77542674a2
16 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7f1c49db53 |
Add pond member management UI (#54)
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Pond Admins manage who participates in a pond, by role, with editor/reader seat quotas — the member-facing layer over the grant model (#51/#52). - shared: `MemberView`/`PondMembersView` + add/change-role schemas (`members.ts`), a `members` i18n namespace (de+en), and member error codes. - api `members/`: a member-centric API over pond-scope user grants — `GET /ponds/:id/members` (any member, for transparency: list grouped by effective role + seat usage + `canManage`), `POST` (add by exact username or e-mail — no directory browsing), `PATCH :userId` (change role), `DELETE :userId` (remove), all Pond-Admin-gated by the guard. Editor/reader seats are enforced against `editors_per_pond`/`readers_per_pond` (#22) inside a per-pond advisory-locked transaction so counts cannot race; the owner's membership is protected, personal ponds refuse a second admin (shared grant rule), and the last Pond Admin cannot be dropped. Every change invalidates the pond permission cache and fires the access NOTIFY (#39/#53). - web `members/`: `MemberManager` in Pond Settings — list grouped by role with a search filter and seat usage, add-by-identifier form (disabled with a localized explanation when the chosen role's seats are full), per-member role change and remove; read-only for non-admins; the personal-pond rule is surfaced. There is no invitation flow (v1): adding is immediate, and the copy says so. - tests: `members.e2e.db.test.ts` (add/change/remove, seat exhaustion, personal-pond and owner rules, read-only transparency, last-admin) and a `members` browser pack (immediate second-browser access, quota disables the add action, non-admin read-only) with its own CI step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| 4d48d72c40 |
Add grant model and shared permission-resolution algorithm (#51)
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The heart of the security model: one algorithm, implemented once, for API, collab, and UI (permissions.md — authoritative). - shared `permissions/`: pure resolution (`resolvePageCapability`) exactly per permissions.md — specificity page > label (incl. ancestor labels) > pond, deny wins within a level, default-closed, Site Admin bypass — plus the trash rule (`canAccessPage` / `canAccessTrashedPage`, ADR 0013). `grantValidationError` enforces the structural constraints. Documented, I/O-free signatures for API/collab reuse. - prisma: `RoleGrant` (+ grant enums) per data-model.md, unique on (pond, subject, role, scope); migration adds a CHECK backstop that a POND_ADMIN grant is pond-scope + user-subject. - api `grants/`: `GrantsService.createGrant` validates before insert (structural + no extra admin on a personal pond), rejects duplicates; `grantsForPond` returns the shared resolver model (what #52/#53 consume); enum mappers between the DB and the shared model. Interim "who may manage grants" stays until #52. - tests: exhaustive table-driven resolver suite — every worked example from permissions.md §Resolution, edge cases (multi-label deny-wins, ancestor inheritance, anonymous/public, most-specific-allow-beats-less-specific-deny, trash) and a property test (a less-specific grant never overrides a more-specific decision); validation unit tests; grants db test proving write-time rejection of invalid grants. - i18n: grant error codes (de + en). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY |
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| 91dfccf226 |
Add SearchProvider interface with PostgreSQL FTS (#49)
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Full-text search behind a swappable interface (ADR 0010).
- prisma: `page_content_cache.search_vector tsvector` (Unsupported column);
migration adds it plus a GIN index (raw SQL — the index is a production
perf optimization; correctness holds without it, so schema-pushed test DBs
work unchanged).
- shared: `normalizeForSearch` (NFKD + strip diacritics + lowercase) folds
both the indexed text and the query, so 'Baume' finds 'Bäume' without the
Postgres `unaccent` extension; search query schema + result view + highlight
sentinels.
- api search module:
- abstract `SearchProvider` (DI token: indexPage / removePage / search /
reindexAll) so an external engine can replace the binding — a fake proves
the seam in a test.
- `PostgresSearchProvider`: weighted vector (title A, labels B, body C),
`websearch_to_tsquery`, `ts_headline` snippets, results filtered to the
ponds the user may read; `GET /search?q=&pondId=&labels=`.
