8 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude Fable 5	6aac785841	#217: map IdP groups and roles onto the permission model ... Declarative instance setting idpMapping.rules turns ID-token claims into pond roles and the site-admin flag on every OIDC login — configuration, not code. Mapped grants travel through the SAME GrantsService path as manual ones (permission cache invalidated, collab access notify fires so live sessions revalidate — asserted by test), never raw rows. Ownership makes precedence explicit: role_grants.origin marks mapped rows, users.is_site_admin_managed marks a mapping-set admin flag. The mapping only creates and revokes what it owns — manual wins: hand-made grants and hand-promoted admins are never revoked by a missing claim (a manual toggle clears the marker and takes ownership). Removal of a claim revokes the mapped grant and the managed flag on the next login. Every mapping-driven change is audited with origin idp_mapping. Failure containment: unknown pond slugs and the last-Pond-Admin protection log-and-skip — a mapping problem must never become a login lockout. Tests drive real OIDC logins against the fake IdP with group claims: grant + working access, revocation incl. notify, manual-wins, managed site-admin promote/demote/hands-off. Documented in permissions.md (own section), ADR 0021, data-model.md and the hardening guide (care rule: same PR). Refs #217. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 13:09:11 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	13f0311d8e	#216: hard AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED switch over every local credential flow ... The deploy-level realization of auth.local.enabled (ADR 0021): FALSE answers 404 on every local credential flow — login, signup, e-mail verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change — enforced centrally in the auth guard via the @LocalCredentialFlow() marker before any session or CSRF logic runs. Deploy-level on purpose: a compromised Site Admin cannot reopen the local path, so the runtime-flip residual risk from ADR 0021 does not materialize (R-02 closed in the risk list). An enumeration fence fails when an auth route is neither marked nor on the reviewed allowlist, so a new credential flow cannot ship unswitched. Stated decisions, each tested: sessions/logout keep working for externally authenticated users; PAT and feed-token issuance stays available (API authorization under its own switches, not interactive sign-in). Bootstrap: complete setup (or SETUP_ADMIN_* pre-seed) before flipping; the api warns at boot when local auth is off with neither OIDC nor proxy auth configured. GET /auth/methods reports local:false and the login page hides the local form and credential links. Hardening guide: the planned auth.local.enabled row moves from 1.3 into the live deploy table with the bootstrap ordering, and the verification checklist gains the login-404 probe. Refs #216. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:58:07 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4c7f001cab	#215: trusted reverse-proxy header / mTLS client-certificate path ... For perimeters that authenticate before the application (ADR 0021 §4). Off unless BOTH AUTH_PROXY_HEADER and AUTH_PROXY_TRUSTED_PEERS are set — nothing about the header is guessed. The peer check runs against the TCP peer address only (a forwarded header is attacker-influenced): a request carrying the header from any other peer is rejected outright and audited as auth.proxy_rejected (catalogue v1.4) — that is a spoof attempt, not a misconfiguration — even when a valid session cookie rides along. From a trusted peer the header IS the identity; a session cookie never escalates beyond it; with the feature off the header is inert. Mapping is explicit (AUTH_PROXY_MAP: username or e-mail); deliberately no just-in-time creation — the header carries no verified address. The mTLS variant (AUTH_PROXY_MODE=mtls-dn) maps the configured attribute (default CN) out of the certificate subject DN the TLS terminator forwards, under the same peer rules. Session-less proxy requests key the read trail per user (user:<id>). The trust boundary is stated in security.md (the section an assessor reads closest), the VS-NfD security documentation and the hardening guide's deploy table. Tests cover all four decisions: off = inert, trusted peer authenticates (username and DN mapping), untrusted peer rejected + audited, no escalation past a session cookie. Refs #215. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:50:09 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	5796b7a5dd	#214: OIDC Authorization Code with PKCE, Keycloak as reference IdP ... External authentication (ADR 0021) built on jose (#188's vetted library) plus fetch — no new dependency enters the supply chain for a security base function. Discovery-configured; ID tokens validate against the IdP's JWKS under an explicit RS256/ES256 allowlist with issuer, audience, expiry and nonce binding. State, nonce and the PKCE verifier travel in a signed HttpOnly Lax cookie keyed by a dedicated HKDF purpose (oidc-state, ADR 0020). Deploy-level configuration (OIDC_ISSUER/CLIENT_ID/CLIENT_SECRET/SCOPES/ PROVIDER_LABEL): who authenticates users is a platform decision. The login page discovers the provider via GET /auth/methods and renders the SSO button (i18n de+en). Identities use the existing slot (provider