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12 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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| db4c5ce9ca |
#190: configurable session lifetime with a server-side idle timeout
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SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS (default 168 h) caps a session's total lifetime from login: expiresAt is set once at creation and never extended — the old sliding 30-day renewal is gone. SESSION_IDLE_HOURS (default 72 h) ends sessions unused for that long, enforced server-side against lastSeenAt with a write throttle scaled to the idle bound so short idle windows still renew. Expired rows are removed on validation and the session list applies both bounds, so idle-dead sessions never show as active. The cookie maxAge follows the configured absolute bound. Documented in .env.example (with the VS-NfD reference values for the upcoming hardening guide #227), compose passes the variables through, security.md and ADR 0007 record the amendment. Refs #190 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| d32c8c3730 |
#189: make the CSRF origin check fail closed
A cookie-carrying mutation without Origin and Referer (or with an unparsable one) is now rejected with 403 csrf_origin_mismatch instead of passing unchecked. The exception for non-browser clients stays structural: PAT/bearer requests carry no session cookie and never reach the check, and a request that does carry the cookie is always checked. The test harness injects the matching Origin (supertest simulates a browser page of this instance) with an explicit suppression header for the negative cases; the Playwright fixture contexts send the header on their manual seeding calls; release-qa.sh pins APP_BASE_URL and sends the matching Origin. Dedicated spec covers: missing headers 403, mismatch 403, unparsable 403, match passes, GETs untouched, PAT mutation without headers passes, cookie+bearer still checked. Refs #189 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| 9674c0bae2 |
Batch notifications into localized e-mail digests with unsubscribe (#95)
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New per-user digestFrequency (hourly default | daily | off) on the profile and in the settings UI. A scheduler job (15 min cadence) mails a user once their oldest unread, unmailed notification exceeds the cadence window: one localized mail per batch, grouped per pond then per page with actor names and change/comment counts, enqueued through the mail outbox. Sending marks the batch mailed — never read — and re-checks page read permission per entry at send time; entries the user can no longer read are dropped from the mail but still marked handled, so revoked content cannot queue forever. Every mail carries a signed, single-purpose unsubscribe link: it only flips the setting to off, renders a session-free confirmation page, and sets no cookie. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| f4f27cbe78 |
Add watches: follow pages and ponds with auto-watch preferences (#93)
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New watches table (polymorphic target, unique per user+target; page purge
removes its rows via the trash service, and the list endpoint drops
targets the user can no longer read). Endpoints: idempotent PUT/DELETE
/watches/{page|pond}/:id gated by read access (404 hides the target),
GET state for the header toggles, and GET /users/me/watches resolving
names and links. Auto-watch hooks: creating a page and commenting
subscribe the actor, each behind a new user preference
(autoWatchOwnPages / autoWatchOnComment, default on) editable via the
profile PATCH and surfaced as checkboxes in the settings. UI: watch
toggle on the page header and the pond settings header, watch list with
unwatch in the account settings; new watches i18n namespace (de+en).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
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| c8aac13dfb |
Add Site-Admin system panel with persistent audit trail (#86)
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New /admin/system panel (operations.md §Maintenance jobs): the maintenance job list shows every registered job with truthful last-run data (new Job.lastDurationMs recorded by the scheduler) and a manual trigger that respects the run-mutex and is itself audit-logged; a backup card mirrors the sidecar's status.json including the freshness verdict; an audit-log viewer filters by actor, action, and time range with pagination; and a storage overview lists the largest ponds. Auth events and admin actions (grants, members, user/quota admin, plugins, settings, setup) now land in a new audit_log table through a central AuditService — which keeps emitting the established stdout log line — while content activity stays log-only by design. All endpoints are Site-Admin-only; covered by API DB tests and a Playwright pack in CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| f0a82bad20 |
Add the first-run setup wizard API with env-backed secret store (#80)
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When the api runs against a database without the setup.completedAt marker, a global SetupGuard answers every non-exempt route with 503 setup_required; only /setup/*, health probes, and the session routes stay reachable. The wizard steps (POST /setup/admin|instance|smtp| registration|complete) write straight to their production homes; the Site Admin step signs its creator in, later steps require that session. Completing sets the marker and locks every step permanently (410, also across restarts, and not reopenable via PATCH /admin/settings). SMTP entered in the wizard is verified with a live delivery test first (failure blocks the step with the transport error as detail) and then persisted to the new env-backed secret store: a mode-600 dotenv file on the new `secrets` volume (SECRETS_FILE). Explicit container env always wins over the store; empty compose-passed strings count as unset. The mail transport now resolves lazily through SmtpConfigService so wizard changes apply without a restart. SETUP_ADMIN_* env pre-seeds the whole wizard at boot for automated deploys; a backfill migration marks instances that already have a Site Admin as completed, and seed/vitest global-setup do the same for fixture databases. The setup e2e suite provisions its own fresh database (CREATE DATABASE + migrate deploy) per run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| 42e97b9df2 |
Add Site-Admin user management (#59)
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Instance operators get basic user administration for support, abuse handling, and GDPR groundwork (security.md §Privacy). - api `admin/`: Site-Admin-gated `/admin/users` — a searchable, paginated list (username, e-mail, status, role, pond count, last login) plus lifecycle actions: disable/enable (a disabled user is logged out everywhere and login is refused with the distinct `account_disabled`), resend verification, delete, and grant/revoke Site Admin. Guards: you cannot act on your own account (`cannot_modify_self`) and the last Site Admin cannot be dropped (`last_site_admin`). Every action is audit-logged with the actor. - `PseudonymizationService`: account deletion scrubs the PII, removes all login identities + sessions, and trashes the personal pond — the kept row is what authorship references, so shared content the user authored shows as "Deleted user" (no orphaned/cascaded content). - web: the Admin area gains a 'Users' surface — search, pagination, and the actions (destructive ones behind an inline two-step confirm; self-actions hidden). New `users` i18n namespace (de+en). - tests: `user-admin.e2e.db.test.ts` (disable → logout + login blocked; delete → pseudonymized authorship + personal pond trashed + credentials gone; last Site Admin and self protected; Site-Admin gating); a non-destructive browser `admin-users` pack proving disable-in-UI blocks login and enable restores it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| 0c6494f209 |
Enforce permissions in API guards and retire interim access (#52)
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Every route now declares its access rule explicitly and is enforced through the shared resolution algorithm (permissions.md): - PermissionGuard + decorators (@RequiresPondRole, @RequiresPagePermission, @RequiresAttachmentPermission, @AuthenticatedOnly) applied to every route; a route-enumeration test proves full coverage alongside @Public()/Site-Admin-guarded routes. - 404/403 policy (documented in README conventions): denied reads answer 404 (existence hiding), denied writes on readable things answer 403; trash views need write capability (ADR 0013). - PermissionService resolves page/pond questions via the shared resolver, with an in-process pond-context cache (grants + label parents) that is invalidated on every grant/label-tree change and TTL-bounded as a multi-process safety net. Grant changes also fire pond_access_changed for collab revalidation (#39/#53). - shared: pond-scope resolution (hasPondRole, canSeePond) next to the page resolver; grant wire schemas + GrantView. - Owner Pond-Admin grants: migration backfill for all existing ponds, created transactionally with every new pond (shared + personal + seed). - Grant CRUD under /ponds/:id/grants (pond_admin-gated) with structural and referential validation, last-admin protection, audit logs. - InterimAccessService deleted; page lists, search, backlinks, phantom links, and trash listings are filtered per page through the resolver; collab tokens are now truly ro for readers. - Fixture-matrix e2e (reader/editor/pond admin/foreign, label-deny, authenticated-subject, revoke-then-immediate-deny cache test). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PGdhRiwU1WRL4XxJfZYipY |
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| f0850eecd3 |
Ponds: data model, CRUD API, personal pond on verification (#21)
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- Pond model with pond-level trash columns (ADR 0013) and settings jsonb holding only deviations from the defaults (sidebar sort, font slots per ADR 0016); migration 20260705090100_ponds - shared: pond schemas/views and slugify (German transliteration, URL-safe, length-capped); deterministic -2/-3 suffixes for collisions - InterimAccessService: single place answering pond access questions until the real role model lands in M5 - POST/GET /ponds, GET /ponds/:slug, PATCH/DELETE /ponds/:id, Site-Admin trash + restore; personal pond auto-created on e-mail verification and for active seed fixtures; personal ponds cannot be trashed - e2e pack covering verify-flow pond creation, slug suffixes, rename, foreign-pond 404s, trash/restore; slugify unit tests Closes #21 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UpQz6ypHJsLfMf4S6fyQEB |
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| 0bc80c9f93 |
Add auth, settings, and admin UI to the SPA
The web app grows its account surface: login (with next-redirect, unverified-hint + resend), signup (react-hook-form + shared Zod schemas, field-level api errors, closed-registration state fed by the new public GET /auth/registration), e-mail verification, forgot/reset password; a settings page with profile (locale applies immediately), password change, and active-session management; a Site-Admin page for instance name, default locale, and registration mode. AuthProvider holds /auth/me, applies the profile locale, and backs route guards (RequireAuth/RequireAnonymous/RequireSiteAdmin); the top bar gains a user menu. All strings ship in the new auth/settings namespaces (de+ en); the exception filter now preserves handler-specific error codes. Verified live: signup → Mailpit → verify → login → profile through the Vite proxy. Closes #16 Closes #17 Closes #18 Closes #19 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 1314096c94 |
Add account/session endpoints and typed instance settings with admin API
Server halves of #17/#18/#19: PATCH /users/me and change-password (verifies the current password, logs out every other session), GET/DELETE /users/me/sessions with current-session flag and protection against revoking oneself; InstanceSettingsService as a typed, cached, Zod-validated registry over instance_settings (schema-default fallback for invalid stored values, audit-logged writes) consumed by the signup flow; /admin/settings behind the new SiteAdminGuard with strict unknown-key rejection. SessionsService moves to its own module to keep Auth/Users acyclic. Three new e2e suites bring the api to 42 tests. Part of #17, #18, #19 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| bed9fc9307 |
Add authentication: signup, verification, sessions, password reset
AuthModule implements the M1 core as one coherent unit: Signup (#13): POST signup/verify-email/resend-verification with shared Zod validation (field-level error details), double opt-in via hashed single-use tokens (24h, superseding reissue), registration_mode enforcement, and per-IP rate limits. Sessions (#14): opaque 32-byte cookie tokens stored as SHA-256 row ids, sliding 30-day expiry (refresh at most hourly), global AuthGuard with @Public() opt-out attaching the user to every request, CSRF origin check on mutating requests, per-account login backoff (5/15min, reset on success), generic 401 for wrong-vs-unknown credentials, logout with immediate invalidation, GET /auth/me. Reset (#15): forgot-password without account enumeration, one-hour single-use tokens, reset destroys all existing sessions. A 14-case supertest e2e suite drives every flow against the test database, reading verification/reset links from the mail outbox. Closes #13 Closes #14 Closes #15 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |