11 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude Opus 5	45f1925917	#302: configurable pond start page, created with every new pond ... Opening a pond landed on whatever sorted first in the sidebar — stable, but a rule nobody could see, and one whose target moved as soon as someone added a page ahead of it. New ponds landed on the empty-pond hint instead of anything useful. - `startPageId` joins the pond settings. No migration: `Pond.settings` is already jsonb. It stores an id, not a slug, so renaming or moving the page keeps it working. - `PondHomePage` prefers it, but only when the page is in this user's page list. That list already holds just what they may see, so a start page hidden by a page-scoped grant — or trashed — falls back silently instead of landing them on a 404, and it costs no extra request. - Both creation paths give the pond a start page, titled from the creator's stored locale. It happens after the creating transaction commits: the owner's grant is written inside it and permissions cache per pond, so creating the page any earlier would ask about rights the grant has not published yet. A failure is logged, not fatal — a pond without a start page still works. `PagesModule` imported `PondsModule` without using it. Removing that vestigial edge let PondsModule depend on PagesModule in the honest direction instead of tying the two together with forwardRef. Every pond created through the api now owns a page, which broke eight suites whose teardown deleted ponds directly — `Page.pond` deliberately has no cascade, because a real purge removes contents explicitly and audits it. A shared `deletePondsWhere` helper deletes pages first. Two tests that counted pages now account for the start page rather than pretending the pond began empty.	2026-08-01 08:06:35 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	d32c8c3730	#189: make the CSRF origin check fail closed ... A cookie-carrying mutation without Origin and Referer (or with an unparsable one) is now rejected with 403 csrf_origin_mismatch instead of passing unchecked. The exception for non-browser clients stays structural: PAT/bearer requests carry no session cookie and never reach the check, and a request that does carry the cookie is always checked. The test harness injects the matching Origin (supertest simulates a browser page of this instance) with an explicit suppression header for the negative cases; the Playwright fixture contexts send the header on their manual seeding calls; release-qa.sh pins APP_BASE_URL and sends the matching Origin. Dedicated spec covers: missing headers 403, mismatch 403, unparsable 403, match passes, GETs untouched, PAT mutation without headers passes, cookie+bearer still checked. Refs #189 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 09:34:44 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	04e21a0aac	Built-in MCP endpoint (Streamable HTTP) on top of the public API (#105) ... AI clients talk to the instance directly at /api/mcp — under the /api/ path (deviation from the issue's literal /mcp) so every existing reverse proxy already routes it; no deployment changes anywhere. - Transport: official @modelcontextprotocol/sdk server, STATELESS — each POST builds a fresh server+transport pair, no session store, replicas stay trivial; GET/DELETE answer 405. Auth per PAT bearer (#104 tokens), per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After). - Own switches, independent of REST: instance mcp.enabled (admin settings, default off; off = 404, feature invisible) + pond setting mcpEnabled (pond-settings toggle, default off) — pinned independent in both directions by tests. - Tools (thin wrappers over the #104 services, same permission gates, audit-logged writes): list_ponds, list_pages, read_page, search, create_page, update_page (replace semantics through the collab-owned restore path — open editors converge), add_comment, list_labels, set_page_labels (exact replace), export_pond (link to the REST ZIP). Tool errors carry the api error codes; results carry stable slugs/ids. MCP resources stay the documented stage-2 stretch goal. - Deliberately on the SDK's low-level Server API with a hand-written tool table (mcp-tools.ts): the typed registerTool generics drove tsc out of memory in a program this size; manual Zod validation keeps the wire behavior explicit. - PublicApiService exposure filtering parameterized ('api' | 'mcp', shared pondFeatureEnabled helper) — one implementation, two switches. - Docs: "Connect Claude Code / MCP clients" section in public-api.md (claude mcp add one-liner + mcp-remote bridge for stdio clients). Verification: 8-test e2e pack driving the real MCP SDK client over Streamable HTTP against a listening api (initialize + tools/list, switch independence in both directions, anonymous/garbage 401, opt-in 404 semantics, page roundtrip incl. restore-NOTIFY, labels/comments, read scope blocked from writes with scope_required); live check through the web proxy against the seeded stack (tools list, create, read, update, search — LIVE CHECK PASSED); full api suite 61/61 files green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-12 11:36:02 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	0c85293830	Public REST API v1: personal access tokens, instance switch + per-pond opt-in (#104) ... Token-authenticated machine access at /api/public/v1 — the foundation for the built-in MCP endpoint (#105). Personal access tokens: - api_tokens table (SHA-256 hash, scope read|write, optional pond restriction, expiry, revocation, throttled last-used) + migration; secrets are dt_pat_<random>, shown exactly once - lifecycle endpoints under /users/me/api-tokens (session-only — a leaked token can never mint more tokens) with audit entries api.token_created/api.token_revoked - settings UI section (create with scope/expiry/pond restriction, one-time reveal with copy, list with status + revoke), de+en Activation (404 semantics per #60 on both levels): - instance setting api.enabled (default off, admin settings switch) - pond setting apiEnabled (default off, pond settings toggle; the PondsService settings-merge learned the key — the #92 lesson) Surface (/api/public/v1, excluded from the SPA's global prefix): - me, ponds, pages (list/read as Markdown+HTML, create from Markdown via the shared pipeline, PATCH title/content, DELETE to trash), search (permission-filtered + narrowed to exposed ponds, highlights as **…**), markdown ZIP export, labels (tree, create/rename/recolour/move/delete, assign/unassign), comments (threads, create, resolve/reopen) - content replacement travels the collab-owned document path: the new state lands as a MANUAL version "API update", then the established restore NOTIFY applies it — open editors converge, history stays append-only, no second lineage (VersionsService.replaceContent) - hand-maintained OpenAPI 3.1 document at /openapi.json, pinned to the controller by a route-coverage test in both directions Enforcement: - PublicApiGuard: instance switch → bearer PAT auth (request.user is the token's user) → per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After) → scope (403 scope_required) → pond opt-in + token restriction - the shared PermissionGuard then applies the unchanged permission model; PageParamSource gained pondSlugParam for the slug+slug routes - no cookies anywhere → no CSRF surface (pinned by a hostile-Origin test) - every write audit-logged as api.write with the token attributed Tests/verification: - 12-test e2e pack: lifecycle, switches, permission matrix (reader/editor/outsider × scopes), restriction, page roundtrip incl. restore-NOTIFY assertion, labels, comments incl. policy, search narrowing, ZIP export, rate limit; full api suite 60/60 green (quota fixture via per-user override — never the instance default) - new collab-pack test proves an open editor converges onto an API content replacement (green against a local seeded stack) - UI smoke against the built SPA: token create/reveal/revoke, pond opt-in persists, admin switch persists (10/10) - docs/self-hosting/public-api.md + README link Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-12 11:17:03 +02:00
Claude Opus 4.8	621aa47244	Add plugin storage, install API, and directory watcher (#71) ... Backend for installing plugin ZIPs (ADR 0008, plugin-architecture.md §Lifecycle, security.md §Plugins). Consumes the #70 SDK for validation. - Schema: `plugins` (id, name, version, apiVersion, kind, mode, manifest jsonb, removedAt soft-delete) + `pond_plugins` (per-pond activation) + `PluginInstanceMode` enum; migration 20260710130000_plugins. - `PluginPackageService`: pure, stateless ZIP → validated package via fflate — structure check, manifest validation (SDK), apiVersion gate, kind/bundle/styles rules, CSS sanitation (no @import / external url() / expression()), zip-slip and unpacked-size guards. Each failure carries a stable PluginErrorCode; manifest issues travel as ApiError details. - `PluginStorageService`: on-disk layout `<PLUGINS_DIR>/<id>/<version>/`; atomic writeVersion (staging dir + rename, no 404 window mid-update), removeVersion/removePlugin, traversal-safe asset resolution, dropzone + quarantine dirs. - `PluginsService`: install/update (update only to a strictly higher version, preserving the admin's instance mode; files land before the metadata pointer flips) / uninstall (refused while required; soft-delete + files removed + pond activations dropped) / list / get. - `POST/GET/DELETE /admin/plugins` (SiteAdminGuard, multer memory upload), error→HTTP-status mapping. Public version-pinned static serving at `GET /plugins/:id/:version/*rest` with immutable cache + nosniff, only for the installed current version. - `PluginWatcherService`: watches `<PLUGINS_DIR>/_dropzone/`, runs the same validation, installs valid drops and quarantines invalid ones with the error logged; inert under NODE_ENV=test (tests drive processDropped). - SDK: `compareVersions`/`isHigherVersion`. shared: `PluginView`, `PluginInstanceMode`, `PLUGIN_ERROR_CODES`, `PLUGINS_DIR` env, plugin error i18n (de+en). Compose: `plugins` volume + `PLUGINS_DIR`. - Tests: package unit test (valid + each invalid class) and an e2e DB test (GUI install + immutable serving, non-admin 403, invalid-manifest details, dropzone install + quarantine, atomic higher-only update, required-guarded uninstall that removes files and tombstones metadata). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-10 16:55:26 +02:00
Claude Opus 4.8	4755c18ef5	Add conversion job queue and pandoc sidecar integration (#62) ... Import/export conversions run asynchronously against an internal pandoc-server sidecar with limits and graceful failure (ADR 0009). This is the plumbing; the import (#63) and export (#65) features enqueue jobs onto it. Sidecar & config: - pandoc/core:3.6 in HTTP server mode added to the Compose stack, internal network only, with a wget healthcheck on /version; the api depends on it healthy and reaches it via the new PANDOC_URL env (default http://pandoc:3030). - readyz gains a warning-level `converter` check: an unreachable sidecar degrades import/export but never flips the instance to unready (new `warn` status on ReadinessCheck). Conversion flow (apps/api/src/import-export/): - ConversionJob table (per-request work queue, distinct from the name-keyed maintenance Job table): owner, formats, input/result bytes, status, attempts, lockedAt. Migration + owner cascade. - PandocConverter (abstract) + PandocServerConverter: POST / with {text,from,to,standalone}; binary input formats (docx/odt/…) are base64-encoded in `text`; 60 s AbortController timeout; input/output size caps. Failures map to distinct localized codes — converter_unavailable / converter_timeout (retryable) and conversion_failed (final). - ConversionWorker: claims one job at a time with `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` (safe against overlapping sweeps and a second process), recovers a stale RUNNING lock, retries transient failures up to 3 attempts then fails. A 2 s sweep plus wake-on-enqueue means a queued job survives an API restart. - ConversionJobService.enqueue (size-limited) + owner-scoped GET /jobs/:id (poll) and GET /jobs/:id/result (stream the output); a foreign/unknown id is 404. ConversionJobView in @dorfteich/shared. Tests: - conversion-job.e2e.db.test.ts (fake converter injected via a new createTestApp override hook): enqueue→convert→poll→result; foreign/unknown job 404; a persisted PENDING job picked up by a fresh app's worker (restart survival); sidecar-down fails after 3 retries while the API stays healthy. - pandoc.converter.test.ts: success, non-200→conversion_failed, refused→ converter_unavailable, and a delay-injecting server→converter_timeout. - Verified locally against a real pandoc/core:3.6 container: markdown→html, markdown→docx (valid PK/OOXML bytes), and a docx→markdown round-trip. Local: typecheck, lint, i18n:check, build all green; api 193 tests (9 new), shared 121, web 50. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-10 04:06:27 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	0c6494f209	Enforce permissions in API guards and retire interim access (#52) ... Every route now declares its access rule explicitly and is enforced through the shared resolution algorithm (permissions.md): - PermissionGuard + decorators (@RequiresPondRole, @RequiresPagePermission, @RequiresAttachmentPermission, @AuthenticatedOnly) applied to every route; a route-enumeration test proves full coverage alongside @Public()/Site-Admin-guarded routes. - 404/403 policy (documented in README conventions): denied reads answer 404 (existence hiding), denied writes on readable things answer 403; trash views need write capability (ADR 0013). - PermissionService resolves page/pond questions via the shared resolver, with an in-process pond-context cache (grants + label parents) that is invalidated on every grant/label-tree change and TTL-bounded as a multi-process safety net. Grant changes also fire pond_access_changed for collab revalidation (#39/#53). - shared: pond-scope resolution (hasPondRole, canSeePond) next to the page resolver; grant wire schemas + GrantView. - Owner Pond-Admin grants: migration backfill for all existing ponds, created transactionally with every new pond (shared + personal + seed). - Grant CRUD under /ponds/:id/grants (pond_admin-gated) with structural and referential validation, last-admin protection, audit logs. - InterimAccessService deleted; page lists, search, backlinks, phantom links, and trash listings are filtered per page through the resolver; collab tokens are now truly ro for readers. - Fixture-matrix e2e (reader/editor/pond admin/foreign, label-deny, authenticated-subject, revoke-then-immediate-deny cache test). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY	2026-07-09 16:31:41 +02:00
Claude Sonnet 5	0fae699018	Add file storage service and image upload API (#27) ... Implements the FileStorage abstraction (uploads/<pondId>/<fileId> on the mounted volume), the attachments model, and POST /ponds/:id/files, GET /media/:fileId, DELETE /files/:id. Uploads are validated by sniffing magic bytes rather than trusting the client's Content-Type/filename (catches a renamed .html-as-.png), checked against the max_file_bytes and storage_bytes quotas, and served with nosniff + immutable caching. Closes #27	2026-07-08 10:35:03 +02:00
Claude Sonnet 5	98e159ab50	Add page CRUD and Yjs state persistence (#23) ... Prisma models `pages`/`page_updates`/`page_content_cache` per data-model.md. Endpoints: POST /ponds/:id/pages (title -> empty Yjs doc state, seeded via y-prosemirror), GET /pages/:id (meta + base64 state), PUT /pages/:id/state (client-encoded Yjs state, rejected above the 5 MiB operations.md limit or if it doesn't decode into a valid document for the schema), PATCH /pages/:id (title/slug — explicit slug changes validate uniqueness per pond, title-only renames keep the slug), DELETE (soft). Access follows InterimAccessService via the page's pond, same 404-not-403 interim rule as ponds. State saves decode the Yjs update with yjs + y-prosemirror and run it through the #24 shared derivation functions (docToPlainText/ docToMarkdown/docToHtml/extractOutline) to refresh page_content_cache. The Yjs XmlFragment name ("default") and the derivation call are factored so the collab server's persistence hooks (#35) can reuse both. Raised the API's JSON body limit to 8 MiB (main.ts and the e2e test app) to fit base64-encoded page state. Closes #23	2026-07-05 22:25:41 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	bed9fc9307	Add authentication: signup, verification, sessions, password reset ... AuthModule implements the M1 core as one coherent unit: Signup (#13): POST signup/verify-email/resend-verification with shared Zod validation (field-level error details), double opt-in via hashed single-use tokens (24h, superseding reissue), registration_mode enforcement, and per-IP rate limits. Sessions (#14): opaque 32-byte cookie tokens stored as SHA-256 row ids, sliding 30-day expiry (refresh at most hourly), global AuthGuard with @Public() opt-out attaching the user to every request, CSRF origin check on mutating requests, per-account login backoff (5/15min, reset on success), generic 401 for wrong-vs-unknown credentials, logout with immediate invalidation, GET /auth/me. Reset (#15): forgot-password without account enumeration, one-hour single-use tokens, reset destroys all existing sessions. A 14-case supertest e2e suite drives every flow against the test database, reading verification/reset links from the mail outbox. Closes #13 Closes #14 Closes #15 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-05 05:22:31 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	36608177f6	Add user, identity, session, and auth-support data model ... Prisma models per data-model.md: users (status enum, site-admin flag), user_identities (password provider now, OIDC later — subject is the stable user id), sessions (hashed ids), auth_tokens (hashed, single- use), plus rate_limits and mail_outbox for the upcoming M1 stories. UsersService creates accounts transactionally with Argon2id-hashed password identities (OWASP parameters, rehash detection) and maps uniqueness violations to field-level conflicts. Database-backed suites run when TEST_DATABASE_URL is set — locally against the dev db, in CI via a new postgres service container; shared auth schemas (username, password policy incl. common-password blocklist) ship with tests. Closes #10 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-05 00:42:22 +02:00