Trashing a page (promote and subtree modes) clears the affected search
vectors, restoring rebuilds them; pond trash clears every page vector of
the pond, pond restore reindexes only the live pages (pages trashed
inside stay out); the GDPR pseudonymization's personal-pond trash does
the same. reindexAll now converges to the invariant (clears trashed,
rebuilds live), and a one-off migration backfills vectors of
already-trashed content.
The query-side deleted_at guards stay untouched as the independent
second layer - the test proves both layers separately, including writing
a vector back onto a trashed page (simulating a future path that forgot
the clear) and asserting the query still hides it. New provider methods
removePond/reindexPond behind the SearchProvider seam.
Refs #195
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
Chosen path: an instance master switch following the api.enabled/
mcp.enabled pattern — while off, both feed routes AND the feed-token
management answer 404 (existence hidden). Default ON: feeds predate the
switch, existing instances and their subscribed readers keep working;
the VS-NfD reference configuration (#227) turns it off. Admin UI gets
the toggle next to the API/MCP switches (i18n de+en).
Moving the token out of the query string is documented as rejected: a
path segment lands in the same proxy and request logs, and feed readers
cannot send headers — that is why the credential is in the URL at all.
What DID leak was our own request log (pino logs req.url): the req
serializer now masks ?token= values (common/mask-token-param.ts), so no
code path logs the credential.
Refs #191
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS (default 168 h) caps a session's total lifetime
from login: expiresAt is set once at creation and never extended — the
old sliding 30-day renewal is gone. SESSION_IDLE_HOURS (default 72 h)
ends sessions unused for that long, enforced server-side against
lastSeenAt with a write throttle scaled to the idle bound so short idle
windows still renew. Expired rows are removed on validation and the
session list applies both bounds, so idle-dead sessions never show as
active. The cookie maxAge follows the configured absolute bound.
Documented in .env.example (with the VS-NfD reference values for the
upcoming hardening guide #227), compose passes the variables through,
security.md and ADR 0007 record the amendment.
Refs #190
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
A cookie-carrying mutation without Origin and Referer (or with an
unparsable one) is now rejected with 403 csrf_origin_mismatch instead
of passing unchecked. The exception for non-browser clients stays
structural: PAT/bearer requests carry no session cookie and never reach
the check, and a request that does carry the cookie is always checked.
The test harness injects the matching Origin (supertest simulates a
browser page of this instance) with an explicit suppression header for
the negative cases; the Playwright fixture contexts send the header on
their manual seeding calls; release-qa.sh pins APP_BASE_URL and sends
the matching Origin. Dedicated spec covers: missing headers 403,
mismatch 403, unparsable 403, match passes, GETs untouched, PAT
mutation without headers passes, cookie+bearer still checked.
Refs #189
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET becomes a root key: every purpose derives its own
HKDF-SHA-256 subkey (deriveTokenKey), and no code path signs with the
root key directly. Collaboration tokens are signed and verified by jose
with HS256 as an explicit allowlist; the sign/verify API turns async at
its three call sites. Unsubscribe tokens move from a purpose-prefix
string to the structural subkey, with a documented dual-verify window
(legacy derivation accepted until 2026-11-01, covering the 90-day TTL
of links in already-sent mail).
The cross-runtime property that justified the homegrown implementation
is now proven by a test: the built CJS and ESM dist artefacts round-trip
tokens in both directions in child processes (jose v6 reaches CJS via
Node's require(esm), pinned Node 22 images). Negative tests cover
cross-purpose subkeys, root-key-signed tokens, alg:none and RS256.
Refs #188 (ADR 0020)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ
pnpm workspace with apps/web, apps/api, apps/collab, and
packages/shared; strict TypeScript base config, repo-wide ESLint (flat)
+ Prettier, Vitest per package, and root scripts lint/typecheck/test/
build. @dorfteich/shared ships a first health-response helper consumed
by apps/api to prove workspace linking. Existing markdown docs are
reformatted once by the new Prettier setup.
Closes#1
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Initial deliverable of the architecture phase: 16 ADRs (stack, CRDT
collaboration, plugin sandbox, import/export, backups, CI/CD), data
model, permission model, real-time collaboration and plugin concepts,
deployment/operations/security documentation, and the milestone roadmap
that the implementation issues are derived from.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
