67 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude Opus 5	1b992c8626	#305: a full pond archive before deletion and before purge ... Deleting a pond already had a strict prompt — typing the pond name, stricter than a confirm dialog. That was never the gap. The gap is that the person who deletes it loses access the moment they do: the pond leaves their view, only a Site Admin can bring it back, and the export is no longer reachable for them. So the archive is offered INSIDE the deletion flow, before the button. What it contains, and why it is not the existing export: - Every page the requester may read, as Markdown, as before. - **Every attachment of the pond**, not only the embedded ones. An attachment nobody put on a page would otherwise vanish unnoticed — which is the whole reason this issue exists. - `manifest.json`: pond settings (EFFECTIVE, defaults filled in — a preservation format must not require its reader to know Dorfteich's defaults), labels, the page hierarchy and sort keys, comments, and attachment metadata including the #199 hash so a reader can verify bytes. It extends the #210 manifest rather than adding a second descriptor, and carries an explicit `formatVersion`. - `README.txt`, because the manifest is for machines: whoever unpacks a folder of Markdown a year from now must not believe they hold a one-click restore. Decisions worth naming: - **"Complete" describes the RESULT, not the route.** A pond admin who may read every page gets `complete: true`; only an archive that actually leaves pages out is incomplete. The Site-Admin route skips the read filter (an archive taken before an irreversible purge must not depend on which ponds the operator happens to be a member of) — those are two different questions and the first version of this conflated them. - **The omission is named before the download**, with its number, in the UI and in the manifest. An archive silently missing content is worse than no archive, because it ends the search. - **Not downloading stays allowed.** A pond of test pages should not require one, and the server cannot tell whether a file arrived anyway — so the finality is stated in text instead of enforced. - **A plain link, not fetch-into-a-blob.** The api streams the ZIP; buffering a whole pond in the tab to draw a progress bar would trade memory for cosmetics. The browser reports progress and completion; what it cannot say — that the archive is being BUILT — is announced in a live region. - Read trail unchanged in kind (ADR 0023): one `export` event per classified page before any classified byte enters the stream. Attachments never travel without their page, so the same events cover them. - New audit action `pond.archived` (catalogue v1.7) with page and attachment counts, omitted pages, and completeness. Format documented in `docs/architecture/pond-archive-format.md`, including what is deliberately NOT in it (history, permissions, trash). Verified by hand, not only asserted: a real pond's archive downloaded and unpacked — README, manifest, three page files, the media file; the manifest's effective settings, per-page classification, the VS-NfD frontmatter and marking preserved in the classified page's Markdown, and the attachment's sha256 present. Plus six api tests (including that an unembedded attachment travels and that a Site Admin gets a complete archive without membership) and the a11y pack 11/11 in both schemes, which now also scans the pond settings screen. Not done, because there is nothing to attach it to: the Site Admin's purge dialog (#193) exists only as an api endpoint — there is no pond-trash UI in the web app. The api half is here and tested, so it becomes a link when that screen is built.	2026-08-01 19:36:10 +02:00
Claude Opus 5	b96997501a	#303: operator-uploaded fonts — storage, API, PDF embedding, backup ... An operator holding a font licence could only use it by baking the file into a custom image, which tied every change to a rebuild and left the file out of the backup. ADR 0016 said there is no runtime font management. It also listed this exact case under "Alternatives considered" — *may become a Site-Admin- level feature later*. The amendment takes that option and answers the two objections it raised: licensing risk (Site Admins only, licence recorded with the family) and file-format attack surface (magic-byte check and a size cap, never a parse). - `CUSTOM_FONTS_DIR` (default `./data/fonts`) — a sibling of uploads and plugins, NOT inside the image-baked `FONTS_DIR`, where a deploy would overwrite it and no backup would ever see it. - One list of data directories (`apps/backup/src/data-dirs.ts`) now feeds both the nightly archive and the restore, so they cannot drift. #306 and #307 add one line each instead of a second mechanism. - Both Dockerfiles bake the path. The backup image sets its volume paths itself ("self-sufficient without compose env" — #71's lesson) and reads no *_DIR from compose; without the ENV entry the archive would have skipped the directory silently. - The PDF path already read WOFF2 from disk at request time, so it only had to pick the other base directory for a custom family. - `fontStack`/`fontEntry` take the instance's uploaded families as an argument — they are runtime data. The catalog is searched first, and a colliding family name is rejected at upload, so a custom font can never shadow a catalog one. - Deletion is never blocked by usage: an unknown family already falls back to the system stack, so affected ponds degrade instead of breaking. The count of affected ponds travels into the audit entry. - Audit catalogue v1.6 (`font.uploaded`, `font.deleted`). Verified: api full suite against a fresh database, 102 files / 571 tests. The upload suite writes into a real temp directory and reads the bytes back off disk, so the storage layer is exercised rather than mocked.	2026-08-01 14:49:13 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	1f56f34113	#296: remove the unsubscribe-token dual-verify window early ... Operator decision at the ADR 0020 acceptance: verification is subkey-only now instead of waiting for the stated 2026-11-01 expiry. Links in digest mails sent before the #188 key separation stop working; recipients use the in-app notification settings. A regression test pins that the legacy derivation (root key + purpose prefix) can never verify again; security.md records the removal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 23:03:03 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	9b7acab294	#232: plugin allowlist with SHA-256 hash pinning ... The install path records the SHA-256 of the delivered bundle ZIP (plugins.bundle_hash; pre-#232 installs show it as unknown until reinstalled). plugins.allowlist in instance_settings names permitted ids with their pinned hashes: empty (default) = not enforced, existing instances unchanged; non-empty = installs of unlisted or deviating bundles are rejected (plugin_not_pinned / plugin_hash_mismatch, 403), and an installed plugin outside the list or with a deviating hash does not load — absent from pond mount lists, frame/assets 404. Every rejection is audited (plugin.rejected, catalogue v1.5). A version bump changes the hash and therefore requires an explicit re-pin — the intended friction (ADR 0025). Admin UI shows observed vs pinned hash per plugin with pin/re-pin/unpin. Scope stated honestly in plugin-architecture.md: the pin answers "is this the reviewed bundle"; post-install disk tampering is platform integrity (ADR 0019), sandbox containment stays the sandbox's job. Hardening guide row + catalog advisory triage; residual risk R-03 resolved. e2e: empty-allowlist compatibility, pinned load, unpinned and tampered installs rejected and audited, pin drift blocks loading while the admin still sees the mismatch, version bump needs re-pin. Full api suite 101 files / 561 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 21:26:36 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	404a3741c8	ADRs 0019-0027: accepted after explicit operator review (2026-07-31) ... Stefan reviewed and accepted all nine VS-NfD ADRs one by one. Two adjustments from the review: ADR 0021 decision 3 now states the #216 refinement in the decision itself (PAT/feed-token issuance stays available to IdP-authenticated sessions — API authorization under its own switches, not interactive sign-in) instead of contradicting the later Decisions section; and the ADR 0020 dual-verify window will be removed early (issue #296) rather than waiting for its stated expiry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 20:47:27 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	da5fd7c770	#243: VS_NFD_MODE and the machine-readable hardening-profile catalog ... The deployment declares through VS_NFD_MODE (off | marked | hidden | enforced, default off) how the application treats configuration that violates the VS-NfD reference profile — deploy-level like BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS, so a compromised Site Admin cannot widen it. The catalog in shared (vs-nfd-profile.ts) is the single source of truth: every profile-relevant setting with a decidable compliant value, judgement calls in an explicit advisory list, and a fence test parsing the hardening guide's reference tables so neither can drift (pattern #201). The api evaluates the catalog against the typed settings registry and validated env and exposes mode + verdict on GET /admin/system/vs-nfd-profile; the admin settings view shows the card whenever the mode is not off. Display only — the treatments land with #244–#246 (ADR 0027, proposed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 18:24:04 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	18239e2fa9	#221: offline update path incl. migrations, rehearsed with rollback ... Adds docs/operations/update-runbook.md (obtain, verify by digest, back up, apply, verify, roll back) with the migration behaviour stated explicitly: a failed migration rolls back its own transaction but is recorded in _prisma_migrations and blocks every further migrate deploy (P3009) — including a re-deployed old image — until migrate resolve --rolled-back; semantically irreversible migrations have exactly one way back, the pre-update backup set. No rolling updates on a compose stage. Rehearsed in the isolated environment of #220: regular update to a v2 image set, then a deliberate failed-update (P3018 division by zero, schema change proven rolled back) with image-rollback-alone shown insufficient and the documented recovery executed. Protocol: docs/vs-nfd/98-update-rollback-protokoll.md. ADR 0024 decisions 5+6 recorded as executed; operations handbook and restore runbook updated; plan checkbox P1-3 ticked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 17:26:50 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4f6596e8a2	#288: reset schema before pg_restore — partitioned tables broke --clean ... Since #224 read_events is partitioned; the dump carries per-partition primary keys as own entries, and pg_restore --clean emitted DROP CONSTRAINT against inherited constraints, which PostgreSQL refuses. The restore then reported FAILED although the content was restored. Dropping and recreating the public schema first makes every --clean drop a no-op and the restore faithful: objects created after the backup no longer survive. Verified in the isolated environment of #220 (set 20260731-132200, exit 0, readyz green). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 17:00:05 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	a758c9d78b	#219: verified reproducible build without network access ... The ADR 0024 §4 decision, taken explicitly and both ways: customers OPERATE prebuilt digest-pinned images (no customer-side build), and ADDITIONALLY the workspace build is verified to work with networking disabled - so site-local patching stays possible without internet. Evidence (docs/vs-nfd/96-offline-build-protokoll.md): pnpm install --offline --frozen-lockfile plus pnpm build under docker run --network none (node:22.15.1-alpine + pnpm 11.9.0, the pinned toolchain), reproduced twice from clean checkouts with identical results. The offline kit is the pnpm store (~870 MB) plus the build user's ~/.cache (~460 MB - the prisma engines live there; without the cache the prisma postinstall fails offline). The one network dependency found and bounded: the drawio plugin's installable ZIP fetches its pinned vendor tarball on first build. Deploy images contain no plugin ZIPs, so the delivery-relevant build is fully offline (CI=1 skips the fetch, as in CI); an offline ZIP build pre-seeds the tarball into packages/plugins/drawio/vendor/. Also catches up the operations manual's scheduler-job table to 10 (read-trail-maintenance was added in #224 without the row here). Refs #219. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 14:39:35 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	6aac785841	#217: map IdP groups and roles onto the permission model ... Declarative instance setting idpMapping.rules turns ID-token claims into pond roles and the site-admin flag on every OIDC login — configuration, not code. Mapped grants travel through the SAME GrantsService path as manual ones (permission cache invalidated, collab access notify fires so live sessions revalidate — asserted by test), never raw rows. Ownership makes precedence explicit: role_grants.origin marks mapped rows, users.is_site_admin_managed marks a mapping-set admin flag. The mapping only creates and revokes what it owns — manual wins: hand-made grants and hand-promoted admins are never revoked by a missing claim (a manual toggle clears the marker and takes ownership). Removal of a claim revokes the mapped grant and the managed flag on the next login. Every mapping-driven change is audited with origin idp_mapping. Failure containment: unknown pond slugs and the last-Pond-Admin protection log-and-skip — a mapping problem must never become a login lockout. Tests drive real OIDC logins against the fake IdP with group claims: grant + working access, revocation incl. notify, manual-wins, managed site-admin promote/demote/hands-off. Documented in permissions.md (own section), ADR 0021, data-model.md and the hardening guide (care rule: same PR). Refs #217. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 13:09:11 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	13f0311d8e	#216: hard AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED switch over every local credential flow ... The deploy-level realization of auth.local.enabled (ADR 0021): FALSE answers 404 on every local credential flow — login, signup, e-mail verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change — enforced centrally in the auth guard via the @LocalCredentialFlow() marker before any session or CSRF logic runs. Deploy-level on purpose: a compromised Site Admin cannot reopen the local path, so the runtime-flip residual risk from ADR 0021 does not materialize (R-02 closed in the risk list). An enumeration fence fails when an auth route is neither marked nor on the reviewed allowlist, so a new credential flow cannot ship unswitched. Stated decisions, each tested: sessions/logout keep working for externally authenticated users; PAT and feed-token issuance stays available (API authorization under its own switches, not interactive sign-in). Bootstrap: complete setup (or SETUP_ADMIN_* pre-seed) before flipping; the api warns at boot when local auth is off with neither OIDC nor proxy auth configured. GET /auth/methods reports local:false and the login page hides the local form and credential links. Hardening guide: the planned auth.local.enabled row moves from 1.3 into the live deploy table with the bootstrap ordering, and the verification checklist gains the login-404 probe. Refs #216. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:58:07 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4c7f001cab	#215: trusted reverse-proxy header / mTLS client-certificate path ... For perimeters that authenticate before the application (ADR 0021 §4). Off unless BOTH AUTH_PROXY_HEADER and AUTH_PROXY_TRUSTED_PEERS are set — nothing about the header is guessed. The peer check runs against the TCP peer address only (a forwarded header is attacker-influenced): a request carrying the header from any other peer is rejected outright and audited as auth.proxy_rejected (catalogue v1.4) — that is a spoof attempt, not a misconfiguration — even when a valid session cookie rides along. From a trusted peer the header IS the identity; a session cookie never escalates beyond it; with the feature off the header is inert. Mapping is explicit (AUTH_PROXY_MAP: username or e-mail); deliberately no just-in-time creation — the header carries no verified address. The mTLS variant (AUTH_PROXY_MODE=mtls-dn) maps the configured attribute (default CN) out of the certificate subject DN the TLS terminator forwards, under the same peer rules. Session-less proxy requests key the read trail per user (user:<id>). The trust boundary is stated in security.md (the section an assessor reads closest), the VS-NfD security documentation and the hardening guide's deploy table. Tests cover all four decisions: off = inert, trusted peer authenticates (username and DN mapping), untrusted peer rejected + audited, no escalation past a session cookie. Refs #215. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:50:09 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	5796b7a5dd	#214: OIDC Authorization Code with PKCE, Keycloak as reference IdP ... External authentication (ADR 0021) built on jose (#188's vetted library) plus fetch — no new dependency enters the supply chain for a security base function. Discovery-configured; ID tokens validate against the IdP's JWKS under an explicit RS256/ES256 allowlist with issuer, audience, expiry and nonce binding. State, nonce and the PKCE verifier travel in a signed HttpOnly Lax cookie keyed by a dedicated HKDF purpose (oidc-state, ADR 0020). Deploy-level configuration (OIDC_ISSUER/CLIENT_ID/CLIENT_SECRET/SCOPES/ PROVIDER_LABEL): who authenticates users is a platform decision. The login page discovers the provider via GET /auth/methods and renders the SSO button (i18n de+en). Identities use the existing slot (provider oidc:<issuer>, subject from the token). First login creates the account just-in-time — ACTIVE and mail-verified only when the IdP asserts a verified address. An existing local account is NEVER adopted silently by e-mail (account-takeover path): login refuses with oidc_link_required and the owner links explicitly via GET /auth/oidc/link (audited auth.identity_linked, catalogue v1.3). Sessions come from the one existing session service. Tests run the full flow against a protocol-faithful fake IdP: PKCE verifier at the token endpoint, JIT creation incl. personal pond, invalid state/nonce/signature/issuer/audience/expiry each rejected, the linking refusal and the explicit link flow. Verified end-to-end against a real Keycloak 26.0 (repeatable procedure documented in security.md §External authentication). Refs #214. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:44:52 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4af5e6e81f	#225: read-trail master switch and written purpose limitation ... New instance switch readTrail.enabled, default OFF: read logging is employee monitoring in a works council's eyes — an ordinary instance must not surveil reads. Off means no event is written ANYWHERE (no row, no stdout line, verified by test); the api announces the switch position once per boot, so an eventless trail is never ambiguous — a gap reads as "was off", never "was lost". The written purpose limitation ships as section 7 of the VS-NfD security documentation (#228): what is recorded (no content, no titles, no IPs, no fingerprinting), why (evidence for reads of marked content only — variant A is the technical anchor of the promise), who may read it (Site Admin, API-only), for how long (readTrail.retentionDays, audited pruning), and what it may NOT be used for (no performance or behaviour monitoring). The hardening guide's reference configuration turns the trail on (reference value true) and points to that text; the existing trail suites now enable the switch explicitly. Refs #225. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:35:18 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	2bdb0ec2cf	#224: read-trail storage — partitioning, retention, admin query path ... Convert read_events to monthly RANGE partitions on occurred_at, with a DEFAULT partition as safety net: a lagging maintenance job must never turn the trail's hard-failure semantics into an outage for classified reads. The dedup unique pair (#223) moves to per-partition indexes (PostgreSQL cannot carry it on the parent); a bucket spanning a month boundary may record one duplicate — over-recording is acceptable, gaps are not. New daily job read-trail-maintenance (job-count fence 9 -> 10) creates months ahead — each with its dedup index — and applies the trail's own retention readTrail.retentionDays (default 365, deliberately independent of audit.retentionDays): whole expired months are DROPped without scanning, remainders deleted by range, every run audited as read_trail.pruned (catalogue v1.2; the fence regex now admits an underscore namespace). Site-Admin query path GET /admin/system/read-events answers "who read page X" and "what did user Y read" within a period — API-only by design, documented. Growth measured and documented in data-model.md: ~1 MB per 1000 events including indexes. Tests: retention pruning + audited deletion + admin queries on the shared database; the partitioned shape, per-partition P2002 dedup, months-ahead creation and DROP-based pruning against a fresh database built by the real migration chain. Refs #224. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:21:45 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	fd4fd60c99	#223: dedup window for the read trail ... One event per (session, page, channel) within an aligned window of readTrail.dedupWindowMinutes (default 5): buckets are floor(epoch / windowSeconds), and a unique (dedup_key, window_bucket) pair collapses concurrent duplicates race-free at insert time — the first access in a window is always recorded, a later duplicate lands on the unique violation and is skipped quietly (a skipped duplicate is not a gap; only real write failures still abort the read). Each row carries windowSeconds, so the evidence states it represents a window, never a request count. Reconnects within a window stay one event; a new session records again even for the same user; channels never collapse into each other; the page-less attachment key uses the documented `-` placeholder. Load evidence: 30 collab-token renewals inside one window produce exactly one event (test), bounding a live editing session at ~12 events/hour/page. Window semantics documented in ADR 0023, the VS-NfD security documentation (#228) and as a hardening-guide line for the new setting (care rule: same PR). Refs #223. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:13:21 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	05a979bac3	#222: read-access trail for classified pages ... Instrument every full-content read channel for pages with classification = vs_nfd (ADR 0023, variant A): SPA state fetch and read rendering, public JSON content, no-JS shell, expanded embeds, public API GET (incl. the MCP read_page path and write echoes), attachment download under the #212 effective classification, all export shapes (markdown, pond ZIP, account data export, queued docx/odt/pdf at enqueue), and collab-token issuance as the api-side proxy for the WS join. Events land in the new read_events table (no FKs — evidence survives page purges and hard user deletions) with actor, session key (session:/token:/job:/anon), page, pond, channel and the classification at read time. Recording failures are NOT swallowed: a failed write aborts the read (hard failure, the deliberate contrast to AuditService — decision recorded in ADR 0023 and security.md §Logging, together with the recorded residuals: content fragments and feeds). One e2e test per channel proves both the event and its absence for unclassified pages, plus the hard-failure semantics. Refs #222. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8	2026-07-31 12:12:55 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	e505fc74dc	#212: mark attachment downloads by filename prefix and companion file ... Downloads whose effective classification is vs_nfd carry the documented VS-NfD_ filename prefix (single source classificationFilenamePrefix() in shared; ADR 0022 records the short form for file names). Effective classification: the linked page's level; an attachment with unset pageId (paste-then-insert, pond-level) FAILS CLOSED to the highest level of any live page in its pond. The pond export ZIP adds a sibling <file>.classification.txt companion with the full marking for classified media, next to the manifest entry (#210). Documented in operations.md, incl. the deliberate residual risk: the file's own content carries no marking (recorded on #231, not hidden). Tests: prefixed classified download, unchanged open download, fail-closed orphan both ways, ZIP companion + manifest level. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 07:29:16 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	488d0d06f1	#205: classification inherits down the tree; lowering is a guarded, audited act ... New pages take max(instance default, parent level); moving a subtree under a higher-classified parent raises every member below that level. No move-like path (reposition, trash-promote, purge-promote) lowers a level as a side effect — pinned by test. Raising is ordinary editorial work; lowering requires the dedicated capability canLowerClassification (pond-wide Pond Admin) in the central permission model. Both directions are audited (page.classification_raised/_lowered, catalogue v1.1) with old value, new value, actor and page. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 06:12:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	183faf7710	#204: classification as first-class page metadata (ADR 0022) ... Enum field on Page (UNCLASSIFIED default, VS_NFD), migration backfills existing pages. New pages take the instance-wide default from classification.newPageDefault (admin-visible, de+en). The value rides in every PageView, so no channel needs an extra request. The field is a marking, not a protection mechanism: a test pins that permission decisions are unchanged by it. The marking wording is fixed in ADR 0022 and sourced solely from classificationMarking() in @dorfteich/shared. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-31 06:01:50 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	000d110727	#201: stable audit event catalogue for syslog/SIEM export ... The 36 audit action ids become a typed union (AUDIT_EVENTS in audit-actions.ts) — an uncatalogued id is now a compile error; every existing id keeps its name. The published, versioned catalogue (docs/architecture/audit-events.md, v1.0) documents per event: trigger, severity, actor and target semantics, and every field, plus the compatibility promise (ids are never repurposed; retiring keeps the row forever) and the stable stdout field set. audit-catalogue.test.ts is the fence: it parses the document's event tables and fails when ids or severities drift from the code (negative case verified). Audit stdout lines now carry the catalogue severity as a routing hint — pino level stays 30 so transport is unaffected; no DB migration. Forwarding path documented: container stdout -> operator's collector; deliberately no application-side syslog client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:51:09 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	c4c84b33f9	#200: hard instance-wide plugins.enabled kill switch ... plugins.enabled (instance setting, default on — plugins predate the switch; the VS-NfD reference configuration turns it off) makes every plugin surface answer 404 via a shared guard: Site-Admin install/list/mode, pond activation and plugin list, the sandbox frame and asset routes. The dropzone watcher quarantines drops instead of installing. Deliberately NOT guarded: the authenticated fallback-metadata route — it serves no plugin code and existing plugin_block nodes need it to render their declared fallback (an image fallback degrades to the neutral placeholder while off, because its bytes live on the disabled asset surface). The editor offers no plugin blocks because the pond plugin list is one of the 404ing surfaces. Admin settings panel gets the toggle (i18n de+en) with the documented api-restart note (in-process settings cache). Answers "code execution inside the zone?" with one verifiable off-switch instead of per-plugin trust machinery (#232, ADR 0025). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:42:42 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	74970f6073	#199: SHA-256 integrity hashes for attachments ... Every upload stores the SHA-256 of its bytes, computed from the in-memory buffer that is written — never by re-reading disk. Every download re-hashes the stored object BEFORE the first byte leaves (memory bounded by the max_file_bytes quota that gated the upload) and fails closed on mismatch with attachment_integrity_failure; the mismatch lands in the audit trail as file.integrity_failed with both hashes. Detection of payload manipulation is the one integrity duty par. 52 VSA leaves with the application — only it knows what the file should be. Pre-#199 rows are hashed by a bounded, idempotent backfill that rides the existing nightly orphan-file-sweep job (no new scheduler job, job fence untouched); unreadable files are logged and retried, never silently skipped, and null-hash rows are served unverified only until the backfill reaches them. Operator runbook note in security.md (restore from backup, re-download, audit entry carries both hashes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:32:29 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	d3289b2167	#202: SBOM and license report in CI ... The release run now generates CycloneDX 1.6 SBOMs with a pinned anchore/syft container — one per released image (scanned from the freshly built image tar, OS packages included) and one for the pnpm workspace (from the lockfile) — plus the full pnpm licenses report, and attaches everything as build artefacts BEFORE publishing the release, so a red gate stops the release. Runner constraints dictated the mechanics (documented in the workflow): the job talks to the HOST daemon, so files travel into the syft container via docker cp and images via docker save to a tar copied the same way (syft cannot read a tar from stdin — verified). scripts/check-licenses.mjs is the documented license policy: permissive allowlist, MPL-2.0/CC-BY-4.0 with recorded reasoning, per-package exception table (khroma: MIT text shipped, metadata missing). CI runs the gate on every PR (pnpm licenses:check); positive and negative case tested locally, both SBOM paths tested against real images/lockfile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:21:58 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	6a520e27b1	#236: pin the Node version ... .node-version (22.15.1) becomes the single authoritative Node version: CI/CD select Node only via node-version-file, every Dockerfile pins node:22.15.1-alpine, and the engines floor in package.json states the same version (open-ended upwards so a newer local Node keeps working — reproducibility rests on images and CI). An early CI step fails on any drift between those places; update procedure in operations.md (Update strategy). Precondition for the reproducibility claim in #219. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-31 04:14:55 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	9a43a2f6bb	#235: keep page_links rows pointing at purged pages — recorded decision ... The row is only the index of a wikilink whose text (slug = title) remains visible in the linking page's own content either way; deleting the index would remove nothing the system still shows while breaking phantom-link re-resolution. Kept as an accepted residue, reasoning in operations.md (deletion/purge section) and recorded on #231. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 22:18:39 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	69d9072d2c	#234: retention for mail_outbox ... Sent mails were kept forever, and digest bodies name page titles and actors — an unbounded copy of content-adjacent data. A new daily mail-outbox-retention job deletes SENT rows (by sentAt) and permanently FAILED rows (by nextAttemptAt, the last attempt's stamp) once they pass mail.outboxRetentionDays (instance setting, default 30). PENDING rows — including failed-but-retryable ones — stay the retry loop's alone. Decision recorded (security.md §Privacy, residual-risk note for #231): digest mails keep carrying page titles for now — there is no per-page classification marking yet to key a suppression on (ADR 0022 / M32 revisits), and a VS-NfD reference configuration can leave SMTP unconfigured entirely. Job-count fence in system.spec: 8 -> 9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 22:17:28 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	ff505bc752	#233: prune conversion job payloads for every job kind ... The raw input/result bytes of import/export conversion jobs were kept forever; a deleted classified page could live on inside its last export. A new daily conversion-payload-prune job nulls both once a finished (succeeded or failed) job passes conversion.payloadRetentionDays (instance setting, default 30) — the row survives for status/audit. PENDING and RUNNING rows keep their payload, so the worker's stale-lock recovery path is untouched; a hand-requeued pruned job fails finally via conversionInputOf instead of crashing the worker. The input column becomes nullable; the migration backfills by clearing payloads of jobs already finished longer ago than the default period (recent results stay downloadable until they age out). Job-count fence in system.spec: 7 -> 8 (new scheduler registration). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 22:12:32 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	3c62b7b773	#197: security response headers and an explicitly restrictive CORS policy ... Hand-rolled middleware instead of helmet: the header set is small enough to own, every value is a deliberate decision, and the api gains no transitive dependency. HSTS (no includeSubDomains — the api cannot speak for sibling subdomains), nosniff, Referrer-Policy no-referrer, X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN (not DENY: the plugin sandbox frame embeds same-origin and its CSP has no frame-ancestors, so this header governs), and a minimal deny-all Permissions-Policy. CORS grants no foreign origin anything; only the APP_BASE_URL origin is ever echoed (where browsers do not consult CORS anyway), with Vary: Origin on every response. No preflight handling — same-origin requests never preflight, and cross-origin API access is cookie-less by design (PAT/Bearer). Wired via the AppModule MiddlewareConsumer so createTestApp boots the identical middleware. Fences: security-headers.e2e.test.ts (header set, foreign origin gets no ACAO) and a frame assertion in plugins.e2e.db.test.ts (framing stays possible). Rationale table in security.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 17:13:24 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	ed2225bb77	#196: audit-trail retention job ... audit.retentionDays (instance setting, default 365) bounds the audit_log: the daily audit-retention job deletes entries past the period and records the deletion itself (audit.pruned with count, cutoff and period) so a gap in the trail is always explainable. Lives in its own AuditRetentionService because the settings service audits its writes - folding retention into AuditService would close a constructor cycle. The read-access trail (#222-#225) is deliberately not covered; it gets its own period. security.md gains the Logging section the schema has cited for a while; the maintenance-job fence moves 6 -> 7 (the deliberate new row). Refs #196 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 14:59:28 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	960a806ee3	#195: trashed content leaves the search index itself ... Trashing a page (promote and subtree modes) clears the affected search vectors, restoring rebuilds them; pond trash clears every page vector of the pond, pond restore reindexes only the live pages (pages trashed inside stay out); the GDPR pseudonymization's personal-pond trash does the same. reindexAll now converges to the invariant (clears trashed, rebuilds live), and a one-off migration backfills vectors of already-trashed content. The query-side deleted_at guards stay untouched as the independent second layer - the test proves both layers separately, including writing a vector back onto a trashed page (simulating a future path that forgot the clear) and asserting the query still hides it. New provider methods removePond/reindexPond behind the SearchProvider seam. Refs #195 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 14:07:34 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	0bc36aa58c	#194: orphan-file sweep, drop the unused Attachment.deletedAt ... Nightly sweep with two directions: attachments still unclaimed (pageId null) after a 24 h grace period - claimed by no collab persist, page upload, or import - are reclaimed (row, file, quota released); files on the uploads volume without a database row (drift after a crashed upload) are removed once older than the grace period. The grace period protects the paste-then-insert window. Deliberate deviation from the issue's content-reference idea, documented in schema comment and operations.md: claimed attachments whose page content no longer embeds them are NOT auto-deleted. The page attachments panel lists claimed files as user-managed objects (inserting into the document is optional there), so 'not embedded' is not 'unused' - an auto-delete would destroy panel assets. Humans clean those up in the panel or the pond file manager, which flags orphans already. Attachment.deletedAt is removed by migration - deletion is hard everywhere (sweep, purge, manual), there is no soft-delete state; the never-true deletedAt:null filters in files/export queries went with it. Refs #194 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 13:19:58 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	402b22e05f	#193: pond purge — retention job and manual Site-Admin endpoint ... Deletion now actually deletes: a trashed pond past the trash retention (same clock as pages, extended trash-purge job) or purged manually via DELETE /ponds/:id/purge (Site-Admin-only, like pond restore) is removed with everything it holds. Files go first (idempotent rm, resumable on a crash), then one transaction ordered around the FK actions: attachments and labels (Restrict) precede the pond; the page delete cascades versions, comments, content cache incl. the search vector, update log, mentions, label assignments, favorites, outgoing links and open collab sessions; the pond delete cascades grants, usage counters (that is the quota correction), pond-plugin opt-ins and conversion jobs; polymorphic watches and pond quota overrides are deleted explicitly. A purge racing a restore or another purge is a no-op; both paths record a pond.purged audit event. Known residues by design, documented in operations.md: target_slug in other ponds' page links (#235) and backups within their retention. Refs #193 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 12:44:52 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	394d1c811d	#192: deploy-level backup target allowlist ... BACKUP_ALLOWED_TARGETS (comma-separated destination hosts) constrains where backups may go, enforced twice: the api rejects settings writes and connection tests towards non-allowlisted hosts with admin-visible error codes and resolves a non-allowlisted configured target to null, and the sidecar enforces the same policy at the point of egress for the WebDAV upload and the rsync mirror alike (shared policy helpers in packages/shared/src/backup-target-policy.ts). BREAKING: the empty default disables every remote target - backups stay local only, the VS-NfD reference configuration (ADR 0026). Existing deployments with a remote target must list its host or uploads and mirror stop. The admin UI distinguishes unavailable-by-policy from unconfigured (i18n de+en) and shows the permitted hosts. Refs #192 (ADR 0026) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 12:17:14 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	afef45732a	#191: feeds.enabled instance switch, feed-token log masking ... Chosen path: an instance master switch following the api.enabled/ mcp.enabled pattern — while off, both feed routes AND the feed-token management answer 404 (existence hidden). Default ON: feeds predate the switch, existing instances and their subscribed readers keep working; the VS-NfD reference configuration (#227) turns it off. Admin UI gets the toggle next to the API/MCP switches (i18n de+en). Moving the token out of the query string is documented as rejected: a path segment lands in the same proxy and request logs, and feed readers cannot send headers — that is why the credential is in the URL at all. What DID leak was our own request log (pino logs req.url): the req serializer now masks ?token= values (common/mask-token-param.ts), so no code path logs the credential. Refs #191 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 11:34:43 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	db4c5ce9ca	#190: configurable session lifetime with a server-side idle timeout ... SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS (default 168 h) caps a session's total lifetime from login: expiresAt is set once at creation and never extended — the old sliding 30-day renewal is gone. SESSION_IDLE_HOURS (default 72 h) ends sessions unused for that long, enforced server-side against lastSeenAt with a write throttle scaled to the idle bound so short idle windows still renew. Expired rows are removed on validation and the session list applies both bounds, so idle-dead sessions never show as active. The cookie maxAge follows the configured absolute bound. Documented in .env.example (with the VS-NfD reference values for the upcoming hardening guide #227), compose passes the variables through, security.md and ADR 0007 record the amendment. Refs #190 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 11:11:15 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	d32c8c3730	#189: make the CSRF origin check fail closed ... A cookie-carrying mutation without Origin and Referer (or with an unparsable one) is now rejected with 403 csrf_origin_mismatch instead of passing unchecked. The exception for non-browser clients stays structural: PAT/bearer requests carry no session cookie and never reach the check, and a request that does carry the cookie is always checked. The test harness injects the matching Origin (supertest simulates a browser page of this instance) with an explicit suppression header for the negative cases; the Playwright fixture contexts send the header on their manual seeding calls; release-qa.sh pins APP_BASE_URL and sends the matching Origin. Dedicated spec covers: missing headers 403, mismatch 403, unparsable 403, match passes, GETs untouched, PAT mutation without headers passes, cookie+bearer still checked. Refs #189 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 09:34:44 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	3d1f4fda53	#188: purpose-bound token keys via HKDF, jose replaces the homegrown JWT ... COLLAB_TOKEN_SECRET becomes a root key: every purpose derives its own HKDF-SHA-256 subkey (deriveTokenKey), and no code path signs with the root key directly. Collaboration tokens are signed and verified by jose with HS256 as an explicit allowlist; the sign/verify API turns async at its three call sites. Unsubscribe tokens move from a purpose-prefix string to the structural subkey, with a documented dual-verify window (legacy derivation accepted until 2026-11-01, covering the 90-day TTL of links in already-sent mail). The cross-runtime property that justified the homegrown implementation is now proven by a test: the built CJS and ESM dist artefacts round-trip tokens in both directions in child processes (jose v6 reaches CJS via Node's require(esm), pinned Node 22 images). Negative tests cover cross-purpose subkeys, root-key-signed tokens, alg:none and RS256. Refs #188 (ADR 0020) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 06:41:11 +02:00
Claude Opus 5	fd07f716f6	docs: VS-NfD readiness planning (ist-aufnahme, plan, ADRs 0019-0026, issue drafts) ... Add docs/vs-nfd/: the analysis brief, the as-is assessment (42 findings, all verified against the code), the prioritized action plan rev. 2 with issue references written back to every checkbox, the two-stage issue/ADR brief, and the full reviewed draft used to create the forge state. Add eight proposed ADRs 0019-0026 covering the VS-NfD architecture decisions: no security base functions (par. 52 VSA anchor), HKDF token key separation, external authentication, page classification, read-access audit trail (variant A), reproducible offline deployment, plugin trust model, and backup target restriction. Forge state created alongside this commit: 11 labels, milestones M24-M31, issues #188-#236 (docs-only change, no code touched). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ	2026-07-30 01:48:05 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	b5d2a436e0	#186: pond accent theming — scoped derivation, cascade pond > user > default ... pondSettingsSchema gains theme = { accent: '#rrggbb' | null } (null = inherit the viewer's theme), exposed as a top-level key of the flat updatePondInputSchema and included in the PondsService settings merge (the known silent-no-op pitfall). The server validates only the hex; conformance arises at render time: PondThemeScope (mounted around the page content next to PondFontScope) derives the accent pair for the EFFECTIVE mode via useEffectiveTheme and sets it as inline custom properties — inline beats both tokens.css and the user-theme <style>, which IS the cascade precedence pond > user > default. Pond settings get a PondThemeSection (inherit | presets | custom color with per-mode preview swatches, explicit save like the font manager); AccentSwatches extracted for reuse; i18n de+en. The no-JS public shell stays deliberately un-themed (ADR 0018 amendment). Tests: pond DB test (theme merge keeps fonts, invalid hex 400), e2e pond-theme.spec (scope boundary content vs. chrome, per-mode re-derivation, axe on the pond settings page; resets the fixture pond). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRtCnB3uLdQtFmvp9HXcRX	2026-07-29 09:09:36 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	83a2fe470e	#184: user accent theming — presets and free color as one mechanism ... apply-theme.ts derives BOTH modes' accent tokens from the stored choice (ui.theme.accent: preset id or {custom:'#hex'}) and writes them as <style id="user-theme"> with :root:root + :root:root[data-theme='dark'] blocks — the doubled :root beats tokens.css regardless of document order, since theme-init.js injects the ui.theme.css cache during <head> parsing, before the bundle styles. The default preset means NO override (hand-tuned tokens.css values stay). main.tsx re-derives from the choice at startup, healing stale caches after app updates. Settings: accent radiogroup inside the Appearance section (visible names, color never the only cue) with per-mode preview swatches on each mode's canonical background, plus a custom color input; i18n de+en. The second fieldset made bare .settings-fieldset locators ambiguous — theme specs now scope via input[name] (fence stays). Tests: apply-theme unit pack, BASE_PALETTE<->tokens.css drift fence in theme-contrast.test.ts, e2e theme-accent.spec (instant apply, pre-paint persistence, default removes override, axe smoke with garish yellow in both modes). ADR 0018 amendment documents the stage-B details. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRtCnB3uLdQtFmvp9HXcRX	2026-07-29 08:59:27 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	4e0ad82220	#180: dark-mode test fence, both-scheme a11y pack, theme e2e, ADR 0018 ... theme-contrast.test.ts parses tokens.css and asserts every real UI colour pairing (4.5:1 text, 3:1 UI) for BOTH palettes, so palette drift fails unit tests instead of review. theme.test.ts covers resolve/apply logic (Node >= 22 ships a shadowing undefined localStorage global — the test brings its own in-memory storage). The a11y pack now runs its four scans in light AND dark via emulateMedia; the new theme pack exercises the three-way switch end to end (instant apply, reload persistence, live OS follow in system mode, override beats OS). ADR 0018 records the theming model broadly: modes now, accent themes by derivation later. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRtCnB3uLdQtFmvp9HXcRX	2026-07-28 20:46:25 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	858909564e	docs: ADR 0017 — Barrierefreiheit als Standard-Anforderung ... Jede künftige UI-Änderung entwickelt Barrierefreiheit direkt mit (Stefans Vorgabe nach Abschluss des WCAG-2.1-AA-Audits): verbindliche Checkliste als ADR, Kurzfassung in CLAUDE.md für jede Dev-Session, Eintrag im ADR-Index. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AGM8jo3hwoV9wsCVGfy8iq	2026-07-21 17:17:26 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	a879561ec7	#155: ChordPro-Plugin — Akkordblätter/Leadsheets als Block ... Neues Referenz-Plugin packages/plugins/chordpro nach dem mermaid-Muster: bewusst ohne Fremdbibliothek (Supply-Chain-Lehre aus #136) — eigener minimaler ChordPro-Parser (Direktiven title/subtitle/ artist/key/capo/tempo/comment, Chorus-Fences, [Akkord]-Marker, #-Kommentare) plus SVG-Formatter mit Monospace-Raster: Akkorde über dem Text, Titelkopf, Chorus-Einrückung, XML-escaped. Persistenz {source, svg} — der Snapshot bedient Lesemodus, Public-Ansicht und Exporte über den PluginFallbackRenderer. Edit-Modus: Textarea + debounced Live-Preview. ZIP 20 KB (Limits 64/256 MiB), 4 Parser-/Formatter-Tests, i18n de+en, Doku-Listen (site-admin en+de, plugin-architecture) ergänzt. Prod-Installation wie üblich per Site-Admin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0155v2aT8AG1kZDQEZiCLBWC	2026-07-20 02:11:36 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	2fe9374f16	Doku: Excalidraw als sechstes Standard-Plugin ergänzt ... - Tutorial K19: neue Sektion „Excalidraw — Skizzen wie von Hand" mit Nadias Bühnenplan-Beispiel (konzerte-live); Intro fünf→sechs Plugins. - Tutorial K18: fünf→sechs Standard-Plugins. - Site-Admin-Guide (en+de): Referenzliste + Build-Namensliste + Build-Hinweis (~16-MiB-ZIP aus npm). - plugin-architecture.md: Referenz-Eintrag excalidraw (npm-Library- Spielart des Bundled-App-Pfads, {scene, svg}). - developer/extending (en+de): Excalidraw als zweite Bundled-App-Variante. Holt die in #136 zugesagten Doku-Ergänzungen nach. Screenshot für K19 folgt nach dem CSP-Deploy (damit die Handschrift korrekt rendert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0155v2aT8AG1kZDQEZiCLBWC	2026-07-19 22:27:17 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	ef973c90d6	Add M13 to the roadmap ... Create-from-link on the not-found screen and the Obsidian vault import (#115-#119), planned and filed today. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-14 16:37:24 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	340f23fc51	Re-align the stage tables after the path change ... Prettier keeps the markdown table columns padded; the /srv/DOCKER replace left them one character short. (Lesson re-learned: the lint gate runs before every push, even for doc-only commits.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-14 12:53:11 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	69e7b1406b	Move the stage directories to /srv/DOCKER (host consolidation) ... ONE consolidated every Docker stack under /srv/DOCKER (BASEL convention, tracked in stwaidele/infrastructure-one); the three Dorfteich stages follow. Deploy targets in cd.yml (test/int) and prod-deploy.yml plus the docs now point at /srv/DOCKER/dorfteich-<stage>. Data lives in named volumes keyed by the unchanged compose project name, so the directory move carries no data migration. The go-live checklist's uptime-kuma path already lives under /srv/DOCKER — the doc just catches up. Deliberately committed together with the host-side move: this commit must not deploy before the directories exist at the new path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-14 12:43:29 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	a33b37f1a4	Add M10–M12 to the roadmap ... M10 (UI polish) and M11 (public API & MCP) existed as Gitea milestones but were missing here; M12 (page hierarchy & knowledge graph, #106–#114) is newly planned. The backlog heading no longer claims to sit after M9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-14 09:34:36 +02:00
Claude Fable 5	97f94f247b	draw.io reference plugin: fullscreen editing, inline SVG rendering ... A new block plugin bundling the OFFICIAL draw.io editor — nothing ever loads from diagrams.net; the sandbox CSP pins every request to the plugin's own version-pinned asset path (zero-external-network verified live via a request-capture run). Plugin (packages/plugins/drawio): - block data { xml, svg }: xml is the draw.io source (document of record), svg the rendered snapshot as raw markup — render mode, office/PDF exports (the existing fallback renderer already inlines data.svg) and the public view all show the diagram without running diagram code - edit mode: snapshot + "edit in fullscreen" (an empty block opens the editor immediately); the bundled editor runs in a child iframe of the plugin's own assets and speaks draw.io's JSON embed protocol — Save & Exit exports xmlsvg, persists { xml, svg } via blockData, and drops back to the inline size - build.mjs fetches the pinned release (v30.3.6) into a gitignored vendor/ cache (fonts-build pattern; skipped in CI — plugin.js still bundles, the installable ZIP needs a dev machine) and packs a trimmed webapp subset: no dev sources, no embed.diagrams.net integrations bundle, no standalone viewers, no MathJax/templates/PWA — 27 MiB ZIP, 85 MiB unpacked, de+en editor languages Host/SDK extensions (generic, not drawio-specific): - new ui.enterFullscreen()/exitFullscreen(): the surface's frame becomes a viewport-covering overlay — same sandboxed iframe, only geometry changes; destroy removes the frame, so a vanished plugin can never leave the app covered - sandbox CSP: connect-src/frame-src now allow the plugin's OWN asset path (was 'none') — bundled apps lazy-load their resources and run in a child frame, but the api and external hosts stay unreachable; HTML assets are served with the same CSP so a packaged page cannot widen the rules, and child frames inherit the sandbox attribute - plugin size limits raised (ZIP 5→64 MiB, unpacked 20→256 MiB) for bundled-app plugins; content types for xml/txt/ico assets Verified end to end against a local stack (9/9): install via dropzone (85 MiB validation), block insert, fullscreen entry, bundled editor boots inside the double sandbox (German UI), shape drawn, Save & Exit persists, snapshot renders inline, survives reload, zero off-origin requests throughout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1	2026-07-12 14:15:30 +02:00