5 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude Fable 5	9b7acab294	#232: plugin allowlist with SHA-256 hash pinning ... The install path records the SHA-256 of the delivered bundle ZIP (plugins.bundle_hash; pre-#232 installs show it as unknown until reinstalled). plugins.allowlist in instance_settings names permitted ids with their pinned hashes: empty (default) = not enforced, existing instances unchanged; non-empty = installs of unlisted or deviating bundles are rejected (plugin_not_pinned / plugin_hash_mismatch, 403), and an installed plugin outside the list or with a deviating hash does not load — absent from pond mount lists, frame/assets 404. Every rejection is audited (plugin.rejected, catalogue v1.5). A version bump changes the hash and therefore requires an explicit re-pin — the intended friction (ADR 0025). Admin UI shows observed vs pinned hash per plugin with pin/re-pin/unpin. Scope stated honestly in plugin-architecture.md: the pin answers "is this the reviewed bundle"; post-install disk tampering is platform integrity (ADR 0019), sandbox containment stays the sandbox's job. Hardening guide row + catalog advisory triage; residual risk R-03 resolved. e2e: empty-allowlist compatibility, pinned load, unpinned and tampered installs rejected and audited, pin drift blocks loading while the admin still sees the mismatch, version bump needs re-pin. Full api suite 101 files / 561 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 21:26:36 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	0003063c39	Add pageTool plugins with toc and page-index references (#77) ... The read-only widget surface over page/pond data (ADR 0008 extension point `pageTool`): - Host: PageToolsPanel lists the pond's active pageTool surfaces behind disclosures — each sandbox iframe mounts lazily on first open and tears down on close. The same surfaces are insertable as plugin_block embeds (#76's insert picker now offers pageTool points too; the sandbox drives both through the same render lifecycle). - New `ui.scrollToHeading(headingId)` capability: outline ids are derived from the doc and never stamped into the DOM, so the host resolves the id to its heading position via the shared extractOutline and scrolls the matching rendered heading. - `readPond.listPages` now carries label *names* per summary (PagesService.pluginPageSummaries) — the page-index filter chips work on data the viewer could resolve anyway; per-page permission filtering stays in the service as before. - Reference plugins packages/plugins/toc and packages/plugins/page-index: real SDK consumers (createPlugin + windowTransport), bundled with esbuild into the package ZIP; i18n de/en is inlined at build time — the sandbox CSP forbids runtime fetches, the i18n/ files stay the single source. The toc re-fetches its outline on a slow poll, so live heading edits appear once the collab server has re-derived the content cache. - e2e page-tools.spec.ts covers the acceptance criteria: live outline updates after the persistence debounce, heading click scrolls, embedded page-index navigates via ui.openPage, and a label-restricted reader never sees the denied page in the index. - CI: the auth-e2e job now runs the section-styles (missed in #75), plugin-blocks, and page-tools packs, with login-rate-limit resets. - plugins.e2e.db.test clears the plugin registry up front: a local dev DB is shared with the e2e stack, whose installed real `toc` would otherwise collide with the fixture of the same id. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-11 13:27:30 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	923532f5f7	Add block plugins: plugin_block node with sandboxed rendering and editing (#76) ... The powerful end of the plugin spectrum (ADR 0008 extension point `block`): - Shared schema: the reserved `plugin_block` node — a block atom carrying pluginId, blockType, and the block data as a JSON object. Its DOM shape round-trips the full state in data attributes (clipboard-safe), markdown maps to a reserved fence (```dorfteich-plugin <plugin>/<type> + data JSON body, fence-escalated when the payload contains backticks), and the content-cache HTML renders a data-carrying neutral placeholder until the export fallbacks land (#79). - Editor: a React NodeView hosts the #73 sandbox — render lifecycle on mount, an edit affordance switching the frame to the plugin's edit mode, and the blockData capability persisting through node attrs (a normal editor transaction, so Yjs replicates it; writes are refused on read-only editors, and the plugin's own attr echo is suppressed so its edit UI never resets mid-typing). Collaborator changes re-invoke the current lifecycle, keeping frames live. The page surface (ids, openPage) flows through a React context like the wikilink pattern; the toolbar gets an insert picker fed from the active code plugins' block extension points. - Fallback: GET /plugins/:id/fallback resolves the manifest fallback from the stored snapshot — it survives uninstall as a tombstone, image fallbacks degrade to neutral once assets are gone. Signed-in only. - e2e plugin-blocks.spec.ts covers all four acceptance criteria: insert → edit → reload round-trip, live two-user collab, disable → fallback → re-enable without document mutation, and copy/paste within and across pages (the markdown clipboard carries the reserved fence). getBlock (cross-page block embedding) stays deferred as in #74: the schema has no per-block ids yet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-11 12:45:14 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	46292c7447	Add plugin administration UI: instance modes and pond activation (#72) ... - api: PATCH /admin/plugins/:id/mode (Site Admin) switches disabled/optional/required; new PluginPondController exposes GET /ponds/:id/plugins (effective list: required + optional-enabled, pond read access — the SPA loads it per pond), GET .../plugins/settings and PUT .../plugins/:pluginId (Pond Admin) to toggle optional plugins. Toggling a non-optional plugin is refused (plugin_not_optional). Install/uninstall/mode/toggle are audit-logged. - web: PluginManager in the admin area lists installed plugins with their declared permissions surfaced prominently (security.md), an upload control that shows validation errors, a mode switch with an impact hint, and a link to the sandbox preview. PondPluginSettings adds a per-pond optional-plugin toggle section to pond settings. - shared: PondPluginSetting, mode/toggle input schemas, plugin_not_optional error code + de/en messages, plugins i18n (admin/mode/pond). - tests: api db test covers mode switching, per-pond activation, the required-everywhere and disabled-nowhere propagation, and the not-optional guard; e2e plugin-admin pack drives the admin list, permission display, mode switch, and pond toggle end to end. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-11 09:32:16 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	0875e2a087	Add the sandbox host runtime for plugin iframes (#73) ... Implements the security core of the plugin system: code-plugin surfaces run in opaque-origin iframes (sandbox="allow-scripts", never allow-same-origin) with a capability-filtered RPC bridge. - api: serve a per-plugin sandbox frame document at /plugins/:id/:version/frame with a CSP that pins every load to the plugin's own asset path (built from APP_BASE_URL, not the request Host, so a Host-rewriting proxy cannot break it) and forbids network access (connect-src 'none'). Plugin assets get Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * so the null-origin frame can load its own module bundle. - web: sandbox-host creates the frame, wires the SDK host bridge over a source-filtered postMessage transport, drives render under a 5 s deadline (hung/failed plugin -> placeholder, never a frozen page), and tears down on unmount. PluginFrame/PluginPreviewPage surface it; the built-in ui.resize handler clamps plugin-requested heights. - plugin-sdk: host bridge reports gate violations via onViolation and registers a gated handler for every v1 method, so an undeclared capability is rejected with capability_not_permitted (not unknown_method). - tests: SDK gate unit test; web sandbox unit tests (opaque origin, source filtering, timeout); and the e2e security pack with a permanent malicious fixture plugin proving no escape (DOM/cookies/storage/fetch/ undeclared capability all blocked) plus well-behaved and hung cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-11 09:16:30 +02:00