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13 Commits
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| 000d110727 |
#201: stable audit event catalogue for syslog/SIEM export
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The 36 audit action ids become a typed union (AUDIT_EVENTS in audit-actions.ts) — an uncatalogued id is now a compile error; every existing id keeps its name. The published, versioned catalogue (docs/architecture/audit-events.md, v1.0) documents per event: trigger, severity, actor and target semantics, and every field, plus the compatibility promise (ids are never repurposed; retiring keeps the row forever) and the stable stdout field set. audit-catalogue.test.ts is the fence: it parses the document's event tables and fails when ids or severities drift from the code (negative case verified). Audit stdout lines now carry the catalogue severity as a routing hint — pino level stays 30 so transport is unaffected; no DB migration. Forwarding path documented: container stdout -> operator's collector; deliberately no application-side syslog client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| 74970f6073 |
#199: SHA-256 integrity hashes for attachments
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Every upload stores the SHA-256 of its bytes, computed from the in-memory buffer that is written — never by re-reading disk. Every download re-hashes the stored object BEFORE the first byte leaves (memory bounded by the max_file_bytes quota that gated the upload) and fails closed on mismatch with attachment_integrity_failure; the mismatch lands in the audit trail as file.integrity_failed with both hashes. Detection of payload manipulation is the one integrity duty par. 52 VSA leaves with the application — only it knows what the file should be. Pre-#199 rows are hashed by a bounded, idempotent backfill that rides the existing nightly orphan-file-sweep job (no new scheduler job, job fence untouched); unreadable files are logged and retried, never silently skipped, and null-hash rows are served unverified only until the backfill reaches them. Operator runbook note in security.md (restore from backup, re-download, audit entry carries both hashes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| d3289b2167 |
#202: SBOM and license report in CI
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The release run now generates CycloneDX 1.6 SBOMs with a pinned anchore/syft container — one per released image (scanned from the freshly built image tar, OS packages included) and one for the pnpm workspace (from the lockfile) — plus the full pnpm licenses report, and attaches everything as build artefacts BEFORE publishing the release, so a red gate stops the release. Runner constraints dictated the mechanics (documented in the workflow): the job talks to the HOST daemon, so files travel into the syft container via docker cp and images via docker save to a tar copied the same way (syft cannot read a tar from stdin — verified). scripts/check-licenses.mjs is the documented license policy: permissive allowlist, MPL-2.0/CC-BY-4.0 with recorded reasoning, per-package exception table (khroma: MIT text shipped, metadata missing). CI runs the gate on every PR (pnpm licenses:check); positive and negative case tested locally, both SBOM paths tested against real images/lockfile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| 69d9072d2c |
#234: retention for mail_outbox
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Sent mails were kept forever, and digest bodies name page titles and actors — an unbounded copy of content-adjacent data. A new daily mail-outbox-retention job deletes SENT rows (by sentAt) and permanently FAILED rows (by nextAttemptAt, the last attempt's stamp) once they pass mail.outboxRetentionDays (instance setting, default 30). PENDING rows — including failed-but-retryable ones — stay the retry loop's alone. Decision recorded (security.md §Privacy, residual-risk note for #231): digest mails keep carrying page titles for now — there is no per-page classification marking yet to key a suppression on (ADR 0022 / M32 revisits), and a VS-NfD reference configuration can leave SMTP unconfigured entirely. Job-count fence in system.spec: 8 -> 9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| 3c62b7b773 |
#197: security response headers and an explicitly restrictive CORS policy
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Hand-rolled middleware instead of helmet: the header set is small enough to own, every value is a deliberate decision, and the api gains no transitive dependency. HSTS (no includeSubDomains — the api cannot speak for sibling subdomains), nosniff, Referrer-Policy no-referrer, X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN (not DENY: the plugin sandbox frame embeds same-origin and its CSP has no frame-ancestors, so this header governs), and a minimal deny-all Permissions-Policy. CORS grants no foreign origin anything; only the APP_BASE_URL origin is ever echoed (where browsers do not consult CORS anyway), with Vary: Origin on every response. No preflight handling — same-origin requests never preflight, and cross-origin API access is cookie-less by design (PAT/Bearer). Wired via the AppModule MiddlewareConsumer so createTestApp boots the identical middleware. Fences: security-headers.e2e.test.ts (header set, foreign origin gets no ACAO) and a frame assertion in plugins.e2e.db.test.ts (framing stays possible). Rationale table in security.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| ed2225bb77 |
#196: audit-trail retention job
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audit.retentionDays (instance setting, default 365) bounds the audit_log: the daily audit-retention job deletes entries past the period and records the deletion itself (audit.pruned with count, cutoff and period) so a gap in the trail is always explainable. Lives in its own AuditRetentionService because the settings service audits its writes - folding retention into AuditService would close a constructor cycle. The read-access trail (#222-#225) is deliberately not covered; it gets its own period. security.md gains the Logging section the schema has cited for a while; the maintenance-job fence moves 6 -> 7 (the deliberate new row). Refs #196 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| 960a806ee3 |
#195: trashed content leaves the search index itself
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Trashing a page (promote and subtree modes) clears the affected search vectors, restoring rebuilds them; pond trash clears every page vector of the pond, pond restore reindexes only the live pages (pages trashed inside stay out); the GDPR pseudonymization's personal-pond trash does the same. reindexAll now converges to the invariant (clears trashed, rebuilds live), and a one-off migration backfills vectors of already-trashed content. The query-side deleted_at guards stay untouched as the independent second layer - the test proves both layers separately, including writing a vector back onto a trashed page (simulating a future path that forgot the clear) and asserting the query still hides it. New provider methods removePond/reindexPond behind the SearchProvider seam. Refs #195 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| afef45732a |
#191: feeds.enabled instance switch, feed-token log masking
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Chosen path: an instance master switch following the api.enabled/ mcp.enabled pattern — while off, both feed routes AND the feed-token management answer 404 (existence hidden). Default ON: feeds predate the switch, existing instances and their subscribed readers keep working; the VS-NfD reference configuration (#227) turns it off. Admin UI gets the toggle next to the API/MCP switches (i18n de+en). Moving the token out of the query string is documented as rejected: a path segment lands in the same proxy and request logs, and feed readers cannot send headers — that is why the credential is in the URL at all. What DID leak was our own request log (pino logs req.url): the req serializer now masks ?token= values (common/mask-token-param.ts), so no code path logs the credential. Refs #191 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| db4c5ce9ca |
#190: configurable session lifetime with a server-side idle timeout
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SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS (default 168 h) caps a session's total lifetime from login: expiresAt is set once at creation and never extended — the old sliding 30-day renewal is gone. SESSION_IDLE_HOURS (default 72 h) ends sessions unused for that long, enforced server-side against lastSeenAt with a write throttle scaled to the idle bound so short idle windows still renew. Expired rows are removed on validation and the session list applies both bounds, so idle-dead sessions never show as active. The cookie maxAge follows the configured absolute bound. Documented in .env.example (with the VS-NfD reference values for the upcoming hardening guide #227), compose passes the variables through, security.md and ADR 0007 record the amendment. Refs #190 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| d32c8c3730 |
#189: make the CSRF origin check fail closed
A cookie-carrying mutation without Origin and Referer (or with an unparsable one) is now rejected with 403 csrf_origin_mismatch instead of passing unchecked. The exception for non-browser clients stays structural: PAT/bearer requests carry no session cookie and never reach the check, and a request that does carry the cookie is always checked. The test harness injects the matching Origin (supertest simulates a browser page of this instance) with an explicit suppression header for the negative cases; the Playwright fixture contexts send the header on their manual seeding calls; release-qa.sh pins APP_BASE_URL and sends the matching Origin. Dedicated spec covers: missing headers 403, mismatch 403, unparsable 403, match passes, GETs untouched, PAT mutation without headers passes, cookie+bearer still checked. Refs #189 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| 3d1f4fda53 |
#188: purpose-bound token keys via HKDF, jose replaces the homegrown JWT
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COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET becomes a root key: every purpose derives its own HKDF-SHA-256 subkey (deriveTokenKey), and no code path signs with the root key directly. Collaboration tokens are signed and verified by jose with HS256 as an explicit allowlist; the sign/verify API turns async at its three call sites. Unsubscribe tokens move from a purpose-prefix string to the structural subkey, with a documented dual-verify window (legacy derivation accepted until 2026-11-01, covering the 90-day TTL of links in already-sent mail). The cross-runtime property that justified the homegrown implementation is now proven by a test: the built CJS and ESM dist artefacts round-trip tokens in both directions in child processes (jose v6 reaches CJS via Node's require(esm), pinned Node 22 images). Negative tests cover cross-purpose subkeys, root-key-signed tokens, alg:none and RS256. Refs #188 (ADR 0020) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| b16d23297e |
Scaffold pnpm monorepo with lint, format, and test tooling
pnpm workspace with apps/web, apps/api, apps/collab, and packages/shared; strict TypeScript base config, repo-wide ESLint (flat) + Prettier, Vitest per package, and root scripts lint/typecheck/test/ build. @dorfteich/shared ships a first health-response helper consumed by apps/api to prove workspace linking. Existing markdown docs are reformatted once by the new Prettier setup. Closes #1 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 0629411966 |
Add architecture documentation, ADRs, and operations concept
Initial deliverable of the architecture phase: 16 ADRs (stack, CRDT collaboration, plugin sandbox, import/export, backups, CI/CD), data model, permission model, real-time collaboration and plugin concepts, deployment/operations/security documentation, and the milestone roadmap that the implementation issues are derived from. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |