.node-version (22.15.1) becomes the single authoritative Node version:
CI/CD select Node only via node-version-file, every Dockerfile pins
node:22.15.1-alpine, and the engines floor in package.json states the
same version (open-ended upwards so a newer local Node keeps working —
reproducibility rests on images and CI). An early CI step fails on any
drift between those places; update procedure in operations.md
(Update strategy). Precondition for the reproducibility claim in #219.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
Implements the security core of the plugin system: code-plugin surfaces
run in opaque-origin iframes (sandbox="allow-scripts", never
allow-same-origin) with a capability-filtered RPC bridge.
- api: serve a per-plugin sandbox frame document at
/plugins/:id/:version/frame with a CSP that pins every load to the
plugin's own asset path (built from APP_BASE_URL, not the request Host,
so a Host-rewriting proxy cannot break it) and forbids network access
(connect-src 'none'). Plugin assets get Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
so the null-origin frame can load its own module bundle.
- web: sandbox-host creates the frame, wires the SDK host bridge over a
source-filtered postMessage transport, drives render under a 5 s
deadline (hung/failed plugin -> placeholder, never a frozen page), and
tears down on unmount. PluginFrame/PluginPreviewPage surface it; the
built-in ui.resize handler clamps plugin-requested heights.
- plugin-sdk: host bridge reports gate violations via onViolation and
registers a gated handler for every v1 method, so an undeclared
capability is rejected with capability_not_permitted (not
unknown_method).
- tests: SDK gate unit test; web sandbox unit tests (opaque origin,
source filtering, timeout); and the e2e security pack with a permanent
malicious fixture plugin proving no escape (DOM/cookies/storage/fetch/
undeclared capability all blocked) plus well-behaved and hung cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
Self-hosted Google Fonts with per-pond selection (ADR 0016), the GDPR
"zero external requests" posture (security.md, CSP `font-src 'self'`).
- Catalog: a curated 15-family OFL/Apache list in shared (family, weights,
category, license, google-webfonts-helper id). `deploy/fonts/build-fonts.mjs`
validates every entry has license info (fails the build otherwise),
downloads the WOFF2 weights into apps/web/public/fonts/ (gitignored), and
generates the @font-face stylesheet — run at image build time from the web
Dockerfile (with retries), never from a visitor's browser.
- Application: PondFontScope sets --font-heading/body/mono (+ weights) from
pond.settings.fonts on the editor + read view; the existing global CSS
already reads those custom properties, so headings/body/code re-resolve to
the pond's fonts. A pond with no settings arrives with the defaulted values
(Roboto 400 / Roboto 200 / Fira Code), so the vision defaults always render.
- Admin UI: pond-settings 'Appearance' section — three slots (family + weight)
with a live preview, Pond-Admin-gated (fonts added to updatePondInputSchema
and merged in PondsService.update); a font catalog attribution page (/fonts)
listing families and licenses. New `font` i18n namespace (de+en).
- CSP: strict Content-Security-Policy in nginx.conf (default-src 'self';
font-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self'; …) —
the app's scripts are all external files, inline styles cover CSS variables.
- Tests: shared catalog-integrity unit test (the invariant the build enforces);
e2e fonts pack — no request leaves the origin when rendering a pond (the GDPR
network assertion), a font choice applies to a page and persists, and a pond
without settings renders the defaults.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
Multi-stage images: web (workspace build baked into unprivileged
nginx with SPA fallback, asset caching, /healthz) and api (pnpm deploy
bundle with the prisma CLI for migrate-on-start, non-root, node-based
healthcheck). deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml defines the stage
stack (web, api, db) with frontend/internal networks, localhost-only
published ports for the host reverse proxy, log rotation, and named
volumes; .env.example documents every variable. compose.dev.yml layers
hot-reloading dev containers (or database-only usage) over the same
definition. Verified locally: full stack healthy, SPA fallback, readyz
green after automatic migration, db not reachable from outside.
Closes#6
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