oidc:<issuer>, subject from the token). First login creates the account just-in-time — ACTIVE and mail-verified only when the IdP asserts a verified address. An existing local account is NEVER adopted silently by e-mail (account-takeover path): login refuses with oidc_link_required and the owner links explicitly via GET /auth/oidc/link (audited auth.identity_linked, catalogue v1.3). Sessions come from the one existing session service. Tests run the full flow against a protocol-faithful fake IdP: PKCE verifier at the token endpoint, JIT creation incl. personal pond, invalid state/nonce/signature/issuer/audience/expiry each rejected, the linking refusal and the explicit link flow. Verified end-to-end against a real Keycloak 26.0 (repeatable procedure documented in security.md §External authentication). Refs #214. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:44:52 +02:00
Claude Opus 4.8	42e97b9df2	Add Site-Admin user management (#59) ... Instance operators get basic user administration for support, abuse handling, and GDPR groundwork (security.md §Privacy). - api `admin/`: Site-Admin-gated `/admin/users` — a searchable, paginated list (username, e-mail, status, role, pond count, last login) plus lifecycle actions: disable/enable (a disabled user is logged out everywhere and login is refused with the distinct `account_disabled`), resend verification, delete, and grant/revoke Site Admin. Guards: you cannot act on your own account (`cannot_modify_self`) and the last Site Admin cannot be dropped (`last_site_admin`). Every action is audit-logged with the actor. - `PseudonymizationService`: account deletion scrubs the PII, removes all login identities + sessions, and trashes the personal pond — the kept row is what authorship references, so shared content the user authored shows as "Deleted user" (no orphaned/cascaded content). - web: the Admin area gains a 'Users' surface — search, pagination, and the actions (destructive ones behind an inline two-step confirm; self-actions hidden). New `users` i18n namespace (de+en). - tests: `user-admin.e2e.db.test.ts` (disable → logout + login blocked; delete → pseudonymized authorship + personal pond trashed + credentials gone; last Site Admin and self protected; Site-Admin gating); a non-destructive browser `admin-users` pack proving disable-in-UI blocks login and enable restores it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-10 00:31:41 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	f0850eecd3	Ponds: data model, CRUD API, personal pond on verification (#21) ... - Pond model with pond-level trash columns (ADR 0013) and settings jsonb holding only deviations from the defaults (sidebar sort, font slots per ADR 0016); migration 20260705090100_ponds - shared: pond schemas/views and slugify (German transliteration, URL-safe, length-capped); deterministic -2/-3 suffixes for collisions - InterimAccessService: single place answering pond access questions until the real role model lands in M5 - POST/GET /ponds, GET /ponds/:slug, PATCH/DELETE /ponds/:id, Site-Admin trash + restore; personal pond auto-created on e-mail verification and for active seed fixtures; personal ponds cannot be trashed - e2e pack covering verify-flow pond creation, slug suffixes, rename, foreign-pond 404s, trash/restore; slugify unit tests Closes #21 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB	2026-07-05 11:08:16 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	1314096c94	Add account/session endpoints and typed instance settings with admin API ... Server halves of #17/#18/#19: PATCH /users/me and change-password (verifies the current password, logs out every other session), GET/DELETE /users/me/sessions with current-session flag and protection against revoking oneself; InstanceSettingsService as a typed, cached, Zod-validated registry over instance_settings (schema-default fallback for invalid stored values, audit-logged writes) consumed by the signup flow; /admin/settings behind the new SiteAdminGuard with strict unknown-key rejection. SessionsService moves to its own module to keep Auth/Users acyclic. Three new e2e suites bring the api to 42 tests. Part of #17, #18, #19 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-05 05:26:45 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	bed9fc9307	Add authentication: signup, verification, sessions, password reset ... AuthModule implements the M1 core as one coherent unit: Signup (#13): POST signup/verify-email/resend-verification with shared Zod validation (field-level error details), double opt-in via hashed single-use tokens (24h, superseding reissue), registration_mode enforcement, and per-IP rate limits. Sessions (#14): opaque 32-byte cookie tokens stored as SHA-256 row ids, sliding 30-day expiry (refresh at most hourly), global AuthGuard with @Public() opt-out attaching the user to every request, CSRF origin check on mutating requests, per-account login backoff (5/15min, reset on success), generic 401 for wrong-vs-unknown credentials, logout with immediate invalidation, GET /auth/me. Reset (#15): forgot-password without account enumeration, one-hour single-use tokens, reset destroys all existing sessions. A 14-case supertest e2e suite drives every flow against the test database, reading verification/reset links from the mail outbox. Closes #13 Closes #14 Closes #15 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-05 05:22:31 +02:00