7 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude Fable 5	394d1c811d	#192: deploy-level backup target allowlist ... BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS (comma-separated destination hosts) constrains where backups may go, enforced twice: the api rejects settings writes and connection tests towards non-allowlisted hosts with admin-visible error codes and resolves a non-allowlisted configured target to null, and the sidecar enforces the same policy at the point of egress for the WebDAV upload and the rsync mirror alike (shared policy helpers in packages/shared/src/backup-target-policy.ts). BREAKING: the empty default disables every remote target - backups stay local only, the VS-NfD reference configuration (ADR 0026). Existing deployments with a remote target must list its host or uploads and mirror stop. The admin UI distinguishes unavailable-by-policy from unconfigured (i18n de+en) and shows the permitted hosts. Refs #192 (ADR 0026) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 12:17:14 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	afef45732a	#191: feeds.enabled instance switch, feed-token log masking ... Chosen path: an instance master switch following the api.enabled/ mcp.enabled pattern — while off, both feed routes AND the feed-token management answer 404 (existence hidden). Default ON: feeds predate the switch, existing instances and their subscribed readers keep working; the VS-NfD reference configuration (#227) turns it off. Admin UI gets the toggle next to the API/MCP switches (i18n de+en). Moving the token out of the query string is documented as rejected: a path segment lands in the same proxy and request logs, and feed readers cannot send headers — that is why the credential is in the URL at all. What DID leak was our own request log (pino logs req.url): the req serializer now masks ?token= values (common/mask-token-param.ts), so no code path logs the credential. Refs #191 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 11:34:43 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	db4c5ce9ca	#190: configurable session lifetime with a server-side idle timeout ... SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS (default 168 h) caps a session's total lifetime from login: expiresAt is set once at creation and never extended — the old sliding 30-day renewal is gone. SESSION_IDLE_HOURS (default 72 h) ends sessions unused for that long, enforced server-side against lastSeenAt with a write throttle scaled to the idle bound so short idle windows still renew. Expired rows are removed on validation and the session list applies both bounds, so idle-dead sessions never show as active. The cookie maxAge follows the configured absolute bound. Documented in .env.example (with the VS-NfD reference values for the upcoming hardening guide #227), compose passes the variables through, security.md and ADR 0007 record the amendment. Refs #190 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 11:11:15 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	d32c8c3730	#189: make the CSRF origin check fail closed ... A cookie-carrying mutation without Origin and Referer (or with an unparsable one) is now rejected with 403 csrf_origin_mismatch instead of passing unchecked. The exception for non-browser clients stays structural: PAT/bearer requests carry no session cookie and never reach the check, and a request that does carry the cookie is always checked. The test harness injects the matching Origin (supertest simulates a browser page of this instance) with an explicit suppression header for the negative cases; the Playwright fixture contexts send the header on their manual seeding calls; release-qa.sh pins APP_BASE_URL and sends the matching Origin. Dedicated spec covers: missing headers 403, mismatch 403, unparsable 403, match passes, GETs untouched, PAT mutation without headers passes, cookie+bearer still checked. Refs #189 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 09:34:44 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	3d1f4fda53	#188: purpose-bound token keys via HKDF, jose replaces the homegrown JWT ... COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET becomes a root key: every purpose derives its own HKDF-SHA-256 subkey (deriveTokenKey), and no code path signs with the root key directly. Collaboration tokens are signed and verified by jose with HS256 as an explicit allowlist; the sign/verify API turns async at its three call sites. Unsubscribe tokens move from a purpose-prefix string to the structural subkey, with a documented dual-verify window (legacy derivation accepted until 2026-11-01, covering the 90-day TTL of links in already-sent mail). The cross-runtime property that justified the homegrown implementation is now proven by a test: the built CJS and ESM dist artefacts round-trip tokens in both directions in child processes (jose v6 reaches CJS via Node's require(esm), pinned Node 22 images). Negative tests cover cross-purpose subkeys, root-key-signed tokens, alg:none and RS256. Refs #188 (ADR 0020) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 06:41:11 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	3e377aaa57	#226: add the §52 VSA delimitation statement ... Reviewer-facing document derived from ADR 0019: per base function (encryption, media protection, network termination, authentication, integrity) what the application does, what it deliberately does not, and which party provides it — every claim traceable to code via the ist-aufnahme. Includes the operator-duty handover (with the IndexedDB endpoint copy named explicitly, I-25) and the delta list mapping every divergence from the target state to its closing issue. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 06:29:05 +02:00
Claude Opus 5	fd07f716f6	docs: VS-NfD readiness planning (ist-aufnahme, plan, ADRs 0019-0026, issue drafts) ... Add docs/vs-nfd/: the analysis brief, the as-is assessment (42 findings, all verified against the code), the prioritized action plan rev. 2 with issue references written back to every checkbox, the two-stage issue/ADR brief, and the full reviewed draft used to create the forge state. Add eight proposed ADRs 0019-0026 covering the VS-NfD architecture decisions: no security base functions (par. 52 VSA anchor), HKDF token key separation, external authentication, page classification, read-access audit trail (variant A), reproducible offline deployment, plugin trust model, and backup target restriction. Forge state created alongside this commit: 11 labels, milestones M24-M31, issues #188-#236 (docs-only change, no code touched). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 01:48:05 +02:00