- `search:reindex` CLI (rebuilds from the content cache, idempotent).
- reindex hooks: page create/rename (title) and label assign/unassign/
rename/delete (labels are weight-B).
- collab: the persistence hook maintains `search_vector` in the same
transaction as the content cache (same weighting, normalized).
- tests: shared normalize/schema; api db (title ranks above body, highlight,
diacritic-insensitive match, permission filter, idempotent reindex) and the
fake-provider DI test; collab persistence already covers the write path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
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| 14e69b399c |
Add wikilink index, backlinks API, and phantom resolution (#47)
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Maintain a server-side `page_links` index on every content change so
backlinks and missing-target ("phantom") links can be queried.
- prisma: `PageLink` (from_page_id, nullable to_page_id, target_slug;
unique per (from, slug); cascade on source purge, set-null on target
purge); migration.
- shared: `extractWikilinkSlugs(doc)` (distinct target slugs) and the
`BacklinkView` / `PhantomLinkView` read shapes.
- collab: the persistence hook (#35) now rewrites the source page's outgoing
links in the same transaction as the content cache — one row per distinct
wikilink slug, resolved to a page in the same pond (null = phantom).
- api: `GET /pages/:id/backlinks` (permission-filtered — wikilinks resolve
within a pond, so seeing the pond is the read right) and
`GET /ponds/:id/phantom-links` (missing targets grouped with their
referrers). Creating or renaming a page to a slug that pages already link
to resolves those phantom rows; because links store the target's id,
backlinks survive a later rename of the target's slug.
- tests: shared extraction unit test; collab persistence db test (store
writes resolved + phantom rows and rewrites the index); api LinksService
db test (backlinks, permission filter, phantom aggregation, create/rename
resolution, id-based backlinks survive target rename).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY
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| a3a012c41d |
Add hierarchical labels: model, CRUD API, and validation (#43)
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Introduce pond-scoped hierarchical labels as the foundation for M4 organization and, later, M5 label-scoped permissions. - shared: `labels.ts` with the label schemas/views and the pure tree helpers (buildLabelTree, collectSubtreeIds, collectAncestorIds, labelDepth, subtreeHeight). These are the single hierarchy walk the label API and the future permission resolver both build on (permissions.md: a grant on a label applies to all its descendants). - prisma: `Label` (self-referential parent_id, unique per (pond, parent, name), cascade to subtree) and `PageLabel` assignment table; migration. - api: `LabelsService` + controller. Tree endpoint returns the hierarchy in one call; create/rename/recolor/move/delete and page assign/unassign. Validation: cycle prevention on move, depth limit 6, unique name per (pond, parent) — enforced under a per-pond advisory lock so root-label uniqueness holds despite Postgres treating NULL parents as distinct. Delete cascades the subtree and requires `?force=true` when pages are assigned. Assignment rejects labels from a different pond. Access gated through InterimAccessService on the owning pond. - i18n: label error codes and the colour validation message (de + en). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY |
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| 1bda137ca4 |
Add version history UI: list, view, diff, restore (#42)
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Users can see who changed what and restore old states (ADR 0013). - shared: dependency-free word-level Markdown diff (diffMarkdown) with a unit test; PageVersionContentView; PAGE_RESTORE_CHANNEL + PageRestoreRequest. - api: GET /pages/:id/versions (list), GET .../:versionId (read-only HTML + Markdown for diffing), POST .../:versionId/restore. Every route requires write access — viewing history is gated like editing (permissions.md). Restore checks permission, then emits the page_restore NOTIFY; history is append-only (the api never deletes a version). - collab: a page_restore listener applies the restore on the live document via openDirectConnection — it snapshots the current state as a PRE_RESTORE version, then replaces the content in one transaction, so every connected client converges and the change persists like a normal edit. - web: HistoryPanel (version list with time/trigger/label/contributors, a read-only render of a selected version, a Markdown diff against the current page, and a restore action), toggled from the page menu. de+en strings. Tests: shared diff (added/removed/round-trip/edges); collab restore DB test (a connected client converges on the restored content; a pre-restore snapshot is appended alongside the original — append-only); api list/get/restore (newest-first, rendered content, write-permission gate, restore returns the target without mutating history). This completes M3 (real-time collaboration & history, #33–#42). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY |
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| d4ebcfcfbe |
Add collaboration token issuance and connection authentication (#34)
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The api mints a short-lived (60 s) HS256 JWT per page open after an interim
permission check; the collab server authenticates every connection with it
(ADR 0003/0007 — the only JWTs in the system).
- packages/shared: browser-safe token schema/types in `collab-token`, and the
Node `crypto` sign/verify in `token-crypto` behind its own subpath export
(`@dorfteich/shared/token-crypto`) so the web bundle never pulls in
`node:crypto`. Only HS256 is produced/accepted; the signature is checked in
constant time before any untrusted field is read.
- api: `GET /pages/:id/collab-token` (auth-required) returns
{token, mode, expiresInSeconds}; `mode` is rw/ro via the interim access
service; issuance is logged at debug level without the token value.
- collab: `onAuthenticate` verifies the token, checks the pageId matches the
document name, stores {userId, mode} context, and enforces `ro` via
Hocuspocus' read-only connection flag. Hocuspocus' own signal handling is
disabled so index.ts remains the single shutdown owner.
- Shared COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET env for api + collab (compose, dev overlay,
.env.example, stage docs); a dev default keeps native dev/test/CI running.
Tests: shared token round-trip/rejection; api endpoint e2e (auth required,
claims, 404 for non-members/unknown ids); collab integration via
HocuspocusProvider (valid token connects; expired/tampered/mismatched-page/
wrong-secret rejected; read-only writes dropped, verified with two clients).
Closes #34
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 0fae699018 |
Add file storage service and image upload API (#27)
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Implements the FileStorage abstraction (uploads/<pondId>/<fileId> on the mounted volume), the attachments model, and POST /ponds/:id/files, GET /media/:fileId, DELETE /files/:id. Uploads are validated by sniffing magic bytes rather than trusting the client's Content-Type/filename (catches a renamed .html-as-.png), checked against the max_file_bytes and storage_bytes quotas, and served with nosniff + immutable caching. Closes #27 |
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| 98e159ab50 |
Add page CRUD and Yjs state persistence (#23)
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Prisma models `pages`/`page_updates`/`page_content_cache` per data-model.md. Endpoints: POST /ponds/:id/pages (title -> empty Yjs doc state, seeded via y-prosemirror), GET /pages/:id (meta + base64 state), PUT /pages/:id/state (client-encoded Yjs state, rejected above the 5 MiB operations.md limit or if it doesn't decode into a valid document for the schema), PATCH /pages/:id (title/slug — explicit slug changes validate uniqueness per pond, title-only renames keep the slug), DELETE (soft). Access follows InterimAccessService via the page's pond, same 404-not-403 interim rule as ponds. State saves decode the Yjs update with yjs + y-prosemirror and run it through the #24 shared derivation functions (docToPlainText/ docToMarkdown/docToHtml/extractOutline) to refresh page_content_cache. The Yjs XmlFragment name ("default") and the derivation call are factored so the collab server's persistence hooks (#35) can reuse both. Raised the API's JSON body limit to 8 MiB (main.ts and the e2e test app) to fit base64-encoded page state. Closes #23 |
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| b89aa6bed0 |
Add editor document schema in packages/shared (#24)
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ProseMirror schema (headings 1-4, lists incl. task lists, blockquote, code block, tables via prosemirror-tables, images, hard breaks; bold/ italic/code/strikethrough/link marks) plus docToMarkdown, markdownToDoc, docToPlainText, docToHtml, and extractOutline built on it. Markdown parsing extends markdown-it's default preset with a token-stream transform for GFM task lists and table-cell paragraph wrapping. docToHtml hand-rolls escaping and link-protocol allowlisting with zero DOM dependencies, so it runs in the API/collab server as well as the browser. Node names `wikilink` and `plugin_block` are reserved for later stories. Closes #24 |
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| 64928f0ac0 |
Quota foundation: overrides, resolution, race-safe consumption (#22)
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- quota_overrides + pond_usage models (BigInt values, unique per
subject+key); migration 20260705185146_quotas
- instance-default quota keys in the settings registry (editors 5,
