6aac785841
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6aac785841 |
#217: map IdP groups and roles onto the permission model
All checks were successful
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (pull_request) Successful in 6m55s
CI / Build container images (pull_request) Successful in 3m0s
CI / Auth e2e pack (pull_request) Successful in 8m49s
CI / Import/export fidelity gate (pull_request) Successful in 58s
CD / Build and push images (push) Successful in 21s
CD / Deploy to Test (push) Successful in 14s
CD / Smoke tests against Test (push) Successful in 1m19s
CD / Promote to Int (push) Successful in 12s
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (push) Successful in 6m28s
CI / Build container images (push) Has been skipped
CI / Auth e2e pack (push) Successful in 8m15s
CI / Import/export fidelity gate (push) Successful in 59s
Declarative instance setting idpMapping.rules turns ID-token claims into pond roles and the site-admin flag on every OIDC login — configuration, not code. Mapped grants travel through the SAME GrantsService path as manual ones (permission cache invalidated, collab access notify fires so live sessions revalidate — asserted by test), never raw rows. Ownership makes precedence explicit: role_grants.origin marks mapped rows, users.is_site_admin_managed marks a mapping-set admin flag. The mapping only creates and revokes what it owns — manual wins: hand-made grants and hand-promoted admins are never revoked by a missing claim (a manual toggle clears the marker and takes ownership). Removal of a claim revokes the mapped grant and the managed flag on the next login. Every mapping-driven change is audited with origin idp_mapping. Failure containment: unknown pond slugs and the last-Pond-Admin protection log-and-skip — a mapping problem must never become a login lockout. Tests drive real OIDC logins against the fake IdP with group claims: grant + working access, revocation incl. notify, manual-wins, managed site-admin promote/demote/hands-off. Documented in permissions.md (own section), ADR 0021, data-model.md and the hardening guide (care rule: same PR). Refs #217. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8 |
|||
| c8aac13dfb |
Add Site-Admin system panel with persistent audit trail (#86)
All checks were successful
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (push) Successful in 3m14s
CI / Build container images (push) Has been skipped
CD / Build and push images (push) Successful in 3m45s
CD / Deploy to Test (push) Successful in 10s
CD / Smoke tests against Test (push) Successful in 1m11s
CD / Promote to Int (push) Successful in 11s
CI / Auth e2e pack (push) Successful in 5m20s
CI / Import/export fidelity gate (push) Successful in 45s
New /admin/system panel (operations.md §Maintenance jobs): the maintenance job list shows every registered job with truthful last-run data (new Job.lastDurationMs recorded by the scheduler) and a manual trigger that respects the run-mutex and is itself audit-logged; a backup card mirrors the sidecar's status.json including the freshness verdict; an audit-log viewer filters by actor, action, and time range with pagination; and a storage overview lists the largest ponds. Auth events and admin actions (grants, members, user/quota admin, plugins, settings, setup) now land in a new audit_log table through a central AuditService — which keeps emitting the established stdout log line — while content activity stays log-only by design. All endpoints are Site-Admin-only; covered by API DB tests and a Playwright pack in CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
|||
| 42e97b9df2 |
Add Site-Admin user management (#59)
Some checks failed
CD / Build and push images (push) Successful in 3m12s
CI / Lint, typecheck, test (push) Failing after 2m29s
CI / Auth e2e pack (push) Successful in 3m32s
CI / Build container images (push) Has been skipped
CD / Deploy to Test (push) Successful in 8s
CD / Smoke tests against Test (push) Successful in 1m11s
CD / Promote to Int (push) Successful in 11s
Instance operators get basic user administration for support, abuse handling, and GDPR groundwork (security.md §Privacy). - api `admin/`: Site-Admin-gated `/admin/users` — a searchable, paginated list (username, e-mail, status, role, pond count, last login) plus lifecycle actions: disable/enable (a disabled user is logged out everywhere and login is refused with the distinct `account_disabled`), resend verification, delete, and grant/revoke Site Admin. Guards: you cannot act on your own account (`cannot_modify_self`) and the last Site Admin cannot be dropped (`last_site_admin`). Every action is audit-logged with the actor. - `PseudonymizationService`: account deletion scrubs the PII, removes all login identities + sessions, and trashes the personal pond — the kept row is what authorship references, so shared content the user authored shows as "Deleted user" (no orphaned/cascaded content). - web: the Admin area gains a 'Users' surface — search, pagination, and the actions (destructive ones behind an inline two-step confirm; self-actions hidden). New `users` i18n namespace (de+en). - tests: `user-admin.e2e.db.test.ts` (disable → logout + login blocked; delete → pseudonymized authorship + personal pond trashed + credentials gone; last Site Admin and self protected; Site-Admin gating); a non-destructive browser `admin-users` pack proving disable-in-UI blocks login and enable restores it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
