4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude Fable 5	afef45732a	#191: feeds.enabled instance switch, feed-token log masking ... Chosen path: an instance master switch following the api.enabled/ mcp.enabled pattern — while off, both feed routes AND the feed-token management answer 404 (existence hidden). Default ON: feeds predate the switch, existing instances and their subscribed readers keep working; the VS-NfD reference configuration (#227) turns it off. Admin UI gets the toggle next to the API/MCP switches (i18n de+en). Moving the token out of the query string is documented as rejected: a path segment lands in the same proxy and request logs, and feed readers cannot send headers — that is why the credential is in the URL at all. What DID leak was our own request log (pino logs req.url): the req serializer now masks ?token= values (common/mask-token-param.ts), so no code path logs the credential. Refs #191 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 11:34:43 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	7252bd16e0	#149: Atom-Feeds für Teiche und Seiten, privat via Feed-Token ... GET /public/:pond/feed.xml (zuletzt geänderte Seiten) und GET /public/:pond/:page/feed.xml (Versions-Historie), @Public mit 404-Semantik; öffentliche Teiche anonym, nicht-öffentliche über neues read-only Feed-Token je Nutzer als ?token=dt_feed_… (neue Tabelle feed_tokens + Migration, Verwaltung in den Nutzer-Einstellungen, FeedTokensSection). Öffentliche HTML-Seiten annoncieren den Teich-Feed per link rel=alternate. DB-Tests (anonym/privat/Token-Lifecycle) und User-Guide-Doku en+de. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0155v2aT8AG1kZDQEZiCLBWC	2026-07-20 00:49:53 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	04e21a0aac	Built-in MCP endpoint (Streamable HTTP) on top of the public API (#105) ... AI clients talk to the instance directly at /api/mcp — under the /api/ path (deviation from the issue's literal /mcp) so every existing reverse proxy already routes it; no deployment changes anywhere. - Transport: official @modelcontextprotocol/sdk server, STATELESS — each POST builds a fresh server+transport pair, no session store, replicas stay trivial; GET/DELETE answer 405. Auth per PAT bearer (#104 tokens), per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After). - Own switches, independent of REST: instance mcp.enabled (admin settings, default off; off = 404, feature invisible) + pond setting mcpEnabled (pond-settings toggle, default off) — pinned independent in both directions by tests. - Tools (thin wrappers over the #104 services, same permission gates, audit-logged writes): list_ponds, list_pages, read_page, search, create_page, update_page (replace semantics through the collab-owned restore path — open editors converge), add_comment, list_labels, set_page_labels (exact replace), export_pond (link to the REST ZIP). Tool errors carry the api error codes; results carry stable slugs/ids. MCP resources stay the documented stage-2 stretch goal. - Deliberately on the SDK's low-level Server API with a hand-written tool table (mcp-tools.ts): the typed registerTool generics drove tsc out of memory in a program this size; manual Zod validation keeps the wire behavior explicit. - PublicApiService exposure filtering parameterized ('api' | 'mcp', shared pondFeatureEnabled helper) — one implementation, two switches. - Docs: "Connect Claude Code / MCP clients" section in public-api.md (claude mcp add one-liner + mcp-remote bridge for stdio clients). Verification: 8-test e2e pack driving the real MCP SDK client over Streamable HTTP against a listening api (initialize + tools/list, switch independence in both directions, anonymous/garbage 401, opt-in 404 semantics, page roundtrip incl. restore-NOTIFY, labels/comments, read scope blocked from writes with scope_required); live check through the web proxy against the seeded stack (tools list, create, read, update, search — LIVE CHECK PASSED); full api suite 61/61 files green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-12 11:36:02 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	0c85293830	Public REST API v1: personal access tokens, instance switch + per-pond opt-in (#104) ... Token-authenticated machine access at /api/public/v1 — the foundation for the built-in MCP endpoint (#105). Personal access tokens: - api_tokens table (SHA-256 hash, scope read|write, optional pond restriction, expiry, revocation, throttled last-used) + migration; secrets are dt_pat_<random>, shown exactly once - lifecycle endpoints under /users/me/api-tokens (session-only — a leaked token can never mint more tokens) with audit entries api.token_created/api.token_revoked - settings UI section (create with scope/expiry/pond restriction, one-time reveal with copy, list with status + revoke), de+en Activation (404 semantics per #60 on both levels): - instance setting api.enabled (default off, admin settings switch) - pond setting apiEnabled (default off, pond settings toggle; the PondsService settings-merge learned the key — the #92 lesson) Surface (/api/public/v1, excluded from the SPA's global prefix): - me, ponds, pages (list/read as Markdown+HTML, create from Markdown via the shared pipeline, PATCH title/content, DELETE to trash), search (permission-filtered + narrowed to exposed ponds, highlights as **…**), markdown ZIP export, labels (tree, create/rename/recolour/move/delete, assign/unassign), comments (threads, create, resolve/reopen) - content replacement travels the collab-owned document path: the new state lands as a MANUAL version "API update", then the established restore NOTIFY applies it — open editors converge, history stays append-only, no second lineage (VersionsService.replaceContent) - hand-maintained OpenAPI 3.1 document at /openapi.json, pinned to the controller by a route-coverage test in both directions Enforcement: - PublicApiGuard: instance switch → bearer PAT auth (request.user is the token's user) → per-token rate limit (429 + Retry-After) → scope (403 scope_required) → pond opt-in + token restriction - the shared PermissionGuard then applies the unchanged permission model; PageParamSource gained pondSlugParam for the slug+slug routes - no cookies anywhere → no CSRF surface (pinned by a hostile-Origin test) - every write audit-logged as api.write with the token attributed Tests/verification: - 12-test e2e pack: lifecycle, switches, permission matrix (reader/editor/outsider × scopes), restriction, page roundtrip incl. restore-NOTIFY assertion, labels, comments incl. policy, search narrowing, ZIP export, rate limit; full api suite 60/60 green (quota fixture via per-user override — never the instance default) - new collab-pack test proves an open editor converges onto an API content replacement (green against a local seeded stack) - UI smoke against the built SPA: token create/reveal/revoke, pond opt-in persists, admin switch persists (10/10) - docs/self-hosting/public-api.md + README link Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-12 11:17:03 +02:00