readers 50, additional ponds 0, storage 1 GiB, max file 25 MiB)
- QuotaService: getEffective with pond → user → instance resolution
(zero counts as a value, not a gap); assertCanCreateSharedPond and
checkAndConsume serialize via pg_advisory_xact_lock inside the guarded
write's transaction; release never drops below zero
- pond creation enforces additional_ponds (personal ponds don't count);
quota errors carry code quota_exceeded + {quotaKey, limit}, localized
- seed grants fixtures an additional_ponds override (default is 0)
- table-driven resolution tests, parallel-consumption test, e2e for the
pond-creation limit
Closes #22
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB
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| f0850eecd3 |
Ponds: data model, CRUD API, personal pond on verification (#21)
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- Pond model with pond-level trash columns (ADR 0013) and settings jsonb holding only deviations from the defaults (sidebar sort, font slots per ADR 0016); migration 20260705090100_ponds - shared: pond schemas/views and slugify (German transliteration, URL-safe, length-capped); deterministic -2/-3 suffixes for collisions - InterimAccessService: single place answering pond access questions until the real role model lands in M5 - POST/GET /ponds, GET /ponds/:slug, PATCH/DELETE /ponds/:id, Site-Admin trash + restore; personal pond auto-created on e-mail verification and for active seed fixtures; personal ponds cannot be trashed - e2e pack covering verify-flow pond creation, slug suffixes, rename, foreign-pond 404s, trash/restore; slugify unit tests Closes #21 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB |
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| 36608177f6 |
Add user, identity, session, and auth-support data model
Prisma models per data-model.md: users (status enum, site-admin flag), user_identities (password provider now, OIDC later — subject is the stable user id), sessions (hashed ids), auth_tokens (hashed, single- use), plus rate_limits and mail_outbox for the upcoming M1 stories. UsersService creates accounts transactionally with Argon2id-hashed password identities (OWASP parameters, rehash detection) and maps uniqueness violations to field-level conflicts. Database-backed suites run when TEST_DATABASE_URL is set — locally against the dev db, in CI via a new postgres service container; shared auth schemas (username, password policy incl. common-password blocklist) ship with tests. Closes #10 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| e855192d23 |
Add i18n with i18next, German and English, and a key-parity check
Translation resources live in packages/shared/i18n/<lang>/<ns>.json (common, errors) and ship with de and en. The web app initializes react-i18next with bundled resources (?lng= wins, then the browser language); all shell components use useTranslation and the temporary t() stub is gone. The api localizes its uniform error bodies via a minimal i18next instance negotiated from Accept-Language. `pnpm i18n:check` fails CI when any key is missing in any language, backed by tested helpers in @dorfteich/shared. Closes #5 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| c12acbdb2c |
Add NestJS API skeleton with config, logging, and /healthz
apps/api boots a NestJS application with: Zod-validated environment configuration (schema in @dorfteich/shared, fails fast listing every invalid variable), structured pino request logging via nestjs-pino (pretty in development, JSON otherwise, auth headers redacted), a global exception filter producing the uniform ApiErrorBody shape, and GET /api/v1/healthz. Vitest runs Nest through SWC for decorator metadata; supertest covers healthz and the 404 error shape. Closes #2 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| b16d23297e |
Scaffold pnpm monorepo with lint, format, and test tooling
pnpm workspace with apps/web, apps/api, apps/collab, and packages/shared; strict TypeScript base config, repo-wide ESLint (flat) + Prettier, Vitest per package, and root scripts lint/typecheck/test/ build. @dorfteich/shared ships a first health-response helper consumed by apps/api to prove workspace linking. Existing markdown docs are reformatted once by the new Prettier setup. Closes #1 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |