Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
75ec7f6006 CSP: data:-Fonts erlauben (eingebettete Fonts in Excalidraw-SVGs)
Excalidraw bettet beim Speichern die verwendeten Schrift-Subsets als
data:-URIs ins Snapshot-SVG ein. Die Seiten-CSP (nginx) und die
Plugin-Frame-CSP erlaubten aber nur `font-src 'self'` bzw. den
Asset-Pfad — die Handschrift fiel in der öffentlichen Ansicht und im
Snapshot-Render auf Serifen zurück (auf Prod an der ersten Demo-Skizze
sichtbar). Fix: `data:` in beiden font-src-Direktiven. data:-Fonts
lösen keinerlei Netzwerk-Request aus — die Zero-Third-Party-Garantie
(security.md) bleibt unberührt; fonts.ts-Kommentar entsprechend
präzisiert.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0155v2aT8AG1kZDQEZiCLBWC
2026-07-19 22:27:17 +02:00
97f94f247b draw.io reference plugin: fullscreen editing, inline SVG rendering
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A new block plugin bundling the OFFICIAL draw.io editor — nothing ever
loads from diagrams.net; the sandbox CSP pins every request to the
plugin's own version-pinned asset path (zero-external-network verified
live via a request-capture run).

Plugin (packages/plugins/drawio):
- block data { xml, svg }: xml is the draw.io source (document of
  record), svg the rendered snapshot as raw markup — render mode,
  office/PDF exports (the existing fallback renderer already inlines
  data.svg) and the public view all show the diagram without running
  diagram code
- edit mode: snapshot + "edit in fullscreen" (an empty block opens the
  editor immediately); the bundled editor runs in a child iframe of the
  plugin's own assets and speaks draw.io's JSON embed protocol —
  Save & Exit exports xmlsvg, persists { xml, svg } via blockData, and
  drops back to the inline size
- build.mjs fetches the pinned release (v30.3.6) into a gitignored
  vendor/ cache (fonts-build pattern; skipped in CI — plugin.js still
  bundles, the installable ZIP needs a dev machine) and packs a trimmed
  webapp subset: no dev sources, no embed.diagrams.net integrations
  bundle, no standalone viewers, no MathJax/templates/PWA — 27 MiB ZIP,
  85 MiB unpacked, de+en editor languages

Host/SDK extensions (generic, not drawio-specific):
- new ui.enterFullscreen()/exitFullscreen(): the surface's frame becomes
  a viewport-covering overlay — same sandboxed iframe, only geometry
  changes; destroy removes the frame, so a vanished plugin can never
  leave the app covered
- sandbox CSP: connect-src/frame-src now allow the plugin's OWN asset
  path (was 'none') — bundled apps lazy-load their resources and run in
  a child frame, but the api and external hosts stay unreachable; HTML
  assets are served with the same CSP so a packaged page cannot widen
  the rules, and child frames inherit the sandbox attribute
- plugin size limits raised (ZIP 5→64 MiB, unpacked 20→256 MiB) for
  bundled-app plugins; content types for xml/txt/ico assets

Verified end to end against a local stack (9/9): install via dropzone
(85 MiB validation), block insert, fullscreen entry, bundled editor
boots inside the double sandbox (German UI), shape drawn, Save & Exit
persists, snapshot renders inline, survives reload, zero off-origin
requests throughout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-12 14:15:30 +02:00
0875e2a087 Add the sandbox host runtime for plugin iframes (#73)
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Implements the security core of the plugin system: code-plugin surfaces
run in opaque-origin iframes (sandbox="allow-scripts", never
allow-same-origin) with a capability-filtered RPC bridge.

- api: serve a per-plugin sandbox frame document at
  /plugins/:id/:version/frame with a CSP that pins every load to the
  plugin's own asset path (built from APP_BASE_URL, not the request Host,
  so a Host-rewriting proxy cannot break it) and forbids network access
  (connect-src 'none'). Plugin assets get Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
  so the null-origin frame can load its own module bundle.
- web: sandbox-host creates the frame, wires the SDK host bridge over a
  source-filtered postMessage transport, drives render under a 5 s
  deadline (hung/failed plugin -> placeholder, never a frozen page), and
  tears down on unmount. PluginFrame/PluginPreviewPage surface it; the
  built-in ui.resize handler clamps plugin-requested heights.
- plugin-sdk: host bridge reports gate violations via onViolation and
  registers a gated handler for every v1 method, so an undeclared
  capability is rejected with capability_not_permitted (not
  unknown_method).
- tests: SDK gate unit test; web sandbox unit tests (opaque origin,
  source filtering, timeout); and the e2e security pack with a permanent
  malicious fixture plugin proving no escape (DOM/cookies/storage/fetch/
  undeclared capability all blocked) plus well-behaved and hung cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
2026-07-11 09:16:30 +02:00