verify-email/resend-verification with shared
Zod validation (field-level error details), double opt-in via hashed
single-use tokens (24h, superseding reissue), registration_mode
enforcement, and per-IP rate limits.
Sessions (#14): opaque 32-byte cookie tokens stored as SHA-256 row
ids, sliding 30-day expiry (refresh at most hourly), global AuthGuard
with @Public() opt-out attaching the user to every request, CSRF
origin check on mutating requests, per-account login backoff (5/15min,
reset on success), generic 401 for wrong-vs-unknown credentials,
logout with immediate invalidation, GET /auth/me.
Reset (#15): forgot-password without account enumeration, one-hour
single-use tokens, reset destroys all existing sessions.
A 14-case supertest e2e suite drives every flow against the test
database, reading verification/reset links from the mail outbox.
Closes#13Closes#14Closes#15
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
