13f0311d8e
8 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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| 13f0311d8e |
#216: hard AUTH_LOCAL_ENABLED switch over every local credential flow
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The deploy-level realization of auth.local.enabled (ADR 0021): FALSE answers 404 on every local credential flow — login, signup, e-mail verification, resend, password forgot/reset/change — enforced centrally in the auth guard via the @LocalCredentialFlow() marker before any session or CSRF logic runs. Deploy-level on purpose: a compromised Site Admin cannot reopen the local path, so the runtime-flip residual risk from ADR 0021 does not materialize (R-02 closed in the risk list). An enumeration fence fails when an auth route is neither marked nor on the reviewed allowlist, so a new credential flow cannot ship unswitched. Stated decisions, each tested: sessions/logout keep working for externally authenticated users; PAT and feed-token issuance stays available (API authorization under its own switches, not interactive sign-in). Bootstrap: complete setup (or SETUP_ADMIN_* pre-seed) before flipping; the api warns at boot when local auth is off with neither OIDC nor proxy auth configured. GET /auth/methods reports local:false and the login page hides the local form and credential links. Hardening guide: the planned auth.local.enabled row moves from 1.3 into the live deploy table with the bootstrap ordering, and the verification checklist gains the login-404 probe. Refs #216. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8 |
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| 4c7f001cab |
#215: trusted reverse-proxy header / mTLS client-certificate path
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For perimeters that authenticate before the application (ADR 0021 §4). Off unless BOTH AUTH_PROXY_HEADER and AUTH_PROXY_TRUSTED_PEERS are set — nothing about the header is guessed. The peer check runs against the TCP peer address only (a forwarded header is attacker-influenced): a request carrying the header from any other peer is rejected outright and audited as auth.proxy_rejected (catalogue v1.4) — that is a spoof attempt, not a misconfiguration — even when a valid session cookie rides along. From a trusted peer the header IS the identity; a session cookie never escalates beyond it; with the feature off the header is inert. Mapping is explicit (AUTH_PROXY_MAP: username or e-mail); deliberately no just-in-time creation — the header carries no verified address. The mTLS variant (AUTH_PROXY_MODE=mtls-dn) maps the configured attribute (default CN) out of the certificate subject DN the TLS terminator forwards, under the same peer rules. Session-less proxy requests key the read trail per user (user:<id>). The trust boundary is stated in security.md (the section an assessor reads closest), the VS-NfD security documentation and the hardening guide's deploy table. Tests cover all four decisions: off = inert, trusted peer authenticates (username and DN mapping), untrusted peer rejected + audited, no escalation past a session cookie. Refs #215. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AUtYMxwTCMHG9mVHnwbFg8 |
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| db4c5ce9ca |
#190: configurable session lifetime with a server-side idle timeout
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SESSION_ABSOLUTE_HOURS (default 168 h) caps a session's total lifetime from login: expiresAt is set once at creation and never extended — the old sliding 30-day renewal is gone. SESSION_IDLE_HOURS (default 72 h) ends sessions unused for that long, enforced server-side against lastSeenAt with a write throttle scaled to the idle bound so short idle windows still renew. Expired rows are removed on validation and the session list applies both bounds, so idle-dead sessions never show as active. The cookie maxAge follows the configured absolute bound. Documented in .env.example (with the VS-NfD reference values for the upcoming hardening guide #227), compose passes the variables through, security.md and ADR 0007 record the amendment. Refs #190 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| d32c8c3730 |
#189: make the CSRF origin check fail closed
A cookie-carrying mutation without Origin and Referer (or with an unparsable one) is now rejected with 403 csrf_origin_mismatch instead of passing unchecked. The exception for non-browser clients stays structural: PAT/bearer requests carry no session cookie and never reach the check, and a request that does carry the cookie is always checked. The test harness injects the matching Origin (supertest simulates a browser page of this instance) with an explicit suppression header for the negative cases; the Playwright fixture contexts send the header on their manual seeding calls; release-qa.sh pins APP_BASE_URL and sends the matching Origin. Dedicated spec covers: missing headers 403, mismatch 403, unparsable 403, match passes, GETs untouched, PAT mutation without headers passes, cookie+bearer still checked. Refs #189 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0168Ph5uBmHm8X28CSVpbpnJ |
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| 9674c0bae2 |
Batch notifications into localized e-mail digests with unsubscribe (#95)
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New per-user digestFrequency (hourly default | daily | off) on the profile and in the settings UI. A scheduler job (15 min cadence) mails a user once their oldest unread, unmailed notification exceeds the cadence window: one localized mail per batch, grouped per pond then per page with actor names and change/comment counts, enqueued through the mail outbox. Sending marks the batch mailed — never read — and re-checks page read permission per entry at send time; entries the user can no longer read are dropped from the mail but still marked handled, so revoked content cannot queue forever. Every mail carries a signed, single-purpose unsubscribe link: it only flips the setting to off, renders a session-free confirmation page, and sets no cookie. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| f4f27cbe78 |
Add watches: follow pages and ponds with auto-watch preferences (#93)
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New watches table (polymorphic target, unique per user+target; page purge
removes its rows via the trash service, and the list endpoint drops
targets the user can no longer read). Endpoints: idempotent PUT/DELETE
/watches/{page|pond}/:id gated by read access (404 hides the target),
GET state for the header toggles, and GET /users/me/watches resolving
names and links. Auto-watch hooks: creating a page and commenting
subscribe the actor, each behind a new user preference
(autoWatchOwnPages / autoWatchOnComment, default on) editable via the
profile PATCH and surfaced as checkboxes in the settings. UI: watch
toggle on the page header and the pond settings header, watch list with
unwatch in the account settings; new watches i18n namespace (de+en).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1
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| f0a82bad20 |
Add the first-run setup wizard API with env-backed secret store (#80)
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When the api runs against a database without the setup.completedAt marker, a global SetupGuard answers every non-exempt route with 503 setup_required; only /setup/*, health probes, and the session routes stay reachable. The wizard steps (POST /setup/admin|instance|smtp| registration|complete) write straight to their production homes; the Site Admin step signs its creator in, later steps require that session. Completing sets the marker and locks every step permanently (410, also across restarts, and not reopenable via PATCH /admin/settings). SMTP entered in the wizard is verified with a live delivery test first (failure blocks the step with the transport error as detail) and then persisted to the new env-backed secret store: a mode-600 dotenv file on the new `secrets` volume (SECRETS_FILE). Explicit container env always wins over the store; empty compose-passed strings count as unset. The mail transport now resolves lazily through SmtpConfigService so wizard changes apply without a restart. SETUP_ADMIN_* env pre-seeds the whole wizard at boot for automated deploys; a backfill migration marks instances that already have a Site Admin as completed, and seed/vitest global-setup do the same for fixture databases. The setup e2e suite provisions its own fresh database (CREATE DATABASE + migrate deploy) per run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EwZ4jR4KFAPvpjWevfUGX1 |
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| bed9fc9307 |
Add authentication: signup, verification, sessions, password reset
AuthModule implements the M1 core as one coherent unit: Signup (#13): POST signup/verify-email/resend-verification with shared Zod validation (field-level error details), double opt-in via hashed single-use tokens (24h, superseding reissue), registration_mode enforcement, and per-IP rate limits. Sessions (#14): opaque 32-byte cookie tokens stored as SHA-256 row ids, sliding 30-day expiry (refresh at most hourly), global AuthGuard with @Public() opt-out attaching the user to every request, CSRF origin check on mutating requests, per-account login backoff (5/15min, reset on success), generic 401 for wrong-vs-unknown credentials, logout with immediate invalidation, GET /auth/me. Reset (#15): forgot-password without account enumeration, one-hour single-use tokens, reset destroys all existing sessions. A 14-case supertest e2e suite drives every flow against the test database, reading verification/reset links from the mail outbox. Closes #13 Closes #14 Closes #15 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |