20 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude Opus 5	b96997501a	#303: operator-uploaded fonts — storage, API, PDF embedding, backup ... An operator holding a font licence could only use it by baking the file into a custom image, which tied every change to a rebuild and left the file out of the backup. ADR 0016 said there is no runtime font management. It also listed this exact case under "Alternatives considered" — *may become a Site-Admin- level feature later*. The amendment takes that option and answers the two objections it raised: licensing risk (Site Admins only, licence recorded with the family) and file-format attack surface (magic-byte check and a size cap, never a parse). - `CUSTOM_FONTS_DIR` (default `./data/fonts`) — a sibling of uploads and plugins, NOT inside the image-baked `FONTS_DIR`, where a deploy would overwrite it and no backup would ever see it. - One list of data directories (`apps/backup/src/data-dirs.ts`) now feeds both the nightly archive and the restore, so they cannot drift. #306 and #307 add one line each instead of a second mechanism. - Both Dockerfiles bake the path. The backup image sets its volume paths itself ("self-sufficient without compose env" — #71's lesson) and reads no *_DIR from compose; without the ENV entry the archive would have skipped the directory silently. - The PDF path already read WOFF2 from disk at request time, so it only had to pick the other base directory for a custom family. - `fontStack`/`fontEntry` take the instance's uploaded families as an argument — they are runtime data. The catalog is searched first, and a colliding family name is rejected at upload, so a custom font can never shadow a catalog one. - Deletion is never blocked by usage: an unknown family already falls back to the system stack, so affected ponds degrade instead of breaking. The count of affected ponds travels into the audit entry. - Audit catalogue v1.6 (`font.uploaded`, `font.deleted`). Verified: api full suite against a fresh database, 102 files / 571 tests. The upload suite writes into a real temp directory and reads the bytes back off disk, so the storage layer is exercised rather than mocked.	2026-08-01 14:49:13 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	da5fd7c770	#243: VS_NFD_MODE and the machine-readable hardening-profile catalog ... The deployment declares through VS_NFD_MODE (off | marked | hidden | enforced, default off) how the application treats configuration that violates the VS-NfD reference profile — deploy-level like BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS, so a compromised Site Admin cannot widen it. The catalog in shared (vs-nfd-profile.ts) is the single source of truth: every profile-relevant setting with a decidable compliant value, judgement calls in an explicit advisory list, and a fence test parsing the hardening guide's reference tables so neither can drift (pattern #201). The api evaluates the catalog against the typed settings registry and validated env and exposes mode + verdict on GET /admin/system/vs-nfd-profile; the admin settings view shows the card whenever the mode is not off. Display only — the treatments land with #244–#246 (ADR 0027, proposed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 18:24:04 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	13f0311d8e	#216: hard AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED switch over every local credential flow ... The deploy-level realization of auth.local.enabled (ADR 0021): FALSE answers 404 on every local credential flow — login, signup, e-mail verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change — enforced centrally in the auth guard via the @LocalCredentialFlow() marker before any session or CSRF logic runs. Deploy-level on purpose: a compromised Site Admin cannot reopen the local path, so the runtime-flip residual risk from ADR 0021 does not materialize (R-02 closed in the risk list). An enumeration fence fails when an auth route is neither marked nor on the reviewed allowlist, so a new credential flow cannot ship unswitched. Stated decisions, each tested: sessions/logout keep working for externally authenticated users; PAT and feed-token issuance stays available (API authorization under its own switches, not interactive sign-in). Bootstrap: complete setup (or SETUP_ADMIN_* pre-seed) before flipping; the api warns at boot when local auth is off with neither OIDC nor proxy auth configured. GET /auth/methods reports local:false and the login page hides the local form and credential links. Hardening guide: the planned auth.local.enabled row moves from 1.3 into the live deploy table with the bootstrap ordering, and the verification checklist gains the login-404 probe. Refs #216. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:58:07 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4c7f001cab	#215: trusted reverse-proxy header / mTLS client-certificate path ... For perimeters that authenticate before the application (ADR 0021 §4). Off unless BOTH AUTH_PROXY_HEADER and AUTH_PROXY_TRUSTED_PEERS are set — nothing about the header is guessed. The peer check runs against the TCP peer address only (a forwarded header is attacker-influenced): a request carrying the header from any other peer is rejected outright and audited as auth.proxy_rejected (catalogue v1.4) — that is a spoof attempt, not a misconfiguration — even when a valid session cookie rides along. From a trusted peer the header IS the identity; a session cookie never escalates beyond it; with the feature off the header is inert. Mapping is explicit (AUTH_PROXY_MAP: username or e-mail); deliberately no just-in-time creation — the header carries no verified address. The mTLS variant (AUTH_PROXY_MODE=mtls-dn) maps the configured attribute (default CN) out of the certificate subject DN the TLS terminator forwards, under the same peer rules. Session-less proxy requests key the read trail per user (user:<id>). The trust boundary is stated in security.md (the section an assessor reads closest), the VS-NfD security documentation and the hardening guide's deploy table. Tests cover all four decisions: off = inert, trusted peer authenticates (username and DN mapping), untrusted peer rejected + audited, no escalation past a session cookie. Refs #215. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:50:09 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	5796b7a5dd	#214: OIDC Authorization Code with PKCE, Keycloak as reference IdP ... External authentication (ADR 0021) built on jose (#188's vetted library) plus fetch — no new dependency enters the supply chain for a security base function. Discovery-configured; ID tokens validate against the IdP's JWKS under an explicit RS256/ES256 allowlist with issuer, audience, expiry and nonce binding. State, nonce and the PKCE verifier travel in a signed HttpOnly Lax cookie keyed by a dedicated HKDF purpose (oidc-state, ADR 0020). Deploy-level configuration (OIDC_ISSUER/CLIENT_ID/CLIENT_SECRET/SCOPES/ PROVIDER_LABEL): who authenticates users is a platform decision. The login page discovers the provider via GET /auth/methods and renders the SSO button (i18n de+en). Identities use the existing slot (provider oidc:<issuer>, subject from the token). First login creates the account just-in-time — ACTIVE and mail-verified only when the IdP asserts a verified address. An existing local account is NEVER adopted silently by e-mail (account-takeover path): login refuses with oidc_link_required and the owner links explicitly via GET /auth/oidc/link (audited auth.identity_linked, catalogue v1.3). Sessions come from the one existing session service. Tests run the full flow against a protocol-faithful fake IdP: PKCE verifier at the token endpoint, JIT creation incl. personal pond, invalid state/nonce/signature/issuer/audience/expiry each rejected, the linking refusal and the explicit link flow. Verified end-to-end against a real Keycloak 26.0 (repeatable procedure documented in security.md §External authentication). Refs #214. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:44:52 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	394d1c811d	#192: deploy-level backup target allowlist ... BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS (comma-separated destination hosts) constrains where backups may go, enforced twice: the api rejects settings writes and connection tests towards non-allowlisted hosts with admin-visible error codes and resolves a non-allowlisted configured target to null, and the sidecar enforces the same policy at the point of egress for the WebDAV upload and the rsync mirror alike (shared policy helpers in packages/shared/src/backup-target-policy.ts). BREAKING: the empty default disables every remote target - backups stay local only, the VS-NfD reference configuration (ADR 0026). Existing deployments with a remote target must list its host or uploads and mirror stop. The admin UI distinguishes unavailable-by-policy from unconfigured (i18n de+en) and shows the permitted hosts. Refs #192 (ADR 0026) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 12:17:14 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	db4c5ce9ca	#190: configurable session lifetime with a server-side idle timeout ... SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS (default 168 h) caps a session's total lifetime from login: expiresAt is set once at creation and never extended — the old sliding 30-day renewal is gone. SESSION_IDLE_HOURS (default 72 h) ends sessions unused for that long, enforced server-side against lastSeenAt with a write throttle scaled to the idle bound so short idle windows still renew. Expired rows are removed on validation and the session list applies both bounds, so idle-dead sessions never show as active. The cookie maxAge follows the configured absolute bound. Documented in .env.example (with the VS-NfD reference values for the upcoming hardening guide #227), compose passes the variables through, security.md and ADR 0007 record the amendment. Refs #190 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 11:11:15 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	52192eb05f	Backup mirror to BASEL: rsync of the sets after every successful run (#84) ... The operator-level extra beside the admin-configured Nextcloud target (#103), unblocked now that the ONE→BASEL tunnel is stable again. - sidecar: optional mirror step (mirror.ts) driven purely by env — BACKUP_MIRROR_TARGET (rsync-over-ssh), BACKUP_MIRROR_SSH_KEY (private key on the secrets volume, never in image or repo), BACKUP_MIRROR_SSH_PORT. Runs after the prune of every successful run, so --delete aligns the remote retention with the local one (the newest-complete-set guarantee carries over). Only set files travel (db-*.dump, files-*.tar.gz); status files and bundles stay local. Host key pinned via accept-new into .mirror_known_hosts on the backups volume; fixed remote modes (dirs 750, files 640, symbolic --chmod — octal needs rsync ≥ 3, macOS dev machines ship 2.6.9). rsync + openssh-client added to the sidecar image. - status: additive `mirror` block in status.json (outcome, transferred count, lastSuccessAt carried across failures) — shown on the admin backup card; failures alert via a new backupMirrorFailed mail (de+en) while the local run still counts as succeeded. - deploy/backup-basel.md: complete BASEL-side walkthrough — dedicated user dorfteich-backup with a /home/ home and a bash login shell, explicitly avoiding the Debian backup-user (UID 34) pitfalls (nologin shell rejects rsync sessions, /var/backups home), key placement through the api container onto the secrets volume, .env values, on-demand verification. - tests: rsync-arg/stats-parsing units plus an integration suite against the real rsync binary (local target; skips where rsync is absent) — transfer, idempotent re-run (0 files), retention alignment, failure path carrying lastSuccessAt. Verified live against the real BASEL host from a native sidecar run: initial transfer, host-key pinning, retention alignment after a local prune, idempotency, and the failure path (surfaced in status.json while the local run stayed green). BASEL side provisioned per the doc. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-12 12:20:32 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	0ef96147e0	Extend readyz with backup freshness and a degraded status level (#85) ... readyz now enumerates database/migrations (hard failures, HTTP 503), converter/renderer, and a new backup check that reads the sidecar's status.json from the read-only backups mount and warns when the last successful backup is older than 26 h. Warning-level checks surface as overall status "degraded" while staying HTTP 200 — monitors alert on the body keyword, Docker healthchecks keep using the liveness endpoints so a degraded instance is never restart-looped. The status.json shape moved to @dorfteich/shared as the contract between the sidecar and its readers (#85/#86); deploy/monitoring.md defines the Uptime-Kuma monitor set per stage. The api image also pre-creates /data/backups node-owned so the shared backups volume stays writable for the sidecar regardless of which container initializes it, and the sidecar's scheduler survives runs that cannot even record their status. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-11 19:02:59 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	8dbff86537	Add backup sidecar: nightly dump, volume archive, prune, status, restore (#83) ... New apps/backup service (ADR 0015): nightly pg_dump -Fc plus one tar of the uploads/plugins volumes as a consistent restore set on a new backups volume, retention prune that never removes the newest complete set, atomic status.json for the readiness/admin consumers (#85/#86), and a failure mail sent directly via nodemailer (the api may be the broken part) with de/en texts in the shared mails catalog. BACKUP_RUN_ONCE=1 gives the on-demand path; deploy/backup/restore.sh automates the documented restore runbook. The pure secret-store helpers moved to @dorfteich/shared so the sidecar resolves the wizard-written SMTP relay exactly like the api. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-11 17:29:15 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	f0a82bad20	Add the first-run setup wizard API with env-backed secret store (#80) ... When the api runs against a database without the setup.completedAt marker, a global SetupGuard answers every non-exempt route with 503 setup_required; only /setup/*, health probes, and the session routes stay reachable. The wizard steps (POST /setup/admin|instance|smtp| registration|complete) write straight to their production homes; the Site Admin step signs its creator in, later steps require that session. Completing sets the marker and locks every step permanently (410, also across restarts, and not reopenable via PATCH /admin/settings). SMTP entered in the wizard is verified with a live delivery test first (failure blocks the step with the transport error as detail) and then persisted to the new env-backed secret store: a mode-600 dotenv file on the new `secrets` volume (SECRETS_FILE). Explicit container env always wins over the store; empty compose-passed strings count as unset. The mail transport now resolves lazily through SmtpConfigService so wizard changes apply without a restart. SETUP_ADMIN_* env pre-seeds the whole wizard at boot for automated deploys; a backfill migration marks instances that already have a Site Admin as completed, and seed/vitest global-setup do the same for fixture databases. The setup e2e suite provisions its own fresh database (CREATE DATABASE + migrate deploy) per run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-11 15:10:28 +02:00
Claude Opus 4.8	621aa47244	Add plugin storage, install API, and directory watcher (#71) ... Backend for installing plugin ZIPs (ADR 0008, plugin-architecture.md §Lifecycle, security.md §Plugins). Consumes the #70 SDK for validation. - Schema: `plugins` (id, name, version, apiVersion, kind, mode, manifest jsonb, removedAt soft-delete) + `pond_plugins` (per-pond activation) + `PluginInstanceMode` enum; migration 20260710130000_plugins. - `PluginPackageService`: pure, stateless ZIP → validated package via fflate — structure check, manifest validation (SDK), apiVersion gate, kind/bundle/styles rules, CSS sanitation (no @import / external url() / expression()), zip-slip and unpacked-size guards. Each failure carries a stable PluginErrorCode; manifest issues travel as ApiError details. - `PluginStorageService`: on-disk layout `<PLUGINS_DIR>/<id>/<version>/`; atomic writeVersion (staging dir + rename, no 404 window mid-update), removeVersion/removePlugin, traversal-safe asset resolution, dropzone + quarantine dirs. - `PluginsService`: install/update (update only to a strictly higher version, preserving the admin's instance mode; files land before the metadata pointer flips) / uninstall (refused while required; soft-delete + files removed + pond activations dropped) / list / get. - `POST/GET/DELETE /admin/plugins` (SiteAdminGuard, multer memory upload), error→HTTP-status mapping. Public version-pinned static serving at `GET /plugins/:id/:version/*rest` with immutable cache + nosniff, only for the installed current version. - `PluginWatcherService`: watches `<PLUGINS_DIR>/_dropzone/`, runs the same validation, installs valid drops and quarantines invalid ones with the error logged; inert under NODE_ENV=test (tests drive processDropped). - SDK: `compareVersions`/`isHigherVersion`. shared: `PluginView`, `PluginInstanceMode`, `PLUGIN_ERROR_CODES`, `PLUGINS_DIR` env, plugin error i18n (de+en). Compose: `plugins` volume + `PLUGINS_DIR`. - Tests: package unit test (valid + each invalid class) and an e2e DB test (GUI install + immutable serving, non-admin 403, invalid-manifest details, dropzone install + quarantine, atomic higher-only update, required-guarded uninstall that removes files and tombstones metadata). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-10 16:55:26 +02:00
Claude Opus 4.8	8a68ef68e7	Add PDF export via Gotenberg (#67) ... Server-side PDF export for reading/sharing (ADR 0009), rendered by a new internal Gotenberg (headless Chromium) sidecar. - Sidecar: `gotenberg/gotenberg:8` in the compose stack (internal, pinned, healthcheck); api `GOTENBERG_URL` env; a `renderer` readyz check at warning-level (mirrors the converter) so PDF export degrades gracefully when Gotenberg is down without failing readyz. - Export HTML: `buildPdfHtml` renders a self-contained document (no app chrome) — the page's content with images inlined as data URIs, the pond's fonts inlined as base64 `@font-face` + applied via CSS variables (ADR 0016), print CSS (A4, page-break rules, a title header), and page numbers from Gotenberg's footer. Plugin-block fallbacks are a marked TODO(#79) for M7. - Fonts in the api image: the api Dockerfile now bakes the font catalog in (`build-fonts.mjs` with FONTS_OUT) so the exporter can read a pond's chosen WOFF2 and inline them; a missing file falls back to the system stack. - Job flow: `POST /pages/:id/export {format: pdf}` builds the HTML (read permission checked by the guard) and enqueues an `export_pdf` job on the #62 queue with the HTML as input; the worker branches `to === 'pdf'` to the `GotenbergRenderer` (html → pdf) instead of pandoc, retrying an unreachable sidecar and failing a refused render (`renderer_unavailable`/`render_failed`, de+en). The client polls and downloads `GET /jobs/:id/result`. - Frontend: the page-menu PDF button is now a real export (PDF added to EXPORT_FORMATS; the disabled placeholder removed). - Tests: export.service.db PDF cases (HTML has title/font-variable/inlined image; renderer-down fails with `render_failed`); e2e PDF export self-skips without a Gotenberg sidecar (like the .docx case). Verified locally against real Gotenberg — a valid PDF with the pond font embedded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-10 12:11:12 +02:00
Claude Opus 4.8	4755c18ef5	Add conversion job queue and pandoc sidecar integration (#62) ... Import/export conversions run asynchronously against an internal pandoc-server sidecar with limits and graceful failure (ADR 0009). This is the plumbing; the import (#63) and export (#65) features enqueue jobs onto it. Sidecar & config: - pandoc/core:3.6 in HTTP server mode added to the Compose stack, internal network only, with a wget healthcheck on /version; the api depends on it healthy and reaches it via the new PANDOC_URL env (default http://pandoc:3030). - readyz gains a warning-level `converter` check: an unreachable sidecar degrades import/export but never flips the instance to unready (new `warn` status on ReadinessCheck). Conversion flow (apps/api/src/import-export/): - ConversionJob table (per-request work queue, distinct from the name-keyed maintenance Job table): owner, formats, input/result bytes, status, attempts, lockedAt. Migration + owner cascade. - PandocConverter (abstract) + PandocServerConverter: POST / with {text,from,to,standalone}; binary input formats (docx/odt/…) are base64-encoded in `text`; 60 s AbortController timeout; input/output size caps. Failures map to distinct localized codes — converter_unavailable / converter_timeout (retryable) and conversion_failed (final). - ConversionWorker: claims one job at a time with `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` (safe against overlapping sweeps and a second process), recovers a stale RUNNING lock, retries transient failures up to 3 attempts then fails. A 2 s sweep plus wake-on-enqueue means a queued job survives an API restart. - ConversionJobService.enqueue (size-limited) + owner-scoped GET /jobs/:id (poll) and GET /jobs/:id/result (stream the output); a foreign/unknown id is 404. ConversionJobView in @dorfteich/shared. Tests: - conversion-job.e2e.db.test.ts (fake converter injected via a new createTestApp override hook): enqueue→convert→poll→result; foreign/unknown job 404; a persisted PENDING job picked up by a fresh app's worker (restart survival); sidecar-down fails after 3 retries while the API stays healthy. - pandoc.converter.test.ts: success, non-200→conversion_failed, refused→ converter_unavailable, and a delay-injecting server→converter_timeout. - Verified locally against a real pandoc/core:3.6 container: markdown→html, markdown→docx (valid PK/OOXML bytes), and a docx→markdown round-trip. Local: typecheck, lint, i18n:check, build all green; api 193 tests (9 new), shared 121, web 50. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-10 04:06:27 +02:00
Claude Opus 4.8	d4ebcfcfbe	Add collaboration token issuance and connection authentication (#34) ... The api mints a short-lived (60 s) HS256 JWT per page open after an interim permission check; the collab server authenticates every connection with it (ADR 0003/0007 — the only JWTs in the system). - packages/shared: browser-safe token schema/types in `collab-token`, and the Node `crypto` sign/verify in `token-crypto` behind its own subpath export (`@dorfteich/shared/token-crypto`) so the web bundle never pulls in `node:crypto`. Only HS256 is produced/accepted; the signature is checked in constant time before any untrusted field is read. - api: `GET /pages/:id/collab-token` (auth-required) returns {token, mode, expiresInSeconds}; `mode` is rw/ro via the interim access service; issuance is logged at debug level without the token value. - collab: `onAuthenticate` verifies the token, checks the pageId matches the document name, stores {userId, mode} context, and enforces `ro` via Hocuspocus' read-only connection flag. Hocuspocus' own signal handling is disabled so index.ts remains the single shutdown owner. - Shared COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET env for api + collab (compose, dev overlay, .env.example, stage docs); a dev default keeps native dev/test/CI running. Tests: shared token round-trip/rejection; api endpoint e2e (auth required, claims, 404 for non-members/unknown ids); collab integration via HocuspocusProvider (valid token connects; expired/tampered/mismatched-page/ wrong-secret rejected; read-only writes dropped, verified with two clients). Closes #34 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-08 15:52:19 +02:00
Claude Opus 4.8	8316c617d2	Add collaboration server skeleton (Hocuspocus) with health, container, and CI/CD (#33) ... Bootstrap apps/collab as a Hocuspocus WebSocket server (ADR 0003): - pino JSON logging (service=collab) and shared Zod env validation (collabEnvSchema); structured connection open/close logs. - /healthz endpoint (process liveness + PostgreSQL ping) served via the onRequest hook, matching the container-internal path and the proxied /collab/healthz path; any WebSocket handshake is accepted for now (authentication arrives with #34, persistence with #35). - Dockerfile (ESM workspace build) and a compose service on the frontend and internal networks with a healthcheck; dev overlay service and a new COLLAB_PORT variable. - CD builds, pushes, and promotes the collab image; CI builds it on PRs; the smoke suite asserts /collab/healthz through the reverse proxy. - deployment.md/stages.md: proxy routing, per-stage COLLAB_PORT, checklist. Closes #33 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-08 14:53:44 +02:00
Claude Sonnet 5	0fae699018	Add file storage service and image upload API (#27) ... Implements the FileStorage abstraction (uploads/<pondId>/<fileId> on the mounted volume), the attachments model, and POST /ponds/:id/files, GET /media/:fileId, DELETE /files/:id. Uploads are validated by sniffing magic bytes rather than trusting the client's Content-Type/filename (catches a renamed .html-as-.png), checked against the max_file_bytes and storage_bytes quotas, and served with nosniff + immutable caching. Closes #27	2026-07-08 10:35:03 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	f00fb19f32	Add mail outbox with SMTP delivery worker and templates ... MailService renders transactional mails (verify-email, reset-password) from the new de/en `mails` i18n namespace — text plus minimal HTML with escaped interpolation — and enqueues them into mail_outbox. MailWorker delivers pending rows every 15s through an injectable transport (nodemailer; faked in tests) with quadratic backoff and a permanent FAILED state after five attempts, logged as a warning. SMTP_* and APP_BASE_URL join the environment schema with defaults matching the new Mailpit container in the dev overlay. Closes #12 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-05 00:46:12 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	ca0f7cf4b1	Add Prisma with PostgreSQL, automatic migrations, and /readyz ... apps/api gains Prisma (instance_settings as the first model) with the initial migration applied automatically at startup via prisma migrate deploy, a lazy-connecting PrismaService, and GET /api/v1/readyz reporting named checks (database reachable, migrations applied) with 200/503. DATABASE_URL joins the validated environment schema; MIGRATE_ON_START=false skips deploys for tests and tooling. An idempotent seed script and a Compose dev overlay with PostgreSQL (host port 5434 — 5433 is taken locally) complete the loop. Closes #3 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-04 19:16:44 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	c12acbdb2c	Add NestJS API skeleton with config, logging, and /healthz ... apps/api boots a NestJS application with: Zod-validated environment configuration (schema in @dorfteich/shared, fails fast listing every invalid variable), structured pino request logging via nestjs-pino (pretty in development, JSON otherwise, auth headers redacted), a global exception filter producing the uniform ApiErrorBody shape, and GET /api/v1/healthz. Vitest runs Nest through SWC for decorator metadata; supertest covers healthz and the 404 error shape. Closes #2 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-04 19:10:07 +02:00