6999b3dd73
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9b7acab294 |
#232: plugin allowlist with SHA-256 hash pinning
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The install path records the SHA-256 of the delivered bundle ZIP (plugins.bundle_hash; pre-#232 installs show it as unknown until reinstalled). plugins.allowlist in instance_settings names permitted ids with their pinned hashes: empty (default) = not enforced, existing instances unchanged; non-empty = installs of unlisted or deviating bundles are rejected (plugin_not_pinned / plugin_hash_mismatch, 403), and an installed plugin outside the list or with a deviating hash does not load — absent from pond mount lists, frame/assets 404. Every rejection is audited (plugin.rejected, catalogue v1.5). A version bump changes the hash and therefore requires an explicit re-pin — the intended friction (ADR 0025). Admin UI shows observed vs pinned hash per plugin with pin/re-pin/unpin. Scope stated honestly in plugin-architecture.md: the pin answers "is this the reviewed bundle"; post-install disk tampering is platform integrity (ADR 0019), sandbox containment stays the sandbox's job. Hardening guide row + catalog advisory triage; residual risk R-03 resolved. e2e: empty-allowlist compatibility, pinned load, unpinned and tampered installs rejected and audited, pin drift blocks loading while the admin still sees the mismatch, version bump needs re-pin. Full api suite 101 files / 561 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8 |
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| 13f0311d8e |
#216: hard AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED switch over every local credential flow
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The deploy-level realization of auth.local.enabled (ADR 0021): FALSE answers 404 on every local credential flow — login, signup, e-mail verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change — enforced centrally in the auth guard via the @LocalCredentialFlow() marker before any session or CSRF logic runs. Deploy-level on purpose: a compromised Site Admin cannot reopen the local path, so the runtime-flip residual risk from ADR 0021 does not materialize (R-02 closed in the risk list). An enumeration fence fails when an auth route is neither marked nor on the reviewed allowlist, so a new credential flow cannot ship unswitched. Stated decisions, each tested: sessions/logout keep working for externally authenticated users; PAT and feed-token issuance stays available (API authorization under its own switches, not interactive sign-in). Bootstrap: complete setup (or SETUP_ADMIN_* pre-seed) before flipping; the api warns at boot when local auth is off with neither OIDC nor proxy auth configured. GET /auth/methods reports local:false and the login page hides the local form and credential links. Hardening guide: the planned auth.local.enabled row moves from 1.3 into the live deploy table with the bootstrap ordering, and the verification checklist gains the login-404 probe. Refs #216. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8 |
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| 87c1c5ee88 |
#231: residual-risk list
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docs/vs-nfd/90-restrisiken.md: nine entries, each with risk, why it is accepted, compensating control and decider — unmarked attachment content (#212), local auth not yet switchable incl. the open runtime- flippability question (#216), deferred plugin hash pinning (#232), the one-time git-history secret check with its pattern caveat (#198), digest-mail titles (I-23, revisit M32), page_links slug residue (I-24), the IndexedDB endpoint copy (I-25), deliberately unscheduled features, and the Site-Admin read bypass. Binding same-PR maintenance rule stated; referenced from the delimitation statement and consumed by the Grundschutz mapping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
